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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the following pages, I would like to present my doctoral thesis giving an overview 
of the treated issues. 
In  Chapter  1,  I  have  tried  to  contextualize  the  present  project  within  the  area  of 
cognitive science. Specifically, the perspective of the present project can be inscribed 
within that endorsed by that area of cognitive science that in the last years moved from a 
focus  on  individual  mind  and  on  individual  cognitive  processes  toward  the  need  to 
consider the human ability to act in social contexts. Several findings supporting this view 
have been presented with the special aim of showing how researchers have noticed the 
need to retrieve the importance of the brain, body, and environment. Thus, an important 
change is taking place in the so-called “Social Cognition” framework, from a focus on the 
individual  mind  toward embodied  and  participatory  aspects  of  social  understanding.  I 
have explored the origin and the recent development of a new interdisciplinary attempt, 
which combines approaches from various disciplines and integrates data from different 
levels of analysis: the social cognitive (neuro)science. 
A relevant point for social cognitive (neuro)science, and for my thesis, is the notion 
of  close  perception-action  link,  as  suggested  by  ideomotor  theories.  The  idea  that 
perception and action are tightly interwoven has received a growing attention also due to 
converging  neurophysiological  evidence  on  the  so-called  mirror  or  shared-circuit 
mechanism,  which  could  provide  the  first  unifying  perspective  of  the  neural  basis  of 
social  cognition  and  of  simulation  mechanisms,  linking  first-  and  third-person 
experiences. In fact throughout the chapter it has been explained that the understanding of 
basic  aspects  of  social  cognition  depends  on  activation  of  neural  structures  normally 
involved  in  our  own  personally  experienced  actions  or  emotions.  By  means  of  this   10 
activation,  a  bridge  is  created  between  the  others  and  ourselves.  With  the  sensory 
description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the state associated 
with these actions or emotions are evoked in the observers, “as if” they were performing a 
similar action or experiencing a similar emotion. Some relevant issues of social cognition 
have  been  then  introduced,  such  as  imitating  action,  joint  action,  motor  resonance, 
emotional contagion, empathy, and theory of mind. 
Among these topics, the aim of the present project was to shed more light on motor 
resonance and joint action, themes that have been detailed and discussed in the first and in 
the second part of the thesis, respectively. Each part has been organized so that each issue 
has been first treated both at a theoretical and empirical level, and then experimentally 
investigated in a series of experiments, by using two well-known effects of cognitive 
psychology: “Affordance” and “Simon”. 
In the first part of this project, the Affordance effect has been considered.  
In particular, in Chapter 2 the notion of affordance was discussed starting from the 
original theorization of Gibson who defined affordances as properties in the environment 
that are relevant for an organism’s goals and that provide the observer with practical 
opportunities which he/she is able to perceive and use. To clarify what type of properties 
affordances are, some post-Gibson theorizations were presented ranging from the position 
of those who stated that affordances are dispositional properties of the environment that 
must be integrated with some dispositional properties of individuals, to other that posited 
that they are relations between the features of a situation and the abilities of an individual. 
Particular attention has received the notion of “Micro-affordance” proposed by Ellis and 
Tucker  to  refer  to  the  potential  elements  of  an  action.  Micro-affordances  have  been 
defined as brain representations of action possibilities, namely as the result in the brain of 
the connection between visual responses and action-related responses and of previously 
stored perception-action experiences. Moreover, micro-affordances were intended as the   11 
relations between features of situations and individual abilities, and such relational nature 
was  confirmed  by  several  empirical  findings  obtained  with  behavioral, 
neurophysiological, and neuroimaging techniques. Such studies, of which I provided a 
brief overview, revealed that canonical neurons seem to have the role of representing 
objects as potential action patterns, thus representing the neural basis of affordances, and 
that objects observation can activate a motor simulation and overt movements. Then, an 
original research has been presented in order to illustrate how it is possible to empirically 
investigate  the  notion  of  affordance  using  a  methodology  of  cognitive  psychology. 
Specifically,  the  work  explored  whether  information  on  object  consistence  is 
automatically activated in adults by measuring the participants’ response times across 
different categorization tasks and different response modalities. A final section has been 
dedicated to the first topic of social cognition investigated in the present work, namely the 
motor  resonance.  Some  findings  have  been  presented  to  demonstrate  how  our  brain 
“resonates” when we see others performing actions, and to point out that this resonance 
mechanism is modulated by the similarity between the actions we observe and the actions 
we are able to perform and is tuned to one’s own motor capabilities. This theoretical and 
empirical overview allows us to understand how it can be possible to use the affordance 
effect to investigate the issue of motor resonance. 
In Chapter 3 a first study with a twofold aim was presented. First, I investigated 
motor  responses  to  objects  and  sensitivity  to  fine  object  characteristics  (i.e.,  object 
typology and object category) and I verified how such responses develop. Specifically, I 
explored both in adults and school-age children the influence of a micro-affordance that 
can  be  defined  dangerousness,  namely  the  ability  to  differently  perceive  and  process 
objects that can be potentially source of danger or pain for us (dangerous object) and 
objects that we can approach and interact without any risk (neutral object). Moreover, the 
capacity  to  discriminate  between  artefacts  and  natural  objects  was  also  investigated.   12 
Second, I explored how motor resonance develops. Indeed, this issue concerns whether 
both children and adults are sensitive to the affordances and the potential dangers offered 
by the objects in the environment to others, so I measured if a general motor resonance 
phenomenon  occurred  or  if  this  motor  resonance  effect  was  sensitive  to  fine-grained 
aspects. In fact, the study focused on the resonant mechanisms elicited when observing 
somebody actively preparing an action toward an object. I explored these issues with a 
priming paradigm, when the interaction between the hand and the object is not direct but 
potential, investigating at a functional level the mechanisms occurring during observation 
of a prime, given by a hand or by a control object, followed by objects that might be 
dangerous or provoke pain. Interestingly, the choice of a priming paradigm allowed to 
investigate the timing of two possibly involved mechanisms: one possibly related to the 
activation of the mirror neuron system, triggered by the observation of the prime-hand, 
and the other to the canonical neuron system, triggered by the presence of the object. 
In the second part of the thesis I focused on the Simon effect. 
In particular, in Chapter 4 I started with the presentation of the “stimulus–response 
(S–R) compatibility effect”, used to investigate the link between systems for perception 
and action, and considered as a function of the relative locations of stimulus and response, 
to  introduce  the  “Simon  effect”.  This  phenomenon,  described  for  the  first  time  in  a 
seminal work of Simon and Rudell, refers to the finding that responses are faster and 
more accurate when correct response and stimulus location correspond than when they do 
not,  even  when  stimulus  location  is  an  irrelevant  feature  to  the  task.  Contemporary 
accounts widely assume that the Simon effect is due to a conflict, emerging at the stage of 
response selection. Particular attention has been dedicated to most recent studies on the 
so-called “social or joint Simon effect”, namely to the finding that a similar Simon effect 
emerged even when the Simon task was shared between two participants. This evidence 
shows that each participant represented the stimulus-response rules and the action plans   13 
of both involved individuals and integrated this representation in his/her action planning. 
Such evidence is interpreted as an automatic emergence of shared representation. Starting 
from the work of Sebanz and colleagues, such joint effect has been used as a tool to 
investigate a relevant topic of social cognition, the joint action, and different cognitive 
processes  related  to  it,  such  as  perception,  attention,  action  planning,  and  cognitive 
control. From the early data, many questions are been raised, concerning for example the 
cognitive  and  neural  mechanisms  underlying  shared  task  representations  and,  more 
relevant  to  the  present  work,  the  social  modulations,  namely  the  influence  of  social 
variables  on  the  creation  of  shared  representations.  In  a  final  section  the  reviewed 
empirical findings has been discussed in a wider theoretical perspective on joint action. 
Focusing  on  a  psychological  approach,  the  mechanisms  and  a  “minimal  architecture” 
model that support joint action have been presented, as well as a classification of such 
actions giving a particular relevance to shared task representation process. 
In Chapter 5, the second study started from some findings, reviewed in the previous 
chapter,  which  indicate  the  possible  influence  of  social  factors  on  the  processes 
underlying joint actions and shared representation. Indeed, the second study of the thesis 
was aimed at investigating whether shared representations, as indexed by the presence of 
the joint Simon effect, are modulated by group membership. Specifically, considering 
some evidence and paradigms of social psychology, I explored the influence of two social 
variables  on  the  emergence  of  shared  representations.  First,  I  investigated  the  role  of 
minimal ingroup–outgroup distinctions: I manipulated minimal cues, dividing arbitrarily 
participants in two groups, and I measured their performance when a Simon task was 
executed  with  an  individual  who  was  supposed  to  belong  to  the  same  group  or  to  a 
different  group.  Second,  I  manipulated  a  more  complex  ingroup–outgroup  distinction, 
namely  the  role  of  experienced  interdependence  between  participants,  manipulating 
whether the goals of two jointly acting individuals were positively related and thus they   14 
had to cooperate during the joint Simon task, or whether they were negatively related and 
thus they had to compete during the task. 
The study presented in Chapter 6 was closely related to the investigation presented in 
the previous chapter, as it was aimed to extend knowledge on the cognitive mechanisms 
at  the  basis  of  shared  representations.  Indeed,  I  further  assessed  whether  shared 
representations are influenced by group membership, in particular by the interdependence 
experienced  by  two  individuals.  Specifically,  considering  some  findings  of  social 
psychology and combining two paradigms of cognitive psychology, the joint Simon and 
the joint transfer-of-learning, I explored to what extent prior experience could modulate 
performance  in  task  sharing.  First  I  assessed  whether  performing  a  competitive  or  a 
cooperative practice task with another participant shaped the way a subsequent task was 
executed, comparing the participants’ performance before and after the introduction of a 
condition of interdependence, and second I measured the duration of this potential effect. 
Finally, a general discussion of the three studies has been presented to summarize the 
results obtained in the experiments conducted, emphasizing their original contribution and 
their importance within the Social Cognition research.   15 
CHAPTER I 
SOCIAL COGNITION 
 
 
1.1 Cognitive Science: from an individualistic to a social perspective 
Traditional cognitive science is born and grown by focusing on individual cognitive 
processes and taking into account the so-called “computer metaphor”. The underlying 
idea of the computational metaphor is that of a “mind-software”, namely the mind seems 
to be governed by programs or sets of rules analogous to those which govern computers 
and it could be understood without taking into account the brain, the body as a whole, and 
the  environment  (Neisser,  1976).  In  fact,  “the  task  of  ...  trying  to  understand  human 
cognition  is  analogous  to  that  of  …  trying  to  understand  how  a  computer  has  been 
programmed” (Neisser, 1967, p. 6). This analogy is chosen because a computer program 
is  a  “recipe  for  selecting,  storing,  recovering,  combining,  outputting  and  generally 
manipulating  information”  (Neisser,  1967,  p.  8).  As  the  computer  operates 
computationally,  so  it  seems  does  the  human    mind.  According  to  this  perspective, 
psychology can be considered “the study of the various computational processes whereby 
mental representations are constructed, organised, interpreted and transformed” (Boden, 
1988, p. 5). 
I will not get into this discussion, since the point that I would to emphasize is that in 
the current cognitive science emerges the need to retrieve the importance of the brain, 
body, and environment, in order to study more fully the mind and the cognitive processes. 
Indeed, researchers have noticed the need to consider the human ability to act in social 
contexts, where each other’s actions and their consequences on the environment need to 
be taken into account. Just think about the crucial importance of the ability to correctly   16 
interpret social signals to predict future actions, and to coordinate one’s actions with those 
of others in order to survive. As will be more  fully  explained later, one key process 
supporting this ability is the formation of shared representations both of what we and the 
others perceive, and of actions and tasks. This allows individuals to anticipate others’ 
actions  rather  then  simply  responding  to  them  and  to  flexibly  interact  in  a  changing 
environment. 
In cognitive science, a general framework has been adopted to investigate perception, 
action, and cognition in social contexts. This framework favours a view, the so-called 
embodied cognition view, that incorporates motor aspects in perception, and emphasized 
the  continuity  and  the  exchanges  between  perception  and  action.  Several  researches 
underlines the close link between the so-called “low-level” or sensorimotor processes and 
the so-called “high-level” or cognitive processes. According to this perspective, cognition 
is embodied and grounded, namely cognition is influenced by our previous experiences, 
and it is related and constrained to specific physical characteristics of our body and of our 
sensorimotor system. This perspective is at odds with classical cognitivist view, which 
claims  that  mind  is  a  tool  for  manipulating  arbitrary  symbols  (e.g.,  Glenberg,  1997; 
Barsalou, 1999; for a review, see Barsalou, 2008). 
Even if for a while perception and action have been extensively studied by assuming 
that they can be completely investigated by focusing on single individuals, in the last 
years in several researches areas, ranging from cognitive neuroscience to experimental 
and developmental psychology, and to philosophy, seems to emerge the need to adopt a 
new social perspective on perceptual, motor, and cognitive activities. Indeed, recently 
several works have been dedicated to explore both the neural and cognitive processes 
underlying basic social phenomena. Only to give some examples, have been considered 
phenomena such as joint attention (Campbell, 2002; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003; Eilan, 
2005;  Heal,  2005)  and  joint  action  (Knoblich  &  Jordan,  2002,  2003;  Tomasello,   17 
Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Carpenter, 2009). More precisely, researchers have 
begun to investigate how low-level sensorimotor mechanisms of sharing attention and 
action are useful for joint attention and action, and how they influence the ability to act 
jointly, with the contribution of higher-level processes such as memory and mind-reading 
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006a; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). 
Unlike other animal species, human beings use language and abstract thinking, make 
calculations, and are able to develop tools. Larger brains enable humans to perform all 
kinds of cognitive operations (i.e., memory, learning, and perceptual processing) more 
efficiently than other species. However, the emergence of these capabilities cannot be 
understood without considering the demands of social interaction (e.g., Tomasello et al., 
2005; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). In particular, humans 
appear  to  have  a  special  motivation  to  share  mental  states  and  are  able  to  flexibly 
coordinate their actions to reach common goals. The so strong human capability to cope 
with an unstructured world is also due to the ability to represent the actions and intentions 
of self and the others. For these reasons, the ability to form shared representations is a key 
factor for flexibly cope with a changing environment and, consequently, the cognitive 
mechanisms supporting the formation of shared representations is an increasingly relevant 
issue in psychology and neuroscience. This example clearly demonstrates that the interest 
for  the  social  aspects  has  spread  even  to  the  “hard  ”cognitive  processes,  traditionally 
considered as impermeable to the social aspects, such as attention. Indeed, in this field 
there is an increasing interest for the cognitive mechanisms involved in the creation of 
shared representations. This topic will be resumed below (see section 1.5.2), will be more 
thoroughly detailed in Chapter 4, and will be the focus of two experimental studies that I 
have conducted (Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
   18 
1.2 Social Cognition: toward a definition 
In the last few years the social dimension has obtained an increasing importance in 
most  disciplines  that  fall  under  the  label  of  “cognitive  science”  and  “cognitive 
neuroscience”. Only recently researchers have begun to explore the biological basis of our 
social abilities and their evolution (Adolphs, 1999; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). For 
more than a century, social psychologists have investigated social behaviour, but their 
researches were conducted in isolation from the rest of neurobiology. Instead, the recent 
link between social psychology and neurobiology derives from studies about the “social 
brain” (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998; Frith & Frith, 2010). This social brain, for humans 
at least, has a “theory of mind”, which has a fundamental role in predicting others’ actions 
on the basis of their desires and beliefs, and it also has a “mirror system”, involved both 
in understanding others’ goals and intentions, and in empathizing with their emotions by 
means of a motor resonance mechanism. The importance of human sociality is reflected 
in the so-called “social brain hypothesis”. According to this theory, there are two reasons 
why  primates  have  their  large  brains:    the  first  function  is  to  process  information  of 
ecological relevance, but above all large brains must to be able to cope the demands 
associated with living in large and complex social groups, a feature which distinguishes 
primates from most other animal species (Dunbar, 1992, 1995). Thus, an important shift 
is taking place in the so-called “social cognition” research, from a focus on the individual 
mind toward participatory aspects of social understanding. 
The general term “social cognition” is used to describe cognition involving others, for 
example understanding others’ emotions, intentions, and actions, and acting towards and 
with  them  in  social  contexts  (De  Jaegher,  Di  Paolo,  &  Gallagher,  2010).  As  well  as 
understanding others, social cognition involves understanding with others (De Jaegher & 
Di  Paolo,  2007;  Gallagher,  2009).  Following  embodied  approaches,  social  cognition   19 
involves the know-how that allows us to sustain interactions, form relations, understand 
each other, and act together (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Clark, 1997). 
A recent definition of social cognition is as follows: “Social cognition explains the 
mechanisms of social behavior using concepts and methods shared with related fields of 
cognitive  psychology  and  cognitive  science  as  well  as  new  fields  such  as  cognitive, 
social, and affective neuroscience.” (Winkielman & Schooler, 2008, p. 49). 
The study of social cognition includes questions as the following: How do we explain 
our own and others’ behavior? What are the theories which underlie these explanations? 
How do we develop and maintain our self-concepts of the kind of people we are? What 
role  do  our  self-concepts  play  in  guiding  our  interpretations  of  the  world  and  other 
people? How do we make judgements about the characteristics of ourselves and other 
people?  How  do  we  figure  out  what  other  people  are  thinking  and  feeling?  What 
information do we use and how do we use it? What role do cognitive processes play in 
social  interaction?  How  do  our  impressions  of  others  guide  our  behavior  in  social 
interaction? 
These questions are addressed through the investigation of topics such us how we 
understand other people’s minds (theory of mind), feelings (empathy), and actions (action 
observation and “mirror neuron systems”); moreover, studies on social cognition focused 
on topics concerning the self, the process of stereotyping and our capacity for emotion 
regulation. Same of these issues, relevant for the present work, will be discussed further 
below (see section 1.5). 
Although the first articles and books referring to the “social brain” were published in 
the early 1990s (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, 
& Rizzolatti, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; 
Brothers, 1997; Frith & Frith, 1999), social cognitive (neuro)science is characterized as a 
broaden movement and as a new interdisciplinary attempt, combining approaches from   20 
various  disciplines  including  developmental,  clinical,  comparative,  and  social 
psychology,  cognitive  neurosciences  and  (neuro)economics,  biology,  evolutionary 
anthropology,  and  philosophy,  only  around  the  turn  of  the  century  (for  a  review,  see 
Singer, 2012). 
Social  cognitive  neuroscience  is  aimed  to  understand  phenomena  as  results  of 
interactions between three levels of analysis: the social level, related to the motivational 
and social factors that influence behavior and experience; the cognitive level, related to 
the information-processing mechanisms that cause social-level phenomena; and the neural 
level, related to the brain mechanisms that underlie cognitive-level processes. Whereas 
the traditional social and cognitive psychological researches make reference only to the 
first two levels of analysis, the social cognitive neuroscience approach implies conducting 
studies and consequently constructing theories that make reference to all three levels of 
analysis  (Ochsner  &  Lieberman,  2001).  Thus,  the  label  social  cognitive  neuroscience 
indicates both the interdisciplinary nature of the field and its emphasis on integrating data 
derived from multiple levels of analysis. 
It  may  be  interesting  trying  to  see  in  more  detail  how  traditional  cognitive 
(neuro)scientists and social psychologists worked and their mutual perspectives, to better 
understand the novelty and the importance of this new interdisciplinary field of research. 
Cognitive (neuro)science has historically been focused on the study of basic abilities with 
little interest for the personal and situational conditions that elicit and influence them, 
thus primarily considering the human brain in isolation and neglecting the social nature of 
humans. From this perspective, the understanding of real-world phenomena is a bottom-
up process. Taking this approach, researchers have tried to investigate a variety both of 
human primary sensory functions such as vision, hearing, taste, and touch, and higher 
cognitive functions such as memory, problem solving, executive functioning, complex 
planning, and even consciousness (Gazzaniga, 2009). In contrast, social psychology has   21 
historically been interested in a broad range of complex and socially relevant phenomena 
that  involve  the  self,  how  the  self  relates  to  others,  and  the  impact  of  emotion  and 
motivation on judgement, behavior, and experience. From this perspective, understanding 
social phenomena is a top-down process that begins with the real-world topic of interest. 
Following this approach, social psychologists have studied mechanisms and brain systems 
underlying classical social psychological phenomena, such as stereotyping, attitudes, self-
knowledge, and interactions in groups (for a review, see Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the adoption of the aforementioned information-
processing  metaphor  offered  a  set  of  conceptual  tools  to  explain  the  similarities  and 
differences  between  different  interconnected  phenomena,  and  this  transformation 
influenced social psychology. A decade later, when data about the brain began to be used 
to constrain theories about different cognitive processes underlying, for example, memory 
(e.g., Shacter, 1990), attention (e.g., Posner & Peterson, 1990), and vision (e.g., Kosslyn, 
1991), cognitive psychology underwent an analogous change. In this way, the field of 
cognitive neuroscience was born and today the cognitive neuroscience approach is used to 
study most topics in cognitive psychology, putting together the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches that cannot be used independently since they are linked to each another. 
As it will be explained more extensively in the next sections, a relevant point for 
cognitive  neuroscience  is  the  notion  of  close  perception-action  link,  as  suggested  by 
ideomotor theories (Prinz, 1997), that has received much attention also due to converging 
neurophysiological evidence on the so-called mirror neurons (for a review, see Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004). Moreover, the use of neuropsychological populations and functional 
neuroimaging  techniques  (e.g.,  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging,  fMRI)  has 
undergone  an  increase,  because  of  their  importance  for  directly  connect  social  and 
emotional functions with neurocognitive systems, and their utility to test new hypotheses 
about the nature of social cognition (Adolphs, 1999; Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson,   22 
2000). The advantage of this new approach to psychology and to social behaviour is that, 
by specifying the underlying processes using terms taken from information theory and 
computer science, it is possible to bridge the gap between mental processes and brain 
function. 
 
1.3 The perception-action link 
As mentioned above, over the past decade, cognitive and neuroscientific researches 
have shown the existence of a mirror system in our mind and brain. In the next section, 
we  will  see  that  this  system  simulates  the  actions  we  observe  (Jeannerod,  2003)  by 
mapping  an  observed  action  onto  a  motor  representation  of  the  same  action  in  the 
observer, thus activating specific cortical networks (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Such a mirror 
mechanism implies that, at some level, action must be intrinsically linked to perception. 
Before seeing the mirror system in more detail, it can be useful to identify and understand 
the origins of such modern neurocognitive theories about action and perception. 
Over  the  years,  many  psychologists  have  claimed  that  when  we  perceive  another 
person’s behavior we experience a sort of tendency to behave similarly. The origin of the 
modern motor theory of action perception can be dated to the early work of Lotze (1852). 
Following Lotze, James (1890) stated that merely thinking about a behavior increases the 
tendency  to  engage  in  that  behavior;  namely,  the  mere  imagination  of  an  action  is 
sufficient to arouse the motor programs used for executing that action. Later, Greenwald 
(1970)  claimed  that  also  perception  of  external  information  can  automatically  induce 
action. This so-called “ideomotor principle” of action control highlights that actions are 
represented not only in terms of body movement but also in terms of the distal perceptual 
effects  they  aim  to  generate.  A  “common-coding”  principle  was  postulated  by 
researchers, for example, also to explain the rapid language acquisition in young children. 
In  this  regard,  Lashley  stated  that  “the  processes  of  language  comprehension  and   23 
language  production  have  too  much  in  common  to  depend  on  wholly  different 
mechanisms”  (Lashley,  1951,  p.  120).  Later,  the  existence  of  a  common  or  shared 
representational system for language comprehension and action codes was postulated by 
Prinz (1990). He hypothesized that the coding system both for perceiving behaviors in 
others and for performing those behaviors is the same, and it cannot be used at the same 
time to perceive and perform a behavior. In this way, action and perception are coded in a 
common  representational  medium,  as  postulated  by  the  so-called  “common  coding 
theory”  of  action  (Prinz,  1997).  Following  this  theory,  when  a  given  movement  is 
executed, an association is created between the motor pattern and the sensory effects and, 
in the reverse direction, the anticipation or perception of the sensory effects can induce a 
movement (Hommel, Müssler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). 
 
1.4 Towards a unifying neural hypothesis of the basis of social cognition 
As claimed before, social cognition is the study of how people interact with other 
individuals in social situations. A more relevant aspect of social interaction is the ability 
to  understand  what  others  are  doing,  their  intention,  and  their  feelings  (Rizzolatti  & 
Fabbri-Destro, 2008). As will be discussed in the present section, several findings of the 
last two decade showed that this capacity is mediated, in part, by a specific mechanism, 
the so-called mirror mechanism (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga,  Fogassi,  &  Gallese,  1999).  The  fundamental  role  of  this  mechanism  is  to 
transform  sensory  information  of  others’  actions  into  a  motor  format,  similar  to  that 
internally generated when observers imagine themselves doing that action or when they 
actually execute it. It is through this similarity between the motor format generated by 
others’  observation  and  the  format  internally  generated  during  motor  and  emotional 
behavior  that  observer  are  able  to  understand  others’  behavior,  without  any  complex 
cognitive  elaboration  (Rizzolatti,  Fogassi,  &  Gallese,  2001).  Indeed,  the  mirror   24 
mechanisms allow us to directly understand the meaning of others’ actions and emotions 
by  internally  replicating  them  (“simulation  process”)  without  any  explicit  reflective 
mediation or conceptual reasoning. Even if we are able to reason about others and to use 
this capacity to understand other people’s minds at the conceptual, declarative level, the 
crucial process that allows us a direct experiential comprehension of the others’ mind is a 
direct simulation of the observed events through the mirror mechanism (Gallese, Keysers, 
& Rizzolatti, 2004). In this sense, the discover of mirror neurons represents a milestone in 
the progress of social cognitive neuroscience. 
What differentiates social interactions from our perception of the world is that not 
only we see others’ actions and we perceive others’ emotions, but we also perform similar 
actions and we experience similar emotions. In fact, there is something shared between 
our first-  and third-person experience of these  phenomena: both the observer and the 
observed  have  a  similar  brain–body  system.  For  this  reason,  in  the  context  of  social 
cognition a fundamental aspect is the brain’s capacity to directly link the first- and third-
person experiences: this mechanism is defined “simulation” (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Gallese et al., 2004). 
The conventional conceptual approach has traditionally explained actions performed 
by others considering observed actions in a similar way to other visual stimuli, namely as 
an integration of all the separate elements that  produces the neural input to a central 
conceptual system that interprets the visual representation (e.g., Fodor, 1982). 
In recent years, a different theory has been formulated to explain how others’ actions 
can be understood, basing on the discovery of a set of neurons called “mirror neurons”. 
These neurons, originally found in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the macaque 
monkey, become active both when the animal performs a specific goal-directed action 
(e.g. picking up a peanut), and when it observes the same specific action (e.g., grasping 
the peanut) being performed by someone else (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al,   25 
1996;  Rizzolatti  et  al.,  1996;  for  a  review,  see  Rizzolatti  &  Craighero  2004).  The 
implication of this finding is that the observation of an action automatically activates parts 
of the same cortical neural network that is active during its execution (Rizzolatti et al., 
1999). 
Mirror neurons have not yet been definitively identified in humans, as it is only rarely 
possible to measure the activity in single neurons (but see Hutchison,  Davis,  Lozaro, 
Tasker,  &  Dostrovsky,  1999;  Mukamel,  Ekstrom,  Kaplan,  Iacoboni,  &  Fried,  2010). 
However,  there  are  several  findings  for  resonance  behaviour  in  humans  both  at  the 
behavioural  and  at  the  physiological  level.  Indeed,  data  from  brain  imaging,  positron 
emission tomography (PET; e.g., Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996), magneto-
encephalography (MEG; e.g., Hari, Forss, Avikainen, Kirveskari, Salenius, & Rizzolatti, 
1998),  and  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS;  e.g.,  Fadiga,  Fogassi,  Pavesi,  & 
Rizzolatti, 1995) have shown that, also in humans, the observation of actions performed 
by others activates cortical motor representations. Namely, have been identified brain 
areas  that  become  active  both  during  the  performance  of  the  action  and  during  the 
observation of the same action being performed by another person (Keysers & Gazzola, 
2006;  Rizzolatti  &  Fabbri-Destro,  2008).  This  means  that  when  we  see  someone 
performing an action, there is not only the activation of various visual areas, but also a 
concurrent  activation  of  part  of  the  same  motor  circuits  that  are  activated  when  we 
perform that action.  In  fact, part of our motor  system becomes  active  “as if” we are 
executing  the  same  observed  action,  even  if  we  do  not  overtly  reproduce  that  action 
(Gallese et al., 2004). 
This mechanism, which explains the comprehension of action basing on the mirror 
neuron  system,  can  be  considered  conceptually  similar  to  the  proposal  advanced  by 
phenomenologists and, in particular, by Merleau-Ponty. For example, with regard to what 
it means to understand an action, he claims that “the sense of gesture is not given, but   26 
understood, that is recaptured by an act of the spectator’s part” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 
185), a description that well explains the direct experiential understanding of the observed 
actions mediated by the mirror mechanism. 
The idea of shared circuits, initially proposed for actions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), 
actually appears much broader. In fact, the mirror system is present in different cortical 
areas  and mediates different functions, according to its anatomical location (for other 
mirror mechanisms, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008). 
The mechanism that I mentioned so far, the “shared-circuits for actions”, is located in the 
parieto-frontal network (which includes the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule, the 
caudal sector of the inferior frontal gyrus, and the adjacent part of the premotor cortex), 
and it underlies the understanding of the goal of the observed motor acts and the intention 
behind them (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Similarly, shared networks for sensations have been 
identified  in  the  primary  and  secondary  somatosensory  areas,  involved  both  in 
experiencing touch on our own body and in viewing other human beings being touched 
(e.g., Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2004; Blakemore, Bristow, 
Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005). Finally, the mirror mechanism is also present in the anterior 
cingulate and insular cortices, and is involved in understanding of others’ emotions. The 
extension of the idea of mirror system to the domain of emotions has led to empathy 
research (e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm 2006; 
de Vignemont & Singer 2006), to which I will refer later (see section 1.5.4). 
Common to all these cases (actions, sensations, and emotions) is that some brain 
areas are involved both in the first person experience (I do or I feel) and in the third 
person perspective (knowing what he/she does or he/she feels). This sharing is able to 
transform what we see another person do or feel into an inner representation of what we 
would do or feel in a similar situation (“simulation theory”; e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Gallese et al., 2004). According to this view, the activation of the cortical motor or   27 
viscero-motor  centers  is  the  crucial  element  for  both  first-  and  third-person 
comprehension of social behavior. When there is an activation of the downstream centers, 
the outcome is a specific action or emotional state. Instead, when only the cortical centers 
are active, without their peripheral effects, a simulation occurs of the observed actions or 
emotions. 
There are several implications of having such shared circuits for actions. First of all, 
by transforming the sight of someone’s actions into our motor representation of these 
actions, we can achieve a very simple and powerful understanding of others’ actions, and 
this provides us an intuitive grasp (insight) of others’ inner life (Gallese et al., 1996; 
Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). Second, mirroring the actions of others 
might  help  to  understand  what  another  person  is  doing  (Rizzolatti  et  al.,  2001)  or  to 
predict what he/she is most probably going to do next (e.g. Blakemore & Frith, 2005). 
Third,  this  mechanism  might  underlie  more  sophisticated  mental  abilities,  such  as 
understanding the others’ intentions (e.g. Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, 
Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 2005). Finally, activating motor programs similar to the ones we 
have observed or heard might be useful in the imitation of others’ actions (Iacoboni, 
Woods,  Brass,  Bekkering,  Mazziotta,  &  Rizzolatti,  1999;  Buccino,  Vogt,  Ritzl,  Fink, 
Zilles, Freund, & Rizzolatti, 2004b). 
 
1.5 Relevant topics in social cognition 
As we have just seen, our brains have developed a basic functional mechanism, a 
mirror or shared-circuit mechanism, which could provide the first unifying perspective of 
the neural basis of social cognition (e.g., Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; 
Singer, 2012). However, this mechanism tend often to be seen as a panacea to explain any 
issue of social cognition. It is important to note that while it plays several very important 
functions,  such  as  those  listed  at  the  end  of  the  previous  section,  it  cannot  explain   28 
everything (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). In fact, while it could be excessive and erroneous 
to use the mirror mechanisms to explain every aspect of social cognition, ranging from 
imitation to language development and theory of mind, (e.g. Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005), 
mirror systems are relevant to some crucial processes in social interaction. It will remain 
for future research to outline the limits of what shared circuits can really explain. 
In the next subsections we will see some relevant issues of social cognition (for a 
review, see Singer, 2012) to which I already previously mentioned. Some of them will be 
taken up and more detailed in the next chapters (see Chapter 2 for motor resonance and 
Chapter 4 for joint action). 
 
1.5.1 Imitating action 
The mirror effects that emerges when we observe motor actions can occur without 
awareness and thus involuntary. For example, observing someone performing an action 
different from our own, for example observing vertical movements of a human actor or of 
a robot while we are executing horizontal movements, makes our actions more variable 
and less accurate (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blackemore, 2003). Moreover, the effect seems to 
be  specific  to  observation  of  human  movement,  since  it  did  not  occur  when  the 
movements were performed by a robot arm. The mirroring of others’ actions seems to 
depend also on whether or not people believe that the movement reflects human motion 
or not, indicating that this tendency to imitate is at its strongest during social interaction 
(Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007). In addiction, it has been shown that the observation of a 
movement leads to a stronger neural activation when the person performing actions is in 
visual contact with us (Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006). 
This mirror effect due to a neural activity elicited by action observation, which is 
stronger during social interaction with an agent similar to ourselves, can also become 
overt imitation. In fact, when two people interact they tend to non-consciously mimic the   29 
postures, mannerisms, facial expressions, and other behaviors of other partner, so that 
their behavior passively and unintentionally change and match the others’ behavior. This 
is known as the “chameleon effect” (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). The authors suggest that 
the involved mechanism is the perception-behavior link; namely, the simple perception of 
an  action  triggers  corresponding  action  representations  in  the  observer  and  thus  it 
automatically increases the likelihood of performing oneself the same  behavior (for a 
review,  see  Van  Baaren,  Janssen,  Chartrand,  &  Dijksterhuis,  2009).  Furthermore,  the 
experience of mimicry causes an increase in prosocial behaviour (Van Baaren, Holland, 
Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg, 2004): the interaction are more easy and the partners 
like each other better when the mimicry occurs. Moreover, persons with high ratings on 
empathy scales show a greater degree of mimicry than others. However, these effects 
emerge  only  when  people  are  unaware  of  such  mimic  behavior  (Lakin  &  Chartrand, 
2003).  
 
1.5.2 Joint action 
Considering the chameleon effect, it can be said that interacting people create joint 
actions  in  which  simple  movements  are  imitated.  However,  this  mirroring  can  also 
emerge at more abstract levels about goals, influencing the speed with which decisions 
are made. For example, Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) required subjects to perform 
together a choice reaction time task concerning a spatial compatibility effect. Even if this 
issue will be more detailed later in Chapter 4 and will be the subject of two experimental 
studies that I have conducted (see Chapters 5 and 6), now I can briefly anticipate that, 
when acting together, each subject automatically represents the task requirements and 
goals both own and of the other subject. This result suggests that knowing about the 
potential actions of a partner increases the relevance of stimuli referring both to the self 
and to the other, and also increases the need to monitor one’s actions (for a review, see   30 
Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). In this example, subjects performed the respective 
task at the same time, but no cooperation was required to correctly perform their tasks. 
Instead, when cooperation becomes necessary in order to correctly execute a joint action, 
shared representations of task features and goals are crucial to attain good performance 
and  results.  Some  authors  studied  this  sharing  in  experiments  on  discourse  and  have 
defined  it  also  as  common  knowledge  or  alignment  that  emerges  automatically  and 
without awareness (Clark, 1996; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). 
 
1.5.3 Motor resonance 
This topic, to which I have already referred in the previous sessions, will be more 
detailed in Chapter 2 and will be the subject of one experimental studies that  I have 
conducted (see Chapter 3). 
As regards the link between perception and action, generally the functional analysis 
proceeds  from  action  perception  to  action  production  and  can  be  classified  under  the 
notion  of  “motor  resonance”,  a  notion  already  mentioned  above  (for  a  review,  see 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). However, this view is incomplete, since there are at least 
two  individuals  involved  in  a  social  interaction  who  alternately  assume  the  role  of 
perceiver/observer and actor. This means that it is also essential to consider the possible 
role of mirror mechanisms from the perspective of the actor and, according to this view, it 
is also necessary to proceed from action production to action perception (Schütz & Prinz, 
2007). Indeed, action production can influence action perception so that observers are 
selectively sensitive to some events in the environment. The motor or action knowledge 
can influence action perception and the perceptual system, so that perceiver might be 
selectively  sensitive  to  those  actions  that  are  related  to  his/her  own  actions.  Strong 
evidence for the claim that perceptual system is tuned to one’s own motor skills comes 
from the studies that investigated motor experts, for example from the works on dancers   31 
of  Calvo-Merino  and  collaborators  (Calvo-Merino,  Glaser,  Grèzes,  Passingham,  & 
Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006). As I will 
explain in more detail in the next chapter, these studied showed that the motor system was 
more strongly engaged during action observation when participants already had a specific 
motor  representation  of  the  action  they  observed.  This  means  that  our  mirror  neuron 
mechanism seems to be activated with differing intensity on the basis of the similarity 
between the actions we observe and the actions that are part of our motor competence. 
The emergence of motor resonance to action also has an important social function: it 
might render an individual selectively tuned to similar actions of conspecifics, so that we 
can only perceive and understand in others what we can do ourselves. In this way, this 
mechanism becomes crucial for empathy. 
 
1.5.4 Emotional contagion and empathy 
As  already  mentioned,  the  initial  idea  that  perception–action  link  enables  us  to 
understand other people’s motor action has been extended, so to include not only the 
ability to share motor actions but also the ability to share feelings and sensations (Preston 
& de Waal, 2002; Gallese, 2003; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm, 2006; de 
Vignemont  &  Singer,  2006).  Recent  empathy  studies  have  indeed  highlighted  the 
presence of such shared neural networks in the domain of emotions. 
Early studies focused on emotional contagion caused by the perception of emotional 
expressions in faces. For example, they demonstrate that the sight of the facial expression 
of  disgust  activates  the  same  brain  areas  involved  during  the  direct  experience  of  a 
disgusting smell (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2003). Similarly, 
the  sight  of  a  fearful  face  activates  the  same  brain  areas  involved  during  the  direct 
exposure to a fearful object (Morris, Frith, Perrett, Rowland, & Young, 1996).   32 
Subsequent studies demonstrated that such shared networks are not only activated 
when we are faced with emotional stimuli. In fact, humans possess also the ability to 
empathize with others when know that someone is suffering even in the absence of any 
explicit emotional stimulation. Here I will briefly refer to this topic as it will be resumed 
in Chapter 3. For example, in a seminal study Singer and colleagues (Singer, Seymour, 
O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004b) measured empathic brain activations elicited 
when participant received pain or when participant knew that her partner suffered pain. 
More specifically, authors recruited couples and measured empathy in vivo by registering 
brain  activity  with  fMRI  in  the  female  partner  while  painful  stimulation  was  applied 
either to her own hand, thus measuring pain-related brain activation of the felt pain, or to 
her partner’s right hand, thus measuring pain-related brain activation of the empathy for 
pain. The results suggest that part of the so-called “pain matrix”, prevalently the bilateral 
anterior insula (AI) and the anterior cingulate cortex, was activated both when subjects 
experienced pain themselves and when they saw a signal indicating that the partner had 
experienced pain. Activation in this network was also registered when subjects watched 
videos showing body parts in potentially painful situations (Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & 
Decety,  2006),  painful  facial  expressions  (Lamm,  Batson,  &  Decety,  2007),  or  hands 
being pricked by needles (Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004; Morrison, 
Peelen, & Downing, 2007). Further studies suggest that the magnitude of these empathic 
brain responses can be modulated by different factors, such as the perceived fairness of 
the other (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004a; Singer, Seymour O’Doherty, 
Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2006) and the intensity of the inflicted pain (Avenanti, Minio-
Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006; for a review, see de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). As 
with the observation of actions, observation of other people’s emotions often becomes 
overt mimicry.   33 
So far, social neuroscientists have mostly investigated phenomena such as emotional 
contagion and empathy and, summarizing, the former indicates a reaction in which one 
shares an emotion with another person without realizing that the other person’s emotion 
was the trigger; instead, empathy requires the awareness that our affective state was due 
to another person’s affective state. 
 
1.5.5 Theory of mind or mentalizing 
As well as actual behaviour or motivational state of the other, also more abstract 
beliefs about who we are interacting with play a relevant role in our life and influence 
social interactions. In fact, when we interact with other persons, we assume that they have 
minds like our own and so we try to anticipate their behaviour considering the contents of 
their minds, namely their beliefs and desires. This is know as having a “theory of mind” 
or “mentalizing” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Frith 1989; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, 
&  Cohen,  2000),  expressions  used  to  indicate  the  general  ability  of  an  individual  to 
attribute mental states such as intentions, desires or beliefs to oneself and others, and the 
ability to understand that others have intentions, desires, and beliefs that are different 
from one’s own (Singer, 2012). 
This  ability  has  been  widely  investigated  using  different  tasks  including  reading 
stories  (Fletcher,  Happé,  Frith,  Baker,  Dolan,  Frackowiak,  &  Frith,  1995;  Saxe  & 
Kanwisher, 2003), looking at cartoons (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000; 
Gallagher,  Happé,  Brunswick,  Fletcher,  Frith,  &  Frith,  2000),  or  watching  simple 
animations  (Castelli,  Happé,  Frith,  &  Frith,  2000).  Moreover,  such  ability  has  been 
extensively studied in both normal and abnormal development, for example highlighting 
that difficulty in understanding other minds is a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum 
conditions (e.g., Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993). I will not go 
into details of these researches as beyond the scope of the thesis.   34 
Interestingly, several studies have revealed the existence of the so-called “theory of 
mind  or  mentalizing  network”  that  includes  the  medial  prefrontal  cortex  (mPFC),  the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the temporal poles (TP) (for reviews, see 
Frith & Frith, 1999, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
 
1.6 Overview and aim of the project 
In conclusion, trying to briefly summarize what has been discussed so far, significant 
progress has been achieved in the last years in cognitive neuroscience and a significant 
change is going on the so-called “social cognition” research field, from a focus on the 
individual mind toward embodied and participative aspects of social comprehension. I 
have  explored  the  origin  and  the  recent  development  of  the  social  cognitive 
(neuro)science,  as  a  new  interdisciplinary  attempt  which  combines  approaches  from 
various disciplines, such as developmental, clinical, comparative and social psychology, 
cognitive neurosciences and (neuro)economics, biology, evolutionary anthropology, and 
philosophy  (for  a  review,  see  Singer,  2012).  The  name  social  cognitive  neuroscience 
indicates  not  only  this  interdisciplinary  nature  of  the  field,  but  also  the  importance 
attributed to the integration of data from multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the 
experience  and  behavior  of  individuals  in  relevant  contexts  (the  social  level)  to  the 
information-processing mechanisms that cause these phenomena (the cognitive level) to 
the brain systems that underlay these processes (the neural level) (Ochsner & Lieberman, 
2001). 
A crucial point for social cognitive (neuro)science is the notion of close perception-
action link, as suggested by ideomotor theories (Prinz, 1997), that has received a growing 
attention  due  to  converging  neurophysiological  evidence  on  the  so-called  mirror  or 
shared-circuit mechanism (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), which could 
provide the first unifying perspective of the neural basis of social cognition (e.g., Gallese   35 
et al., 2004). Evidence that the same brain areas are involved both in the first person 
experience (I do or I feel) and in the third person perspective (knowing what he/she does 
or he/she feels) demonstrates that this sharing transforms what we see other people do or 
feel  into  an  inner  representation  of  what  we  would  do  or  feel  in  a  similar  situation 
(simulation theory) (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). Such shared or mirror system is crucial 
for some processes in social interaction. 
Among the different topics addressed by the social cognitive (neuro)science, the aim 
of the present project is investigated motor resonance and joint action. Specifically, a 
series of targeted social cognitive experiments are been designed to elucidate the human 
mechanisms of motor resonance and joint action. To this aim, I decided to use two well-
known and established effects of cognitive psychology: “Affordance” and “Simon”. Here 
is a summary of how I intend to proceed in this dissertation, useful to better explain the 
aim of my project. 
In the first part of the thesis the notion of “Affordance” will be introduced beginning 
with  the  seminal  definition  and  theorization  of  Gibson  (1979),  and  his  ecological 
perspective,  up  to  the  latest  developments  and  to  the  concept  of  “Micro-affordance” 
postuled  by  Ellis  and  Tucker  (2000).  By  means  of  an  overview  of  various  empirical 
findings and of an original research (Anelli, Nicoletti, & Borghi, 2010; Anelli, Nicoletti, 
& Borghi, in preparation b), I will explain how it can be possible to use the affordance 
effect to investigate the issue of motor resonance. In fact, the first experimental research 
presented in the thesis (Study 1; Anelli, Nicoletti, Kalkan, Sahin, & Borghi, in press b; 
Anelli, Borghi, & Nicoletti, under review) was aimed both to verify how responses to 
objects and sensitivity to fine object characteristics develop, examining the influence of a 
micro-affordance  that  can  be  defined  dangerousness,  and  to  investigate  how  motor 
resonance  develops.  The  experiments  conducted  both  with  children  and  adults  have 
allowed to study active responses to dangerous stimuli and the effects of social variables,   36 
such  as  gender  and  age  of  participants,  thus  investigating  fine-grained  resonant 
mechanisms. 
The  second  part  of  this  thesis  concerns  the  other  chosen  paradigm.  The  “Simon” 
effect will be presented both at a theoretical and empirical level, starting from the first 
experimental evidence (Simon & Rudell, 1967) to the most recent researches on the so-
called “social or joint Simon effect” (Sebanz et al., 2003). The overview will be useful to 
understand how, through the social or joint Simon effect, it is possible to examine the 
issue of joint action. In fact, the purpose of the other two studies presented in the thesis 
was to investigate whether shared representations, as indexed by the presence of the joint 
Simon  effect,  are  influenced  by  perceived  group  membership.  More  specifically,  the 
Study  2  (Iani,  Anelli,  Nicoletti,  Arcuri,  &  Rubichi,  2011;  Anelli,  Nicoletti,  Arcuri,  
Rubichi, &  Iani, in press a) has explored both  the role of minimal ingroup–outgroup 
distinctions and of type of interdependence between participants on the modulation of 
shared representations, also taking into account theories and data of social psychology 
(Rabbie  &  Horwitz,  1969;  Tajfel,  Billig,  Bundy,  &  Flament,  1971).  Along  the  same 
research line, the Study 3 (Anelli, Iani, Nicoletti, & Rubichi, in preparation a) was aimed 
to  further  clarify  the  role  of  the  type  of  interdependence  between  participants  on  the 
shared representations emergence, combining the use of joint Simon and “joint transfer of 
learning”  (Milanese,  Iani,  &  Rubichi,  2010)  paradigms,  and  even  considering  related 
evidence  from  social  psychology  (Sherif  ,  Harvey,  White,  Hood,  &  Sherif,  1961; 
Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007). 
 Finally,  a  general  discussion  of  the  three  studies  will  highlight  the  original 
contribution of the presented results and their importance within the Social Cognition 
research.   37 
PART 1 
 
CHAPTER II 
AFFORDANCE EFFECT 
 
 
As  anticipated  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  first  part  of  the  thesis  concerns  the 
“Affordance” theme. Thus, in the present chapter I discuss this issue both at a theoretical 
and empirical level. First, I will focus on the origin of the Gibson’s notion of affordance 
and  on  the  conditions  that  allow  affordances  to  emerge.  Second,  a  paragraph  will  be 
dedicated  to  post-Gibson  theorizations,  giving  particular  attention  to  the  notion  of 
“Micro-affordance” developed by Ellis and Tucker, underlining both the similarities and 
the  differences  from  the  Gibsonian  notion,  and  presenting  some  important  empirical 
findings  obtained  with  different  techniques  (e.g.,  behavioral,  neurophysiological,  and 
neuroimaging). Then, I will present an original research to illustrate how it is possible to 
investigate  the  notion  of  affordance  through  experiments  using  a  methodology  of 
cognitive psychology; in particular, the work investigates the role of object consistence in 
adults  by  measuring  the  participants’  response  times  in  different  categorization  tasks. 
Finally, a section will be dedicated to trying to understand how it is possible, by using the 
“affordance  effect”,  to  investigate  a  relevant  topic  of  social  cognition,  the  motor 
resonance, which will be the subject of the Study 1, presented in the next chapter. 
 
2.1 Definition and Gibsonian notion of affordance 
Over the past decade, a growing number of cognitive and neuroimaging studies have 
focused  on  affordances.  In  the  1979  for  the  first  time  Gibson  proposed  a  theory  of   38 
affordances,  defining  them  as  properties  in  the  environment  that  are  relevant  for  an 
organism’s goals. In other words, affordances are what the environment offers to acting 
organisms (for example, an apple offers us the possibility to be grasped and eaten). It is 
important to underline that an affordance is not an object, but rather it is the outcome of a 
process. It can be argued that the notion of affordance represents the result of an approach 
to cognition that avoids the use of mental representations and strongly emphasizes the 
relation between knowledge and action (Good, 2007). Such attempt is the “Ecological 
approach” to perception, developed by James Gibson in a period of about thirty years and 
culminated in the book “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” (Gibson, 1979). 
As  we  shall  see,  the  ecological  approach  underlines  the  mutuality  of  the  perceiving 
organism and environment, and the reciprocity of perception and action. 
Before discussing in more detail the notion of affordance and to better understand its 
novelty,  it  could  be  useful  to  briefly  present  the  origin  of  the  Gibson’s  ecological 
approach, highlighting its main differences with respect to the conventional cognitivist 
approach (Zhang & Patel, 2006). First of all, I can consider the starting point. For the 
conventional theory of perception, the starting point for perception is the retinal image, it 
is the stimulation of light on the retina that provides information for visual perception. 
According to Gibson, the starting point is the ambient optic array, it is the structure in the 
light  that  provides  direct  information  to  the  observer  about  the  media,  surfaces, 
substances, and events. Second, the level of description. According to Gibson, the right 
level of describing perception is ecology, not physics or geometry, as claimed by the 
conventional theory of perception. From his point of view, perception can be intended as 
the direct pickup of invariant properties in the optic array. Third point, the static vs. active 
perception. For the conventional theory, perception is a passive detection of the retinal 
image. According to Gibson, however, perception is an act: perception and action are 
seen as strongly interconnected, as stimulation per se does not lead to perception. Fourth,   39 
mediated  vs.  direct  perception.  According  to  the  conventional  theory,  perception  is  a 
computational  process,  mediated  by  inferences  which  are  the  elaborations  of  mental 
representations. What one perceives depends not only on the stimulation of light, but also 
on  the  mental  processes  used  in  processing  that  information.  According  to  Gibson, 
however,  perception  is  not  mediated  by  memory,  inference,  nor  by  any  other 
psychological process and mental content in which internal representations are organized. 
This means that humans can directly perceive objects in the world on the basis of the 
pickup of invariants in the optic array, as previously stated, and such invariants specify all 
objects and events in the environment. Last point, the complementarity of the organism 
and the environment. For the conventional theory, perception is the processing of the 
retinal image formed by the stimuli in the environment and thus is a one-way perception. 
According to Gibson, however, perception of the environment is also the perception of 
the self. The environment and the organism are mutually complementary and linked. The 
environment implies the organism and vice-versa. 
Recovering more in detail what has emerged so far, Gibson defined affordances as 
properties in the environment providing the observer with practical opportunities which 
he/she is able to perceive and use (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012). The relations between 
the  physical  structures  of  the  environment  and  the  physique  of  the  organism  are  the 
elements that specify the affordances (e.g., a chair affords sitting for people). To explain 
the  Gibson’s  original  affordances,  to  these  elements  must  be  added  two  fundamental 
properties:  the  complementarity  of  the  environment  and  the  organism,  and  the  direct, 
effortless pickup of affordances (Zhang & Patel, 2006). Indeed, “the affordance of the 
environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or 
ill... I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way 
that  no  existing  term  does.  It  implies  the  complementarity  of  the  animal  and  the   40 
environment” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). As affordances are relative to animals, they can 
only be measured in ecology, but not in physics, as anticipated above. 
Affordances can be registered directly by our perceptual system, are invariant and 
holistic: when we look at an object, we perceive its affordances, not its dimensions and 
properties. Affordances should not be construed as just objective or subjective properties, 
nor should they be considered as purely physical or psychical in nature, since they “cuts 
across the dichotomy of subjective and objective [being] equally a fact of the environment 
and a fact of behaviour. It is both physical and psychical,  yet neither. An affordance 
points both ways, to the environment and the observer” (Gibson, 1979, p. 129). Hence, 
affordances only make sense from a system point of view. 
This last point recalls a concept particularly relevant for an embodied perspective: the 
conditions allowing affordances to emerge pertain to both perception and action. They are 
properties neither of the object/environment nor of the acting organisms, but they are 
intrinsically relational properties. For example, a door handle affords opening only for 
humans, not for other living beings (animals or plants). Namely, affordances are specific 
for a particular organism and related to its own body structure, and bodily characteristics. 
As previously noted, affordances are based on object properties that are registered 
directly by our perceptual system, without the mediation of object recognition and of 
semantic knowledge: “You do not have to classify and label things in order to perceive 
what they afford” (Gibson, 1979, p. 134). Namely, the pattern of stimulation induced by 
the object in the perceiver specifies the behavioral possibilities afforded by objects.  
 
2.2 From Gibson’s view to micro-affordance 
As we have seen, Gibson’s ecological psychology was developed primarily for visual 
perception. Gibson considered the implications of his ecological approach and theory of 
affordances for other domains of psychology and for philosophy. However he could not   41 
extend his theory to the mainstream cognitive psychology, because of his hypothesis of 
direct  perception  and  not  mediated  by  internal  representations  nor  by  any  other 
psychological process. 
Neisser (1994) and Shepard (1984) tried to reconcile Gibson’s ecological view, that 
focuses  on  the  importance  of  the  information  in  the  environment,  and  cognitive 
psychology, that focuses on the role of internal representations. For example, studying the 
ecological constraints of internal representations, Shepard (1984) claimed that not only 
perceiving, but also imagining, thinking, and dreaming are driven by internalizations of 
long-lasting  external  constraints.  According  to  Shepard,  instead  of  picking  up  the 
invariants that are present in the sensory arrays, as a result of both biological evolution 
and perceptual and cognitive learning, an organism selectively resonates to the invariants 
that are significant for it. 
Gibson’s ecological psychology and his theory of affordances have been elaborated in 
the areas of human factors and applied cognitive science. To give some examples, in the 
book  “The  Psychology  of  Everyday  Things”,  Norman  (1988)  explored  the  roles  of 
affordances, forcing functions, and natural mappings in the design of cognitive artifacts; 
Kirlik  and  Bisantz  (1999)  built  a  process  model  of  skilled  human-environment 
interaction; Gaver (1991) also applied and extended this theory in the design of computer 
displays. 
Several attempts have been made to clarify what type of properties affordances are. 
Some researchers have pointed out that affordances are dispositional properties of the 
environment that must  be integrated with some dispositional properties of individuals 
(e.g., Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982; Turvey, 1992). Instead others expressed a different 
perspective. Among these we can mentioned Chemero who claimed that affordances are 
relations between the features of a situation and the abilities of an individual, and thus 
they are not properties of the environment related to the observer (2001, 2003, 2009). The   42 
importance to differentiate properties and features is that to perceive a property of an 
object one must identify the object and know that the object has that property (Costantini 
& Sinigaglia, 2012). Conversely, to perceive an affordance, “there is no need to know 
anything  about  any  particular  entity”  (Chemero,  2009,  p.  140),  since  the  ability  to 
perceive is sufficient. Similarly, individual abilities cannot be defined as dispositional 
properties, since “there is something inherently normative about ability: individuals with 
abilities  are  supposed  to  behave  in  a  particular  way,  and  they  may  fail  to  do  so. 
Dispositions,  on the  other  hand,  never  fail;  they  simply  are  or  not  in the  appropriate 
circumstances  to  become  manifest”  (Chemero,  2003,  p.  189).  Finally,  abilities  are 
interconnected and hierarchically organized, so that all other abilities are based on more 
basic abilities, namely on primary motor abilities. 
Several researchers have postulated that to interact appropriately with an object, it is 
necessary  to  integrate  the  affordances  it  provides  with  our  previous  experience  of 
interaction and use of the same or similar objects (Borghi, 2005). Such experience does 
not need to be direct, but it can also derive from observation. For example, Mareschal and 
Johnson  (2003)  found  that  four-months-olds  infants  are  able  to  acquire  information 
related to the affordances of an object through merely observation of others rather than 
through direct experience. Independently of whether this experience is direct or acquired 
by imitation, what we see might reactivate previous visuomotor experiences with objects, 
thus  influencing  the  way  we  respond  to  them.  In  this  regard,  a  good  definition  of 
affordance is provided by Humphreys, who claimed that affordances might be based on 
stored conceptual knowledge, but not necessarily: “What I mean by the term is some 
direct link between the perceived visual properties of an object and an action that may be 
performed with it. This link between the perceived properties of objects and actions may 
be, but does not need to, be based on a stored representation of the particular object” 
(Humphreys, 2001, p. 408).   43 
Recently, among the studies focusing on the role of affordance in the control of the 
action, Fajen (2007, 2008) proposed an innovative approach, the so called “affordance-
based  control”,  starting  from  the  “information-based  control”  and  the  “model-based 
control” approaches. He argued that key aspects of the information-based control and the 
theory of affordances can be merged and create a new theoretical approach. Affordance-
based control postulated that the primary function of perception is to allow individuals to 
see the world in terms of what they can and cannot do. Successful performance depends 
on the perception of possibilities for action (i.e., affordances) that are perceived directly 
from  information  in  optic  flow.  This  approach  highlights  the  close  relation  between 
information in optic flow and movement that is characteristic of visually guided action. 
Moreover, it may also explain how individuals consider the dynamic properties of their 
body and the environment: the perception of affordances must be recalibrated following a 
change in action capabilities and a scaling of task-specific information. 
Recent views of affordances indicated affordances as brain representations of action 
possibilities, namely as the result of previously stored perception-action experiences (Ellis 
& Tucker, 2000). Affordances can be divided into two main categories, on the basis of the 
corresponding motor abilities. The first is labelled “walking-like” or “macro-affordances” 
and includes the affordances where the situation requires motor abilities in locomotion or 
navigation (e.g. walking, climbing, jumping, going up, going down, etc.). The second 
category is named “grasping-like” or “micro-affordances”, that is, the affordance relations 
where the situation requires interactions towards an object (e.g. hand- or mouth-grasping, 
manipulating, tearing, pulling, pressing, biting, kicking etc.). 
In the following I will focus on the second category of affordances, more relevant to 
the present work. Thus, giving a look at micro-affordance, it is interesting to note that, to 
underline both the similarities and the differences from Gibsonian affordances, Ellis and 
Tucker  (2000)  proposed  the  name  of  “micro-affordances”  to  refer  to  the  potential   44 
elements  of  an  action.  Micro-affordances  can  be  defined  as  “brain  assemblies”  that 
represent objects, namely they are the result in the brain of the connection between visual 
responses and action-related responses that have developed during the process of adapting 
to the environment. Similarly to Gibsonian affordances, micro-affordances are elicited 
automatically, independently from the goal of the actor, thus they refer to simple actions 
and not to complex actions, in which plays a role the goal of the actor (for example, 
eating  or  drinking).  Instead,  micro-affordances  facilitate  simple  and  specific  kinds  of 
interaction  with  objects  that  also  involved  the  activation  of  conceptual  knowledge 
(Borghi, 2005). In fact, micro-affordances differ from Gibsonian notion, since they are 
much more specific and are a consequence of object-based attention (Vainio, Ellis, & 
Tucker, 2007). They do not elicit grasping, but a specific component of grasping which is 
more appropriate to a particular object. 
 
2.2.1 Empirical evidence 
The  relational  nature  of  micro-affordances  was  confirmed  by  several  empirical 
findings  obtained  with  different  techniques  (e.g.,  behavioral,  neurophysiological,  and 
neuroimaging techniques). Behavioral studies demonstrated that the mere observation of 
something graspable retrieves the appropriate set of hand-action possibilities, even when 
there is not a real interaction or intention to act (Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umiltà, 
1999). More specifically, it has been shown that the execution of left-right hand motor 
acts are influenced by task-irrelevant object information (e.g. the left-right orientation of 
the handle of a mug), so that a facilitation effect emerges when the orientation of the 
affording  part  of  the  object  (e.g.  handle)  and  the  responding  hand  are  spatially 
correspondent (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004). Phillips and 
Ward (2002) reported an analogous compatibility effect between object orientation and 
motor  act  execution,  presenting  participants  with  a  visual  manipulable  object-prime   45 
oriented towards or away from participants, or in a neutral position, followed by a target 
requiring a response with the left or right hand, or a foot press. The results showed that 
lateralized responses were facilitated by object handles oriented in a corresponding way. 
On the whole, several studies with compatibility paradigms have demonstrated that the 
vision of objects activates a motor simulation and might even evoke overt reaching and 
grasping movements (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Bub, Masson, & Bukach, 2003; 
Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003; Borghi, 2004; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006; 
Borghi,  Bonfiglioli,  Lugli,  Ricciardelli,  Rubichi,  &  Nicoletti,  2007;  Bub,  Masson,  & 
Cree,  2008;  Fischer,  Prinz,  &  Lotz,  2008;  Vainio,  Symes,  Ellis,  Tucker,  &  Ottoboni, 
2008). 
Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies showed that, both in monkeys and in 
humans, specific parieto-frontal circuits encode the observed situation features in terms of 
one  or  more  action  potentialities.  The  perception  of  affordance  implies  that  the  same 
neurons are activated both to encode the motor acts they control (e.g. hand-grasping) and 
to respond to the situated visual features requiring those motor acts. In monkeys, single 
cell recordings from the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) have shown the existence of a 
special class of visuo-motor neurons, the so-called “canonical neurons”, that seems to 
constitute the neural basis for affordances. These neurons discharge in the presence of 
graspable object, even when the monkey was just fixating it and thus no overt response is 
required (Rizzolatti, Camarda, Fogassi, Gentilucci, Luppino, & Matelli, 1988; Jeannerod, 
Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995; Murata, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, Raos, & Rizzolatti, 
1997;  Raos,  Umiltà,  Murata,  Fogassi,  &  Gallese,  2006;  Umiltà,  Brochier,  Spinks,  & 
Lemon, 2007). A congruence effect has been observed between the type of grip coded by 
a  given  neuron  and  the  size  and  shape  effective  in  activating  corresponding  visual 
response (Sakata, Taira, Murata, & Mine, 1995). Indeed, most neurons are selectively   46 
activated  by  specific  kinds  of  grips  (e.g.,  precision  vs.  power  or  full  hand  grips), 
suggesting that they probably represent objects in terms of potential action patterns. 
As for humans, similar results have been registered. For example, an early PET study 
(Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997) showed the automatic activation of the left 
premotor cortex during the observation of manipulable objects, even in the absence of 
motor  output.  Further  fMRI  studies  demonstrated  the  activation  of  the  left  premotor 
cortex and the inferior parietal lobule when graspable objects were observed (Chao & 
Martin, 2000), and that this fronto-parietal circuit was activated during the execution of a 
given  hand  grip  depending  on  the  specific  hand  grip  afforded  by  the  object  features 
(Grèzes,  Tucker,  Armony,  Ellis,  &  Passingham,  2003).  Other  brain  activation  studies 
showed that the response of the left ventral premotor cortex was stronger for manipulable 
than for non-manipulable objects (Gerlach, Law, & Paulson, 2002; Kellenbach, Brett, & 
Patterson, 2003). Several fMRI and PET studies have shown that the brain is differently 
activated by tools compared to other objects which do not evoke actions, such as animals 
and  faces  (e.g.,  Martin,  Wiggs,  Ungerleiden,  &  Haxby,  1996;  Chao  &  Martin,  2000; 
Grèzes & Decety, 2002; Johnson-Frey, 2003; Boronat, Buxmaun, Coslett, Tang, Saffran, 
Kimberg, & Detre, 2005; Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; for a review, see Martin, 2007), 
and that left premotor cortex was also activated during the recalling of actions associated 
with tools (Grafton et al., 1997). Along this line, more recently Buccino and colleagues 
(Buccino, Sato, Cattaneo, Roda, & Riggio, 2009) investigated with a TMS paradigm the 
excitability of the primary motor cortex during the observation of manipulable objects 
(e.g., a mug). Notice that the handle of the objects could be broken, thus reducing the 
corresponding affordance. Results showed that MEPs were larger when the handle of the 
object was complete, thus suggesting that the cortical motor system plays a crucial role 
not only in the programming and online control of movements, but also in the processing   47 
of the features of the objects that allow us to perceive them in terms of affordances, and 
thus as effectively graspable or not. 
Both behavioural and brain imaging studies, of which I have mentioned only few 
examples, leave open different questions. An interesting point concerns the existence of 
different kinds of affordance. As we have seen, behavioral studies showed the emergence 
of compatibility effects, for example between handle orientation of the object and key to 
press (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Phillips & Ward, 2002), and between object size and the 
kind of grip used to respond (Ellis & Tucker, 2000). Borghi and Riggio (2009) proposed 
that might be possible to distinguish different kinds of affordances: stable affordances, 
such as shape and size, which depend on information stored in memory, and temporary 
affordances, such as orientation, which refer to object properties that can vary depending 
on the context. Such affordances might refer to different cognitive and neural systems. 
Referring to the analysis of visual behavior of Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982), Milner 
and Goodale (1995, 2008) proposed the existence of two mechanisms responsible for 
visual processing: the ventral and the dorsal streams. More specifically, the ventral stream 
runs from visual cortex (VC) to inferotemporal cortex (ITC) and is responsible for the 
objects recognition (“what” pathway). Instead, the dorsal neural stream runs from VC to 
parietal cortex (PC) and processes object-directed actions (“where” pathway). Milner and 
Goodale (1995) also postulated the existence of an off-line mode that involves the ventral 
stream and an on-line mode that depends on the dorsal stream. Affordances of objects are 
thought  to  be  encoded  by  the  dorsal  stream,  however,  if  there  are  different  kinds  of 
affordances,  they  could  sub-served  by  different  neural  pathways  (Young,  2006). 
Temporary  affordances,  useful  for  reaching  and  grasping  actions,  probably  involve 
primarily the dorsal stream, instead stable affordances may involve the ventral stream. In 
accord to this view, recent studies suggested a less rigid distinction and proposed that the 
dorsal route can be distinguished into a pure dorsal-dorsal route and a ventral-dorsal route   48 
(Gentilucci, 2003; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). This three-way distinction might allow to 
discriminate between stable and variable affordances. 
Taken  together,  both  behavioural  and  brain  imaging  studies  have  shown  that 
perceiving affordances activates in observers specific motor programs, and it can be argue 
that micro-affordances are relations between features of situations and individual abilities. 
 
2.3 An affordance effect case-sample: the object consistence 
As  anticipated,  now  I  would  present  an  original  research  (Anelli  et  al.,  2010)  as 
example of how it is possible to empirically investigate the notion of affordance by means 
of the methodology of cognitive psychology. 
Literature on categorization has focused on the importance of a variety of perceptual 
properties. Extrinsic properties, i.e. invariant object features, such as object shape (e.g., 
Panis,  Vangeneugden,  Op  de  Beeck,  &  Wagemans,  2008;  Panis,  Vangeneugden,  & 
Wagemans, 2008) and object size (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 2001), have been extensively 
investigated;  in  addition,  intrinsic  properties  that  cannot  be  visually  detected,  such  as 
weight  (e.g.,  Brouwer,  Georgiou,  Glover,  &  Castiello,  2006;  Scorolli,  Borghi,  & 
Glenberg, 2009), have also been studied. However, an important property related to both 
object perception and manipulation has not been extensively studied. To our knowledge 
there are no studies on adults showing how physical object malleability (from now on 
consistence) might influence the way humans categorize and represent category members. 
This  strikes  us  as  surprising  because  consistence  is  a  relevant  and  peculiar  object 
property,  since  it  can  be  estimated  simply  by  seeing  objects,  but,  in  order  to  be 
determined with a certain degree of reliability, it also requires direct object manipulation. 
In  addition, information on how to manipulate objects, and, in particular, on whether 
objects are hard or soft, becomes part of our long term semantic knowledge.   49 
This  study  fills  a  gap  in  research  on  affordances  as  it  clearly  demonstrates  the 
importance of object consistence in different categorization tasks performed by adults. To 
our knowledge the role of consistence has mainly been investigated focusing on infants’ 
and children’s categorical organization. 
Even if the majority of studies on categorization have focused on shape, size, and 
texture, there are some researches which have investigated the role played by consistence 
and  object  malleability  in  categorization.  For  example,  Gibson  and  Walker  (1984) 
observed that 1-month-olds infants were able to extract information about the softness or 
rigidity of an object merely through exploration by the mouth. Rochat (1987) presented 
neonates and 2- and 3-month-olds infants with objects which were identical in shape, 
texture, and dimension  but which varied in consistence. He demonstrated that infants 
respond  haptically  in  a  different  way  to  hard  and  soft  objects,  and  this  difference  is 
modulated by the response modality, oral or manual. This result indicates that infants’ 
behaviour  is  not  under  the  control  of  reflexive  mechanisms  but  is  rather  sensitive  to 
affordances emerging from objects. Overall, results on neonates and infants reveal that 
the sensitivity to object consistence develops quite early. 
Relevant  to  our  aims  are  studies  investigating  the  so-called  “shape  bias”  in 
categorization. Since the seminal work of Landau, Smith and Jones (1988), a variety of 
experiments have provided evidence in favour of the shape bias, that is the tendency to 
extend new labels to objects similar in shape rather than in size, colour, and texture. For 
example, children classify objects endowed with animacy cues, such as objects with eyes, 
by both shape and texture, whereas they classify eyeless objects only on the basis of 
shape (Jones, Smith, & Landau, 1991), foods on the basis of colour (e.g., studies with 
monkeys by Santos, Hauser, & Spelke, 2001), and substances on the basis of material. 
Ellis  and  Oakes  (2006)  presented  14-month-old  infants  with  objects  that  could  be 
categorized by shape (balls vs. blocks) or material (soft vs. hard). Infants who were more   50 
acquainted  with  categorization  at  a  superordinate  level  or  who  had  larger  receptive 
vocabularies categorized the objects by material as well as by shape, in a flexible way, 
whereas other infants tended, primarily, to form categories based on shape. 
To  date,  studies  focusing  on  object  consistence  were  conducted  mainly  in  the 
developmental areas, while the present work investigates the role of object consistence in 
adults. The question we intend to address in this work is whether information on object 
consistence is automatically activated in adults across different categorization tasks and 
different  response  modalities.  In  other  words,  we  hypothesize  that,  while  observing 
images  of  objects,  we  simulate  an  interaction  with  them,  and  we  predict  that  this 
simulation is so fine-grained as to be sensitive to differences in object consistence. As 
previously seen, the simulation theory (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2007) has 
its  neurophysiological  basis  in  the  discovery  of  two  kinds  of  visuo-motor  neurons: 
canonical and mirror neurons (see Gallese et al., 1996; for a review, see Rizzolatti & 
Craighero,  2004).  Of  particular  relevance  for  our  aims  are  canonical  neurons,  which 
discharge during both the execution of specific object-directed actions and during the 
mere  visual  presentation  of  graspable  objects.  In  our  work  we  also  intend  to  explore 
whether  information  on  consistence  is  used  to  distinguish  between  different  kinds  of 
concepts (artefacts and natural objects). 
To address these issues we devised three experiments. Across the experiments we 
used images of common graspable objects (for the complete list, see Appendix A), in 
order  to  avoid  the  influence  of  linguistic  information,  and  a  categorization  task, 
manipulating the relevance of consistence to the task. More specifically, in Experiment 1 
participants were required to decide whether pictures of objects represented hard or soft 
objects,  thus  consistence  was  relevant  to  the  task;  in  Experiments  2  and  3  the  task 
consisted in categorizing objects into artefacts or natural objects, thus it did not require 
consistence  to  be  directly  accessed.  We  also  manipulated  the  response  modality  as   51 
follows. In Experiments 1 and 2 we asked participants to respond by grasping either a soft 
or a hard tennis ball, in order to enhance information related to object manipulation. The 
use of a soft vs. a hard ball was manipulated between blocks but within participants, 
because  we  thought  that  the  sensitivity  to  such  a  subtle  tactile  dimension  could  be 
detected only by reducing the variability across subjects. In Experiment 3 we required 
participants to respond by using a simple key pressure, assuming that this modality of 
response should not directly activate information on object consistence. 
On the basis of this theoretical framework, we advanced the following predictions. 
Across all experiments we predict a main effect of consistence and an interaction between 
consistence and kind of object. If we simulate interacting with objects while seeing them, 
then hard objects should be processed faster than soft ones, as in real life, since the kind 
of grip that hard objects evoke requires less time to be executed, it is less complex, and it 
does not require the hand to surround the object for a whole. In addiction, this effect of 
consistence should be more salient for artefacts than for natural objects. Moreover, the 
comparison between the three experiments will allow us to verify whether consistence is 
activated independently of the kind of task and from the response modality. If consistence 
is activated independently of the kind of task, we should obtain the same results across 
the three experiments, that is, the effect should emerge even in tasks which simply require 
the categorization of objects into artefacts and natural objects. If consistence is activated 
independently of the response modality, we should obtain the same results across the 
three experiments, that is, the effect should emerge even in tasks implying a simple key 
pressure as response modality. Finally, by comparing the three experiments we aim to 
explore  to  what  extent  participants  are  sensitive  to  the  response  modality.  Namely, 
participants could be sensitive either to fine details or to broad differences concerning the 
modality of response. If they are sensitive to fine details, a difference should emerge 
between grasping the soft ball, grasping the hard ball, and pressing the key to answer; if   52 
they are sensitive to broad differences we should only find a difference between ball 
grasping and key pressing. 
The analyses of variance (ANOVA) on correct response times showed, first of all, 
that  we  are  sensitive  to  differences  in  object  consistence  and  that  this  sensitivity  to 
consistence occurred in all three experiments, across different categorization tasks and 
was  not  modulated  by  response  modalities.  Namely,  participants  detected  differences 
between  hard  and  soft  objects  independently  of  whether  the  task  required  them  to 
categorize  objects  by  consistence  or  to  categorize  them  by  object  kind  (artefacts  vs. 
natural objects), and independently of whether they had to respond by pressing a key 
while grasping either a soft or a hard ball or to respond by pressing a key on a keyboard 
without holding balls. Given that differences in consistence are not due to factors such as 
familiarity, visual complexity or typicality  (controlled by means of three ratings), the 
advantage of hard over soft objects seems to be due to the simulation of a real interaction 
with an object rather than to a simple semantic association between a property and an 
object. This is in line with the idea that the kind of grip that hard objects evoke requires 
less time to be executed and it is less complex (Ehrsson, Fagergren, Jonsson, Westling, 
Johansson,  &  Forssberg,  2000).  However,  this  effect  of  consistence  was  present  with 
artefacts,  rather  than  with  natural  objects.  It  is  therefore  plausible  that  it  is  linked  to 
grasping for using an object rather than to grasping for simply manipulating it (for a 
discussion on this issue, see Borghi et al., 2007). 
Secondly, differences in response modality as well as in task change the way we 
represent artefacts and natural objects. When the task requires subjects to focus on single 
exemplars  (Experiment  1),  our  results,  in  line  with  the  Cascade  model  (Humphreys, 
Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Humphreys & Forde, 2001), show that natural objects are 
processed slower than artefacts. This should be due to the fact that identifying individual 
category  exemplars  is  more  demanding  for  natural  objects  than  with  artefacts,  since   53 
natural objects are more similar to each other than artefacts, thus they “compete” more for 
identification. Our results were also in keeping with the PACE (pre-semantic account of 
category-effects) model, a refined account of the Cascade model (Gerlach, Law, Gade, & 
Paulson,  2000;  Gerlach,  Law,  &  Paulson,  2004,  2006;  Gerlach,  2009).  According  to 
PACE, category effects do not depend only on differences in structural similarity between 
categories but also on the kind of task. Thus, PACE accounts for our results as it predicts 
that natural objects are only disadvantaged if the task requires a fine-grained perceptual 
differentiation among items. When the response enhanced manipulation (Experiment 2), 
responses did not differ between artefacts and natural objects, because participants did not 
need to process the single  exemplars but performed a broad categorization task. This 
should lead to an advantage of natural objects over artefacts, but we found no difference 
between the two categories. This is probably due to the fact that responding while holding 
balls  enhances  manipulability,  and  this  might  interfere  with  the  processing  of  natural 
objects more than with the processing of artefacts. Finally, when the response did not 
enhance  manipulation  (Experiment  3),  artefacts  were  categorized  slower  than  natural 
objects.  In  keeping  with  the  Cascade  model,  natural  objects  are  faster  with  a 
categorization task which does not require the access to single exemplar. This result also 
supports the view according to which artefacts activate both manipulation and function 
information, while natural objects activate only manipulation information (Borghi et al., 
2007; Vainio et al, 2008). 
Third, and more crucially, we found that consistence helps to disentangle different 
kinds of objects. More  specifically, we detect  differences in consistence more clearly 
within artefacts than within natural objects. This might be due to the fact that artefacts’ 
characteristics are perceived as more clearly defined compared to those of natural objects. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  interaction  between  consistence  and  object  category  is 
maintained  across  tasks  that  require  subjects  to  focus  either  on  the  single  exemplars   54 
(Experiment 1) or on superordinate categories (Experiments 2 and 3) suggests that the 
result is specific for this property, consistence, and it cannot depend simply on the fact 
that artefacts have higher within category differences. 
We also performed a follow up study on consistence with school-age children (Anelli 
et al., in preparation b), with the aim to verify whether knowledge on consistence emerges 
and thus is already present in kids. We used the same method as with adults, using a 
simplified task: the children had to perform either a natural/artefact categorization task or 
to decide whether the object was smooth or hard, by pressing a key on a keyboard without 
holding balls.  
Preliminary results showed that there were no differences between adults and children 
performance when the task required a natural/artefact discrimination, while a different 
performance were registered when a hard/soft discrimination was necessary. Indeed, in 
the first task children pay attention to motor-perceptual features (i.e. consistence), while 
in the second one consistence seems do not influence the performance, in line with the 
idea that knowledge on consistence is not yet completely present in school-age children. 
This  kind  of  study  has  implications  for  research  on  object  affordances,  since  the 
sensitivity to object consistence shows that visual stimuli activate previous sensorimotor 
interactions  with  the  objects.  The  results  have  novel  implications  for  work  on 
categorization, as they clearly showed that consistence represents an important cue which 
helps to disentangle information associated with artefacts and natural objects, and it might 
be  relevant  to  characterize  artefacts.  Therefore,  models  of  categorization  should  be 
extended to include this very important property. 
 
2.4 Affordance effect and motor resonance 
Briefly resuming what has been previously highlighted, many studies have shown 
that objects observation evokes simple actions, such as reaching and grasping. Therefore,   55 
the notion of affordance, originally proposed by Gibson (1979), can be defined in term of 
potential action patterns activated during the vision of objects. As for the neural basis of 
affordances, canonical neurons discovered in the monkey ventral premotor cortex (Murata 
et al., 1997) seem to have the function of representing objects as potential action patterns. 
Brain activation studies in humans confirms that the mere observation of a graspable 
object  activates  components  of  the  action  observation  network,  namely  the  dorsal 
premotor cortex and the anterior intraparietal sulcus (Grafton et al. 1997), and that the 
influence of the object on grasp planning is within this network (Grèzes et al. 2003). 
Moreover, several behavioural studies used compatibility paradigm and demonstrated 
that objects observation can activate a motor simulation and evoke overt reaching and 
grasping  movements  (e.g.,  Borghi  et  al.,  2007; Vainio  et  al.,  2008;  for  a  review,  see 
Borghi & Cimatti, 2010). Since this last point is particularly relevant for the purposes of 
this thesis, now I would present in more detail the cited studies. 
 
2.4.1 Compatibility paradigm and motor simulation 
Borghi and colleagues (2007) investigated whether seeing objects automatically leads 
to an activation of information about how to manipulate them. Participants were required 
to observe on the computer screen photographs of objects, that could be manipulated 
either  with  a  power  or  a  precision  grip,  and  they  had  to  classified  target-objects  as 
artefacts  or  natural.  Target-objects  were  preceded  by  primes  showing  photographs  of 
hands in grasping postures (precision or power grip). Results showed a congruency effect 
between the prime-hand posture (precision vs. power) and the kind of grip required to 
grasp  the  target-object  (precision  vs.  power).  This  effect  was  found  only  when  the 
experiment was preceded by a motor training phase in which participants imitated the 
gestures displayed in the hand-pictures. The result suggests that motor  information is 
automatically  activated  by  visual  stimuli;  however,  participants  have  to  be  trained  to   56 
reproduce the primes-postures before the categorization task, in order to induce a stronger 
association  with  the  hand-postures  they  would  adopt  to  interact  with  specific  target-
objects, and thus obtain a specific motor priming. Vainio et al. (2008) tried to further 
clarify to what extent, during object identification, occurs the processing of motor aspects 
of an object. The authors used a modified version of the paradigm of Borghi et al. (2007), 
replicating the study with video-clips instead of static hands images and without asking to 
participants to perform a motor training phase. Results showed a stronger congruency 
effect between the hand posture and the grip evoked by objects. Thus, simulating the 
grasp action in the training phase (Borghi et al., 2007) and observing dynamic grasping 
(Vainio et al., 2007) may bear similar influences on effect production. When the hand 
primes are static, the training might be necessary for the reactivation of gestures that are 
primed  by  the  observed  hand  in  an  action-observation  matching  system.  In  contrast, 
observation of dynamic grasping may directly lead to this activation of gestures in the 
same system. Taken together, these two behavioral studies highlight that when a hand in 
potential interaction with an object is observed motor information emerges, leading to a 
facilitation effect and a motor simulation (for a review, see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010). 
Overall, both behavioral and brain imaging findings clearly indicate that perceiving 
affordances  leads  to  the  activation  of  specific  motor  programs  in  observers.  The 
possibility for a given feature to evoke a motor behavior (e.g., a grasping-like behavior) 
relies on the sensori-motor coupling that allows an onlooker to map the feature onto the 
motor possibilities of one’s own motor repertoire (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012). This 
phenomenon occurs both at the neural and at the behavioral level and can be interpreted 
as activation of a motor simulation. Referring to what claimed in the previous chapter, 
simulation means that the same sensorimotor systems are activated both on-line during 
interaction with objects and off-line during object observation, even if in the last case 
there is not an execution of overt movements (e.g., Jeannerod, 2006; Gallese, 2009).   57 
2.4.2 Characteristics of resonance mechanism 
Other  studies  have  revealed  further  features  of  this  motor  simulation  system.  For 
example, they suggested that the mirror system activity specifically codes motor actions 
of  a  biological  agent:  indeed,  less  mirror  system  activity,  in  other  words  less  motor 
resonance, was registered during the observation of an artificial hand action than during 
the  observation  of  a  real  hand  action  (Perani,  Fazio,  Borghese,  Tettamanti,  Ferrari, 
Decety,  &  Gilardi,  2001;  Tai,  Scherfler,  Brooks,  Sawamoto,  &  Castiello,  2004). 
Moreover,  biomechanically  impossible  actions  did  not  activate  the  mirror  system 
(Stevens,  Fonlupt,  Shiffrar,  &  Decety,  2000).  Buccino  and  colleagues  (Buccino,  Lui, 
Canessa, Patteri, Lagravinese, Benuzzi, Porro, & Rizzolatti, 2004a) compared the actions 
of  non-conspecifics,  and  found  that  actions  belonging  to  the  motor  repertoire  of  the 
observer were mapped on his/her motor system. Motor resonance increases when both 
participants and observed actor share the same culture (Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & 
Iacoboni, 2007) and perspective (Bruzzo, Borghi, & Ghirlanda, 2008).  On the whole, 
these  results  suggest  that  our  resonance  system  is  sensitive  to  the  degree  of 
correspondence between the observed action and the motor capability of the observer. 
It is important to highlight another relevant point: the role of individual differences. 
Each  person’s  motor  repertoire  is  constrained  not  only  by  common  musculoskeletal 
anatomy, but also by the skills that person has learned (Grèzes & de Gelder, 2008). A 
particular action may be included in the motor repertoire of a trained expert but not in the 
motor  repertoire  of  someone  who  has  not  been  so  trained.  Different  researchers  used 
acquired  motor  skills  as  an  instrument  to  investigate  the  tuning  of  the  brain’s  mirror 
mechanisms.  Indeed,  groups  of  individuals  with  different  acquired  motor  skills  were 
tested to verify whether the brain’s system for action observation is precisely tuned to the 
individual’s  acquired  motor  repertoire.  In  this  regard,  some  interesting  researches 
demonstrated that the activation of a motor simulation is possible only when performing a   58 
given sequence of actions is part of participants’ motor competence or, stated differently, 
that individuals are selectively sensitive to those actions that are  related to and share 
features with their actions (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
several  evidence  derives  from  researches  on  motor  expertise.  For  example,  different 
studies have demonstrated that resonant mechanisms are activated during observation of 
others dancing, playing basketball, or climbing, and that this motor resonance is stronger 
when expert athletes rather than novices observe other experts (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 
2005, 2006; Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, 
& Grafton, 2009; Pezzulo, Barca, Bocconi, & Borghi, 2010). 
More specifically, in a  fMRI study Calvo-Merino et al. (2005) studied experts in 
classical ballet and experts in capoeira dancing. Greater activity in the mirror areas was 
found when dancers watched their own dance style (i.e., when classical ballet dancers 
watched ballet moves and capoeira artists observed capoeira moves). Thus, the motor 
system was more strongly engaged during action observation when participants already 
had  a  specific  motor  representation  of  the  action  they  observed.  However,  this  effect 
could also be due to dancers’ higher visual familiarity with a kind of movement and not to 
a  real  motor  simulation.  These  concerns  were  directly  addressed  in  a  control-study 
(Calvo-Merino et  al., 2006). Expert female and male classical ballet dancers  watched 
movies of gender specific ballet moves. The rationale behind this study was that male and 
female  dancers  should  have  the  same  amount  of  visual  exposure  to  all  movements, 
because  they  do  their  training  together,  hence  the  critical  manipulation  was  watching 
movements performed by male or female. Results showed a stronger activation in motor 
areas and a larger motor resonance effect when dancers observed movements performed 
by  other  classical  ballet  dancers  of  their  own  gender,  thus  from  their  own  motor 
repertoire,  compared  to  opposite-gender  moves  that  they  frequently  saw  but  did  not 
perform. Thus, participants seem to translate the observed movements into their specific   59 
motor capabilities. Furthermore, this finding  constitutes a proof that dancers not only 
mentally simulated but also predicted the upcoming part of a move they observed on the 
basis of their own motor knowledge, as demonstrated by the activation of the cerebellum 
which is involved in precise prediction (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). 
In the same vein, in a psychophysical study Aglioti et al. (2008) showed that elite 
basketball players are able to predict the success of free shots at a basket earlier and better 
than expert observers and novice players. This advantage for experts has been attributed 
to  their  higher  capability  to  read  body  kinematics  in  the  early  movement  phases  and 
consequently to make prediction. 
Finally, in a behavioral study Pezzulo et al. (2010) showed to expert and novice rock 
climbers three different routes (easy, impossible, and difficult). The performance in a 
subsequent recalling test showed no differences between experts and novices on the easy 
and impossible routes, whereas the performance of experts was better than that of novices 
on the difficult route. Also in this case, the simulation process appears to be modulated by 
motor repertoire and expertise. 
To conclude, to date several evidence clearly demonstrates that our brain “resonates” 
when we see others performing actions. This resonance mechanism is modulated by the 
similarity between the actions we observe and the actions we are able to perform, and this 
demonstrates that the perceptual system is tuned to one’s own motor capabilities. What 
has been presented in this chapter will be useful in the next one, given that the Study 1 is 
focused on investigating fine-grained resonant mechanisms with dangerous affordances.   60   61 
CHAPTER III 
STUDY 1:  
MOTOR RESONANCE WITH DANGEROUS AFFORDANCE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to survive, humans must become able to respond adequately to the invites 
objects offer to them. For example, they need to be able to discriminate between objects 
that can be potentially source of danger or pain (from now on dangerous object) and 
objects they can approach without any risk (from now on neutral object). Namely, they 
have to learn to grasp useful objects, such as glass and tomato, and to avoid grasping 
potentially  dangerous  objects,  such  as  broken  glasses  and  cactus.  Should  also  be 
considered that information on potential risks objects evoke might conflict with motor 
actions activated while observing objects. 
As widely discussed in Chapter 2, since the seminal book of Gibson (1979), many 
behavioural and neuroscience studies have shown that observing objects, and particularly 
tools, activates affordances evoking motor responses (e.g., Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Martin, 
2007;  Bub  &  Masson,  2010),  and  that  even  comprehending  words  activates  the 
affordances of the objects they refer to (e.g., Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Gentilucci, 
2003; Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011). In the 
last decade research has shed new light on the role played by affordances. Behavioural 
experiments  have  shown  that  objects  evoke  specific  action  components  (i.e.  micro-
affordance, Ellis & Tucker, 2000): for example, when observing an apple or a bottle, 
participants are facilitated when they have to respond by mimicking a power rather than a 
precision grip (Tucker  & Ellis, 2001). A number of computational models have been   62 
proposed (e.g., Sahin, Cakmak, Dogar, Ugur, & Ucoluk, 2007; Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi, 
& Baldassarre, 2010; Borghi, Di Ferdinando, & Parisi, 2011). In the field of cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a major difference between the Gibsonian view 
and recent studies is that, in contrast with the externalist perspective promoted by Gibson, 
current  research  takes  into  account  how  affordances  are  represented  in  the  brain. 
However,  the  majority  of  studies  focus  on  affordances  in  adults,  with  a  few  notable 
exceptions (e.g., Rochat, 1987; Smith, 2000, 2005). 
In contrast, the present study (Anelli et al., in press b; Anelli et al., under review) 
focuses on how affordances develop as it aims at investigating whether both adults and 
school-age children are sensitive to differences in object typology (i.e. between neutral vs. 
dangerous objects) and object category (i.e. between artefact and natural objects), and 
whether they resonate while observing a hand priming an object. 
As claimed by Sahin and colleagues (Sahin et al., 2007), we perceive affordances 
from multiple perspectives. Specifically, we perceive not only the affordances that the 
environment offers to us, but also the affordances that the environment offers to others. 
The  second  type  of  affordances  (i.e.,  the  affordances  from  an  observer  perspective) 
appears when we observe the potential interaction of someone else (human, animal or 
even  robot)  with  the  environment.  In  a  recent  study,  Costantini  and  colleagues 
(Costantini,  Ambrosini,  Tieri,  Sinigaglia,  &  Commitieri,  2010)  have  shown  that 
participants  respond  to  objects  affordances  when  objects  are  located  in  their  own 
peripersonal but not in the extrapersonal space, unless they  are located in the other’s 
peripersonal space. This indicates that we are sensitive to objects’ affordances and at the 
same  time  that  we  are able  to  see  objects  from  the  point  of  view  of  another  person. 
Consistently with the idea that we perceive affordances from an observer perspective, 
behavioral studies with a priming paradigm have shown that when the target-object is 
preceded  by  a  hand  prime  displaying  a  congruent  grip,  categorization  responses  are   63 
facilitated (e.g., Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio et al., 2008). As more fully described in the 
previous chapter (see section 2.4.1), these studies highlight that when observing a hand in 
potential interaction with an object motor information emerges and a facilitation effect is 
found (for a review, see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010). 
Provided that observing graspable objects, particularly when preceded by an action 
prime,  evokes  a  motor  response,  what  happens  when  dangerous  objects  are  seen  in 
interaction with a hand? Different TMS studies on empathy for pain, a topic introduced in 
Chapter 1 (see section 1.5.4), have investigated passive responses to pain observation 
(e.g., Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Avenanti et al., 2006). The results of such 
researches  showed  that,  after  watching  a  needle  inserted  deep  into  a  model  hand,  a 
selectively inhibition was registered. Indeed, the significant MEPs amplitude decreases 
were specific not only for the observed body part (i.e. for the hand and not for the foot), 
but also for the particular muscle observed, compared to a non-body object (tomato) or to 
a tactile stimulation (innocuous cotton bud control). Thus, pain observation leads to a 
specific corticospinal inhibition, similar to directly-experienced painful stimulation (e.g., 
Le  Pera,  Graven-Nielsen,  Valeriani,  Oliviero,  Di  Lazzaro,  Tonali,  &  Arendt-Nielsen, 
2001;  Farina,  Tinazzi,  Le  Pera,  &  Valeriani,  2003).  This  finding  suggests  a  resonant 
activation of pain representations in the onlooker’s sensorimotor system. 
Not  only  neural,  but  also  behavioral  evidence  (Morrison  et  al.,  2007)  has 
demonstrated a specific influence of pain observation on overt motor responses. More 
specifically,  observing  a  video  of  a  needle  penetrating  a  hand  speeded  withdrawal 
movements (key releases) and slowed approach movements (key presses); this difference 
was not present when participants observed a cotton bud touching a hand or when both 
the needle and the cotton bud penetrated or touched a sponge rather than a hand. 
To this point, it is important to specify what we mean by the notion of empathy in this 
study. Following Morrison et al. (2007), we can distinguish between pain empathy and   64 
pain recognition. “We regard pain empathy as a compassionate affective state which the 
observer experiences on behalf of the sufferer, and which may result in prosocial actions. 
Pain recognition [is] a basic appraisal of the pain-related nature of the sufferer’s situation. 
Although pain recognition may be necessary for empathy, it is not sufficient for it, and 
may  occur  independently  of  empathy  in  day-to-day  contexts.  Nevertheless,  pain 
recognition may involve affective evaluation and motor response modulation” (Morrison 
et al., 2007, p. 415). In line with this distinction, previous studies concern the influence of 
pain observation on motor responses, thus pain recognition. It is also important to clarify 
that  adopting  the  notion  of  empathy  for  pain  we  intend  to  refer  to  phenomena  of 
emotional  contagion,  not  to  the  cognitive  aspects  of  empathy.  Nummenmaa  and 
colleagues (Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008) explain that simulating 
others’ emotional states can represent a special case of empathy, i.e. emotional empathy, 
which  differs  from  cognitive  empathy.  Indeed,  emotional  empathy  (or  emotional 
contagion) involves the mirror neuron system more than cognitive empathy, and is at the 
basis of the motor resonance for others. 
Overall,  previous  studies  provide  clear  evidence,  pertaining  both  behavioural 
responses  and  underlying  neural  mechanisms  of  empathy  for  pain  (namely,  pain 
recognition and emotional contagion). However, to our knowledge they investigate only 
cases in which pain is passively induced by an object (e.g., the needle), and in which there 
is a direct interaction between the painful object and the hand. Our study, instead, focuses 
on  the  resonant  mechanisms  elicited  when  observing  somebody  (a  hand)  actively 
preparing an action toward a dangerous object and when the interaction between the hand 
prime and the object is not direct but potential. 
A further line of research is relevant to the issue addressed in this study. Recent 
neuroscience works have provided evidence of a motor resonance effect triggered by the 
observation of others’ actions. As already discussed in the previous chapters, a variety of   65 
brain imaging results have shown that, the higher the similarity between the observed 
motor  program  and  the  motor  program  participants  are  able  to  execute,  the  more  the 
mirror neuron system is activated (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006; Aglioti et al., 2008; 
Calvo-Merino,  Ehrenberg,  Leung,  &  Haggard,  2010;  Pezzulo  et  al.,  2010).  A  good 
example  is  given  by  neuroimaging  and  behavioural  studies  on  action  observation  on 
expert dancers. For example, in a series of experiments Calvo-Merino and colleagues 
demonstrated  that  neural  activity  in  premotor  and  parietal  areas  was  stronger  when 
dancers  viewed  moves  from  their  own  motor  repertoire  compared  to  opposite-gender 
moves that they knew but did not perform. 
To our knowledge, the only study in which motor resonance was investigated while 
observing different kinds of hands interacting with painful stimuli is a recent TMS work 
(Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010) that explored emphatic brain responses in white and 
black  participants  while  observing  the  pain  of  ingroup  or  outgroup  members  (i.e.,  of 
members of the group to which they belong or not). Perceiving painful stimulations on 
ingroup members led to an immediate resonance (i.e., an inhibition of the onlookers’ 
corticospinal  system)  while  responses  to  outgroup  members’  stimulations  were  less 
automatic. 
On the behavioural side, evidence on motor resonance during observation of different 
kinds  of  hands  (e.g.,  in  different  postures,  in  different  perspectives,  or  belonging  to 
different populations) has been found with priming paradigms. Bruzzo and colleagues 
(Bruzzo et al., 2008) demonstrated that the similarity between observed hand primes and 
participants  own  hands  facilitated  judgements  on  action  plausibility:  specifically, 
responses were faster when participants wore a glove and observed gloved hands, and 
when  they  observed  hands  in  their  own  perspective  rather  than  in  an  allocentric 
perspective. Liuzza and colleagues (Liuzza, Setti, & Borghi, 2012) recently investigated 
motor resonance in children. Children were required to judge the weight of an object   66 
primed by a child or an adult hand in an action-posture (grasp) or in a non action-posture 
(fist). Their responses were faster when the object was preceded by a grasping hand and 
when the prime-hand was a child’s hand rather than an adult’s one. In a similar vein, 
Ranzini  and  colleagues  (Ranzini,  Borghi,  &  Nicoletti,  2011)  investigated  action-  and 
object-related motor cueing effects, by means of a hand-cued line bisection task in which 
human and robotics hands were displayed. Relevantly to the present work, they found a 
stronger  lateralization  effect  with  biological  than  non-biological  stimuli  indicating  a 
higher motor resonance effect with human than with robotic hands. 
In  sum,  so  far  Avenanti  and  colleagues  (Avenanti  et  al.,  2005,  2006  2010)  have 
provided evidence of a  resonant mechanism while observing different kinds of hands 
interacting with painful stimuli. However, in these studies pain was passively induced by 
the object (the needle), and participants could observe the direct interaction between the 
hand  and  the  needle.  In  our  study  we  intend  to  explore  resonant  mechanisms  with  a 
priming paradigm, during active action preparation, when the hand and the object do not 
interact.  Thus,  the  present  work  investigates  at  a  functional  level  the  mechanisms 
occurring during observation of a prime given by a hand or by a control object followed 
by objects that might be dangerous or provoke pain. To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous study has investigated active responses to dangerous stimuli and the effects of 
social variables, such as gender and age of participants, on this kind of task. In addition, 
even if the study by Liuzza et al. (2012) confirms the existence of motor resonance in 
children, to our knowledge so far nobody has explored how motor resonance develops 
from childhood to adult age. 
To investigate this complex issue we used a priming paradigm, presenting children 
(Experiment  1  and  Experiment  2)  and  adults  (Experiment  3)  with  different  kinds  of 
primes followed by different kinds of objects. We presented five different kinds of hands-
primes:  four  human  hands  and  a  robotic  hand.  The  human  hands  were  orthogonally   67 
organized as follows: there were two male hands and two female hands, of which two 
hands were in a grasping posture and two were in a not grasping (i.e., static) posture. The 
robotic hand was included to verify whether a difference was present between responses 
to  human  and  non-human  hands  (i.e.,  between  biological  and  non-biological  primes). 
Beside these five hands-primes, a control stimulus was presented, given by an object of 
low visual complexity and very easily recognizable, i.e. a brick, in order to check whether 
the presentation of any kind of prime might influence the participants’ responses. Overall, 
the primes were selected in order to manipulate the gender of the observed prime-hand 
(male  vs.  female  hands)  and  to  suggest  or  not  a  potential  action  (grasping  vs.  static 
hands). 
The presentation of the prime was followed by the appearance of a target-object. 
Overall, we selected sixteen target-objects. In order to manipulate the object typology and 
the object category, the objects were orthogonally organized as follows: we used eight 
neutral  and  eight  dangerous  objects,  of  which  eight  objects  were  artefacts  and  eight 
natural objects. 
The aim of our study is twofold. First, we intend to verify how responses to objects 
and sensitivity to  fine object characteristics (i.e. object typology and  object category) 
develop. Specifically, we investigate the ability to differently perceive and process objects 
that can be potentially source of danger or pain for us (dangerous object) and objects that 
we can approach and interact without any risk (neutral object). We did not distinguish 
between  potential  pain  or  threat,  since  we  were  interested  in  motor  resonance  while 
observing objects or entities that can potentially provoke pain, independently from their 
being  active  or  passive.  Indeed,  even  for  animals  it  would  be  difficult  to  distinguish 
between those representing an active threat and those potentially dangerous but typically 
more  passive:  for  example,  would  a  scorpion  considered  as  an  active  threat  or  as 
responding  only  when  attacked?  We  hypothesize  that  all  graspable  objects  activate  a   68 
facilitating motor response; however, in the case of dangerous objects the response might 
be blocked, generating an interference effect. In other words, observing dangerous and 
painful objects would evoke aversive affordances, in line with the results of Morrison and 
colleagues (Morrison et al., 2007). As to the developmental trajectory of this effect, we 
predict that the capability to distinguish object typology (i.e. between dangerous and not 
dangerous objects) emerges quite early in development, as it is crucial from an adaptive 
point of view, whereas the capability to differentiate motor responses depending on fine-
grained  differences  related  to  the  object  category  (i.e.  between  artefact  and  natural 
objects), for example activating functional information for artefacts, emerges later. 
Second, we aim to investigate how motor resonance develops. Namely, this issue 
concerns  whether  both  children  and  adults  are  sensitive  to  the  affordances  and  the 
potential  dangers  offered  by  the  objects  in  the  environment  to  others.  In  writings  of 
Gibson, support for the observer perspective can also be seen. While describing the nature 
of the optical information for perceiving affordances, Gibson (1979) mentions that it is 
required for a child to perceive the affordances of things in the environment for others as 
well as itself: “The child begins, no doubt, by perceiving the affordances of things for her, 
for her own personal behavior. But she must learn to perceive the affordances of things 
for other observers as well as herself” (Gibson, 1979, p. 141). We hypothesize that, with 
age, participants become progressively more careful to the agent who may interact with 
object, namely responses are modulated by details of the hands as well as of the motor 
program the hand evokes. More specifically, if a general motor resonance phenomenon 
occurs, then we should obtain a difference between responses to the biological primes 
(i.e., human hands) and the non-biological primes (i.e., robot hand and brick).  If this 
motor resonance effect is sensitive to fine-grained aspects, then we should find: first, a 
gender-dependent motor resonance, namely male participants should resonate more with 
male hand-primes, and female participants with female hand-primes; second, a sensitivity   69 
to the relationship between the hand posture and the action, namely we should find a 
difference in responding to the grasping compared to the static hand posture. 
Interestingly,  the  choice  of  a  priming  paradigm  could  allow  us  to  investigate  the 
timing of two different mechanisms, one possibly related to the activation of the mirror 
neuron system, triggered by the observation of the hand, and the other to the canonical 
neuron  system,  activated  by  the  presence  of  the  object  (Liuzza  et  al.,  2012).  Two 
possibilities are open. The first is that observing the hand-prime induces to prepare an 
action, possibly through the mediation of the mirror neuron system, and that later, on 
appearance of the object, either a facilitating or a blocking mechanism induced by the 
object intervenes. This leads to the prediction that, the higher is the motor resonance 
induced by the observed prime, the more a general facilitation effect should be present. 
The second possibility is that the prime, together with the object that follows, activates a 
specific motor program. This leads to the prediction that, the more similar the prime is to 
the participant’s own hand, the slower the responses with dangerous objects should be. To 
clarify: the more we identify ourselves with the person we observe, the more we are 
careful in dealing with dangerous objects. 
 
3.2 Experiment 1  
The aim of the first experiment is twofold. First, we intend to investigate whether 
school-age children are sensitive to differences in object dangerousness (i.e. neutral vs. 
dangerous  objects)  and  object  category  (i.e.  artefact  vs.  natural  objects)  as  well. 
Specifically, we predict an interference effect with dangerous objects, resulting in slower 
response times with dangerous compared to neutral objects.  
Second, we are interested in exploring whether and to what extent children resonate 
while  observing  a  hand  priming  an  object.  If  observing  a  hand  prime  evokes  motor 
resonance, then responses should differ when observing a biological prime (i.e. a prime   70 
more similar to the participants hand, a human hand) compared to a non biological one 
(i.e. a robotic hand and a control prime). Furthermore, the hands showed as primes belong 
to children of the same age of the participants. In addition, if children are sensitive to fine 
grained aspect of the action they observe, they should respond differently when observing 
grasping hands compared to static hands, and when observing hands of their own gender 
compared to hands of another gender. If the motor resonance effect induced by the prime 
is  modulated  by  the  presented  object,  then  we  should  find  that  the  higher  similarity 
between the prime and the children’s own hand causes an interference when the prime is 
followed by a dangerous object and a facilitation when followed by a neutral object. 
To  these  aims,  we  run  an  experiment  in  which  participants  were  required  to 
distinguish between artefacts and natural target-objects, so that the object dangerousness 
was not relevant to the task. 
 
3.2.1 Methods 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-six participants (16 males and 10 females) with a mean age of 7.4 years (age 
range:  6  –  8  years)  took  part  in  the  experiment.  All  subjects  were  right-handed  and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment and their parents gave informed consent. 
 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Participants sat in front of a 17-inch colour monitor (the eye-to-screen distance was 
approximately  50  cm).  E-Prime  2.0  software  was  used  for  presenting  stimuli  and 
collecting responses. 
The experimental stimuli consisted of sixteen colour pictures of living and non-living 
objects preceded by a prime, in order to enhance (grasping hand) or to reduce (static   71 
hand) aspects related to the action, so that a simulation effect was induced (see Appendix 
B for the complete list and the pictures of the stimuli, section B.1 and B.2). All the objects 
would be normally grasped with a power grip. There were four categories (dangerous-
natural  objects,  dangerous-artefact  objects,  neutral-natural  objects,  neutral-artefact 
objects), with four objects for each class. Each target-object was preceded by one of the 
six primes: a grasping hand of a male child, a grasping hand of a female child, a grasping 
hand of a robot, a static hand of a male child, a static hand of a female child, a control 
stimulus (brick). 
A  rating  was  carried  out  in  order  to  check  whether  the  target  objects  differed  in 
dangerousness.  Forty-three  raters  were  asked  to  evaluate  the  degree  of  danger  and 
potential  pain  evoked  by  each  object  on  a  five-point  Likert  scale  (with  1  =  not 
dangerous/neutral  object  and  5  =  extremely  dangerous  object).  Response  means  were 
entered into a within-subjects 2 x 2 ANOVA with the following factors: Typology (neutral 
and dangerous) and Category (artefact and natural). The analysis revealed the main effect 
of Typology [F (1, 12) = 95.3, MSE = 0.24, p < .001]. This result demonstrated that the 
sixteen objects differed concerning danger and pain evoked, and it also showed that there 
was no difference between artefact and natural objects. 
 
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were required to decide as fast as possible whether the target-stimulus 
was an artefact or a natural object by pressing one of two designed keys. Half of the 
participants were required to make a right-hand key-response if the target was artefact and 
a  left-hand  key-response  if  it  was  natural,  whereas  the  opposite  hand-to-category 
arrangement was applied to the other half. 
The experiment consisted of one practice block of 24 trials and one experimental 
block of 96 trials. Each trial (see Figure 3.1 for the experimental design) began with a   72 
 
prime 
200 ms. 
50 ms.  target-object 
until response or 
2000 ms. 
500 ms. 
SOA 
feedback 
2000 ms. 
fixation point (+) displayed for 500 ms in the centre of the screen. Then, a prime was 
shown for 200 ms, followed by a white screen (SOA) for 50 ms. Then, a target object was 
shown and remained on the centre of the screen until a response had been made or 2000 
ms had elapsed. Both prime and target objects were centred on the screen. Their average 
size  was  307 x  323  pixel.  Participants  received  feedback  on  reaction  time  (RT)  after 
pressing the right or the wrong key (the reaction time value or “Error”, respectively). The 
next trial began after the feedback disappeared. The order of conditions was balanced 
across participants. Overall the experiment lasted about 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Results 
Reaction  times  (RT)  for  incorrect  responses  and  RTs  more  than  two  standard 
deviations from each participant’s overall mean were excluded from the analysis. Error 
trials were excluded from further analyses (7 %). We decided to use ANOVA since it is 
widely used in RTs analyses in psychology and neuroscience. Indeed, compared to other 
statistics  ANOVA  is  remarkably  robust  to  deviations  from  normality,  and  slight 
Figure 3.1 Study 1: experimental design, example of a trial. 
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deviations  from  normality  typically  characterize  RTs  distributions  (for  discussion  on 
robustness of ANOVA, see Lindman, 1974; Boos & Brownie, 2004). The correct RTs 
were entered into a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 x 6 analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Participant 
Gender (male and female) as between participants factor, and Object Typology (neutral 
and dangerous), Category (artefact and natural), and Prime (grasping hand of  a male 
child, grasping hand of a female child, grasping hand of a robot, static hand of a male 
child,  static  hand  of  a  female  child,  control  stimulus)  as  within  participants  factors. 
Fisher’s LSD post-hoc tests were also conducted on significant interactions. 
The analysis revealed the main effect of Object Typology [F (1, 24) = 5.12, MSE = 
20273, p = .03], showing that responses were faster when the object was neutral and 
slower when the stimuli were dangerous (M = 694 vs. 721 ms, respectively), (Figure 3.2). 
Moreover, we obtained an effect of Prime [F (5, 120) = 2.27, MSE = 7561, p = .05]. The 
second main effect revealed that participants responded faster to the stimuli preceded by a 
human hand prime (i.e. a biological hand, 701 ms) and slower to the stimuli preceded by a 
robot hand and control stimulus (i.e. a non-biological hand, 722 ms). As revealed by the 
post-hoc test, response times were faster when the prime was the grasping hand of a 
female (M = 690 ms) than the grasping hand of a robot (M = 725, p < .01) or the control 
stimulus (M = 714, p = .04). Moreover, response times were faster when the prime was 
the static hand of a female (M = 699) than the grasping hand of a robot (p = .03), (Figure 
3.3).  Furthermore,  there  was  a  significant  interaction  between  Object  Category  and 
Participant Gender [F (1, 24) = 4.28, MSE = 24434, p < .05]. The post-hoc test showed 
that males responded faster to natural objects and slower to artefacts objects (M = 686 vs. 
720 ms respectively, p < .05), while there was no difference between natural and artefact 
objects as far as females were concerned (722 vs. 702 ms, respectively, p = .34), (Figure 
3.4). 
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Figure 3.2 Study 1, Experiment 1: significant Object Typology effect for RTs, 
values are in ms and error bars show standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 3.3 Study 1, Experiment 1: significant Prime effect for RTs, values are in 
ms and error bars show standard errors of the means. 
Figure  3.4  Study  1,  Experiment  1:  Object  Category  and  Participant  Gender 
interaction for RTs, values are in ms and error bars show standard errors of the 
means.   75 
3.2.3 Discussion 
Our  results  clearly  demonstrate  that  school-age  children  are  sensitive  to  the 
distinction between neutral graspable and dangerous objects. As revealed by the response 
time  patterns,  dangerous  objects  yielded  longer  RTs,  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  a 
response was prepared, followed by a blocking mechanism leading to interference. To our 
knowledge, this is the first behavioural study demonstrating the capability to distinguish 
between neutral and dangerous objects in children. 
Interestingly,  children  seem  to  be  aware  also  of  the  difference  between  object 
categories. Specifically, males responded faster to natural objects than to artefacts. This 
result is in line with the literature (Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio et al., 2008; Anelli et al., 
2010) and could be due to the activation of both manipulative and functional information 
with artefacts, while with natural objects only manipulative information is activated. 
In  addition,  our  results  clearly  show  a  motor  resonance  effect,  since  children  are 
sensitive to the difference between actions performed by biological and non-biological 
agents. Overall, we found that children responded faster when the prime was a human 
hand compared to other stimuli (robotics hand and brick). We tend to interpret our result 
in terms of motor resonance: in line with common coding theories (e.g., Hommel et al., 
2001) resonance would be higher when the similarity between the hand prime and the 
participant’s  hand  is  higher.  Indeed,  previous  studies  provided  evidence  of  resonant 
effects, in both children and adults, showing with a variety of paradigms that, the higher 
the similarity between the hand (or the movements of the observed organism) and our 
own hand (or our movement), the more facilitation occurs (e.g., Ranzini et al., 2011; 
Liuzza et al., 2012). We tend to exclude that the advantage of human hand over the 
control stimuli was due to a sort of oddball effect, as human primes were twice as many 
as other primes. Indeed, each single prime was presented the same number of times (4 
presentations in the practice block and 16 presentations in the experimental block). If we   76 
assume that participants were sensitive to the frequency of presentation of hand primes, 
then we should expect an advantage of the robotic hand over the brick (since all primes 
except the brick were hands), but there was not. 
However, we must point out that children did not seem to be sensitive to other fine 
grained  aspect  of  the  action  they  observe,  namely,  there  was  no  effect  of  gender 
congruency nor of kind of posture. There could be two possible explanations: first, we 
can have used, as biological primes, hands that do not differ enough by gender; namely, 
one could argue that there was not a clear difference between hands of a male child and 
hands of a female child, so that there can be a perceptual problem to discriminate the 
gender of the observed hand. Second, it can be possible that children are not yet sensitive 
to fine grained aspects of motor resonance such as gender. 
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
In order to disentangle whether the results of the Experiment 1 could be due to a 
perceptive problem of the primes hands (i.e., hands without a clear difference between 
hand of a male child and hand of a female child) or to a gender’s lack of sensitivity, in the 
Experiment 2 we presented adult hands as primes (i.e., hands with a more clear difference 
between hand of a man adult and hand of a woman adult). 
 
3.3.1 Methods 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty participants (16 males and 14 females) with a mean age of 8.2 years (age 
range: 6 – 10 years) took part in the Experiment 2. All subjects were right-handed and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment and their parents gave informed consent. 
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3.3.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same used in Experiment 1 except for 
the following. We replaced the hands primes of children with hands primes of adults (see 
Appendix B, section B.3), so that each target-object was preceded by one of the following 
six primes: a grasping hand of a man adult, a grasping hand of a woman adult, a grasping 
hand of a robot, a static hand of a man adult, a static hand of a woman adult, a control 
stimulus (brick). 
 
3.3.2 Results 
Data were treated as in Experiment 1. Reaction times (RTs) for incorrect responses 
and RTs more than two standard deviations from each participant’s overall mean were 
excluded from the analysis. Error trials were excluded from further analyses (6 %). The 
correct RTs were entered into a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 x 6 ANOVA, with Participant Gender 
(male  and  female)  as  between  participants  factor,  and  Object  Typology  (neutral  and 
dangerous), Category (artefact and natural), and Prime (grasping hand of a man adult, 
grasping hand of a woman adult, grasping hand of a robot, static hand of a man adult, 
static hand of a woman adult, control stimulus) as within participants factors. Fisher’s 
LSD post-hoc tests were also conducted on significant interactions. 
In the ANOVA, the analysis revealed two main effects: Object Typology [F (1, 28) = 
12.66, MSE = 6707, p < .01] and Prime [F (5, 140) = 2.75, MSE = 8673, p = .02]. 
Responses were faster when the object was neutral and slower when the stimuli were 
dangerous (744 vs. 765 ms, respectively), (Figure 3.5). The second main effect showed 
that participants responded faster to the stimuli preceded by a human hand prime (i.e. a 
biological hand, 745 ms) and slower to the stimuli preceded by a robot hand and control 
stimulus (i.e. a non biological hand, 773 ms). As revealed by the post-hoc test, response 
times were faster when the prime was the grasping hand of a woman (M = 748 ms) than   78 
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the grasping hand of a robot (M = 774, p = .03) or the control stimulus (M = 771, p < .05), 
and when the prime was the grasping hand of a man (M = 746) than the grasping hand of 
a robot (p = .02) or the control stimulus (p = .04). Moreover, the responses were faster 
when the object was preceded by the static hand of a woman (M = 745 ms) than the 
grasping hand of a robot (p = .02) or the control stimulus (p = .03), and when the prime 
was the static hand of a man (M = 743) than the grasping hand of a robot (p = .01) or the 
control stimulus (p = .02), (Figure 3.6). 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions. However, the interaction 
Object Typology and Category was marginally significant [F (1, 28) = 3.68, MSE = 8673, 
p = .07], and it suggested that responses to neutral objects were differently modulated by 
the category of the stimuli (i.e., responses to natural objects were faster than to artefacts, 
M = 733 vs. 754 ms, respectively), while in responses to dangerous objects a difference 
between natural and artefact objects (M = 769 vs. 762 ms, respectively) was not present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Study 1, Experiment 2: significant Object Typology effect for RTs, 
values are in ms and error bars show standard errors of the means.   79 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
In line with results of Experiment 1, results confirmed that children were sensitive 
to  the  distinction  between  dangerous  and  neutral  objects,  as  response  times  were 
slower with the first than with the second. However, no difference was found between 
artefacts  and  natural  objects,  although  data  suggest  that  this  distinction  begun  to 
emerge. 
In addition, also in the Experiment 2 we found evidence of a motor resonance 
effect, since children responded faster with biological than with non biological primes. 
However, they did not seem to be sensitive to fine-grained aspects of the action, since 
there  was  no  effect  of  gender  congruency  and  since  response  times  did  not  differ 
depending on the kind of posture (grasping vs. static hand). 
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the two mechanisms, the motor resonance 
evoked by the prime and the motor response induced by the object observation, seem 
to be rather independent. Indeed, with the biological prime we found a facilitation, 
independently  of  the  kind  of  object  appearing  later,  and  not  an  interference  on 
appearing  of  dangerous  objects.  This  testifies  that  probably  there  is  an  overall 
Figure 3.6 Study 1, Experiment 2: significant Prime effect for RTs, values are 
in ms and error bars show standard errors of the means. 
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facilitation  effect  induced  by  observation  of  the  hand  action,  and  that  interference 
occurs rather late, i.e. upon object presentation. 
Overall, these results allow us to argue that data of the Experiment 1 seem to be 
due to a gender’s lack of sensitivity in children and not to a perceptual problem of the 
primes hands, namely school-age children are not yet sensitive to fine grained aspects 
of motor resonance such as gender. 
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
In order to verify whether with age participants develop a finer sensitivity to objects 
and action characteristics, we used the same procedure of Experiment 2 but we assessed 
young adults. 
 
3.4.1 Methods 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Bologna (10 males and 10 
females)  with  a  mean  age  of  23.5  years  (age  range:  19  –  32  years)  took  part  in  the 
Experiment 3 for course credits. All subjects were right-handed and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave 
written informed consent. 
 
3.4.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same used in Experiment 2. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
Data  were  treated  as  in  previous  experiments.  Reaction  times  (RTs)  for  incorrect 
responses  and  RTs  more  than  two  standard  deviations  from  each  participant's  overall   81 
mean were excluded from the analysis. Error trials were excluded from further analyses 
(4 %). The correct RTs were entered into a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 x 6 ANOVA, with the same 
factors and Fisher’s LSD post-hoc tests as those of Experiment 2. 
In the ANOVA, the analysis revealed the main effects of Object Typology [F (1, 18) 
= 9.25, MSE = 3263, p < .01]. As in the previous experiments, responses were faster when 
the object was neutral and slower when the stimuli were dangerous (500 vs. 515 ms, 
respectively), (Figure 3.7).There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
However, the main effect of Prime [F (5, 90) = 1.79, MSE = 2136, p = .12], and Prime x 
Participant Gender, [F (5, 90) = 1.99, MSE = 2136, p = .08], were marginally significant. 
In  line  with  the  aim  to  investigate  the  gender-related  resonance  effect,  we  performed 
separated analyses by levels of Participant Gender in order to better understand these 
potentially significant results. The main effect of Prime was significant as far as the males 
group was concerned [F (5, 45) = 3.63, MSE = 2080, p < .01]. As revealed by the post-
hoc test, participants responded faster when the prime was the grasping hand of a man (M 
= 473 ms) than with all other primes. More specifically, responses with the prime of the 
grasping hand of a man were faster than responses with the prime of the grasping hand of 
a woman (M = 501, p < . 01), grasping hand of a robot (M = 512, p < . 01), static hand of 
a man (M = 506, p = . 01), static hand of a woman (M = 506, p = . 02), and control 
stimulus (M = 504, p = .01), (Figure 3.8). The main effect of Prime was not significant for 
the females group [F (5, 45) = 0.26, MSE = 2191, p = .93] but there was a significant 
interaction between Object Typology and Category [F (1, 9) = 7.5, MSE = 941, p = .02]. 
The post-hoc test showed that responses to neutral objects were faster when they were 
natural and slower when they were artefacts (M = 498 vs. 518 ms, respectively, p < .01), 
while there was no difference between natural and artefact objects as far as dangerous 
objects concerned (523 vs. 520 ms, respectively, p = .69), (Figure 3.9).   82 
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Figure 3.7 Study 1, Experiment 3: significant Object Typology effect for RTs, 
values are in ms and error bars show standard errors of the means. 
Figure 3.8 Study 1, Experiment 3: significant Prime effect for RTs (males group), 
values are in ms and error bars show standard errors of the means.  
Figure  3.9  Study  1,  Experiment  3:  Object  Typology  and  Object  Category
interaction  for  RTs  (females  group),  values  are  in  ms  and  error  bars  show 
standard errors of the means.   83 
3.4.3 Discussion 
In  keeping  with  what  found  with  children  in  the  previous  experiments,  adults 
responded slower to dangerous than to neutral objects, probably due to an interference or 
a blocking mechanism. Our data do not allow us to disentangle between two alternatives. 
Indeed, it is possible that even dangerous objects evoke affordances, but responses to 
them  are  slowed  down  due  to  the  presence  of  a  late  occurring  blocking  mechanism. 
Alternatively, it is possible that dangerous objects, even if they are potentially graspable, 
do not invite reaching/grasping the object, but that they rather evoke aversive affordances, 
since their danger is perceived from very early processing phases. Literature on approach-
avoidance effects has shown that positively connoted words evoke approach movements, 
while negative connoted words evoke avoidance movements (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Van  Dantzig,  Pecher,  &  Zwaan,  2008;  Freina,  Baroni,  Borghi,  &  Nicoletti,  2009). 
However, in these studies emotional stimuli are referred to the self, while in the present 
study participants observe hands of others in potential interaction with objects. Previous 
TMS data have shown  that observing pain inhibits hand muscles through the cortical 
motor system (e.g., Avenanti et al., 2005). However, in our study the effect of the object 
might be independent from the effect driven by the action observation. To this aim the 
results by Morrison and colleagues (Morrison, Tipper, Fenton-Adams, & Back, 2012) are 
relevant, showing with fMRI that inferior postcentral gyrus is activated with dangerous 
objects,  irrespective  of  whether  a  grasping  or  a  withdrawal  action  on  the  object  is 
observed.  Further  observations  on  the  mechanisms  underlying  the  possible  inhibitory 
mechanisms will be introduced in the general discussion. 
Interestingly,  adults  are  aware  also  of  the  distinctions  between  object  categories. 
Specifically, females responded faster to natural objects than to artefacts, as registered in 
Experiment 1. As stated before, this result is in line with the literature (Borghi et al., 
2007; Vainio et al., 2008; Anelli et al., 2010) and probably depends on the activation of   84 
both manipulative and functional information with artefacts, and only of manipulative 
information with natural objects. This experiment adds to previous results in the literature 
as it shows that participants responded differently to the two object typologies only when 
they  dealt  with  neutral  objects,  while  with  dangerous  objects  the  perception  of  their 
danger overcame more  fine-grained categorical distinction.  It remains to be explained 
why females responded differently to natural objects and artefacts, while males did not. 
Notice, however, that in males we found evidence of a resonant mechanism, as they 
responded faster to the man hand prime than to the other primes. Importantly, the fact that 
they responded faster to the grasping hand of a man proofs their sensitivity to the different 
motor program conveyed by the hand. This sensitivity to hand posture was not present in 
children,  nor  it  is  present  in  women.  Whereas  all  were  equally  responsive  to  object 
dangerousness, females responded differently to object categories, while males responded 
differently to hand postures revealing sensitivity to fine-grained aspects of action. One 
can  speculate  that  this  results  pattern  has  an  evolutionary  basis.  If  we  consider  our 
ancestors, it is well known that males were primarily hunters, while women had to select 
plants and vegetables to promote agriculture. 
 
3.5 General Discussion 
Results (Anelli et al., in press b; Anelli et al., under review) clearly demonstrate that 
both  children  and  adults,  males  and  females,  are  sensitive  to  the  difference  between 
dangerous and neutral objects. Dangerous objects produce an interference, as the slower 
RTs required to process dangerous compared to neutral objects demonstrate. However, 
our  data  do  not  allow  us  to  disentangle  between  different  accounts,  discussed  in  the 
previous section. We suppose that only  data on time course would allow us to more 
precisely  determine  to  what  the  delay  with  dangerous  objects  is  due  and  to  clearly 
determine whether affordances or aversive affordances are activated. Nevertheless, some   85 
speculations are possible concerning the different underlying neural mechanisms involved 
during  processing  of  dangerous  stimuli  compared  to  neutral  ones.  Studies  on  the 
emotional Stroop effect (e.g., Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004) reveal that response times are 
generally  slowed  down  with  emotional  stimuli.  The  slowdown  of  responses  can  be 
associated to an inhibition effect provoked by a selective attention mechanism, as that 
typically  characterizing  Stroop  effect.  Alternatively,  it  has  been  proposed  that  with 
emotional stimuli a generic slowdown due to the threatening character of the stimuli is 
present (Algom et al., 2004). This explanation is compatible with our data. However, 
another possible way to understand the mechanism underlying the slowdown of response 
times with dangerous stimuli compared to neutral ones is in terms of the mechanisms 
highlighted by Caligiore and colleagues (Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi, Ellis, Cangelosi, & 
Baldassarre,  2012)  for  treating  cognitive  conflict.  Their  TRoPICAL  model  (see  also 
Caligiore et al., 2010) is able to account for negative compatibility effects that emerge 
when participants have to respond to target-objects avoiding to respond to distractors. The 
model shows that the dorsal and ventral pathways process information related to both the 
target-object and the distractor. This model can be used to account for our data as well. 
Indeed, Caligiore et al. (2012) have shown that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a double 
role, exerting both an inhibitory and an excitatory control (Knight, Staines, Swickc, & 
Chaocet,  1999;  Munakata,  Herd,  Chatham,  Depue,  Banich,  &  O’Reilly,  2011).  In 
Caligiore et al. (2012), this inhibitory control allows the model to refrain from executing 
the actions suggested by the distractors; similarly, since PFC can receive inputs from the 
emotional circuits, in our case it may allow participants to inhibit the tendency to respond 
to affordances in case of dangerous objects. A further possibility (for example, see Etkin, 
Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008) is that two 
different,  separable  circuits  underlie  cognitive  and  emotional  conflict:  a  lateral  PFC 
system  devoted  to  resolving  conflict  non  related  to  emotional  stimuli,  and  a  rostral   86 
anterior cingulate system devoted to resolving emotional conflict and associated with a 
top-down inhibition of the amygdala with emotional distractors. However, as recently 
argued by Munakata et al. (2011) the PFC would have an impact on inhibition related 
emotional stimuli as well. Indeed, the authors show that PFC, specialized to abstract goal-
derived information, is  at the basis of different forms of inhibition: a  form of  global 
inhibition involving cortical and subcortical regions, among which those related to fear 
processing, and a form of indirect competitive inhibition in neocortical and subcortical 
regions. 
As second relevant point, we demonstrate that children are not equally sensitive to the 
difference  between  objects  categories  (natural  vs.  artefacts),  that  starts  to  develop  in 
children but appears clearly only in the adult-female group. This results pattern suggests a 
specific  developmental  trajectory.  Even  if  the  task  requires  to  distinguish  between 
artefacts and natural objects, at all ages participants respond differently to dangerous and 
neutral objects, but more fine-grained differences such as those related to object category 
emerge later. 
As third result, the effect of primes reflects the existence of a resonant mechanism, 
that is already developed in children and which becomes progressively more fine-tuned 
with  age.  Indeed,  children  already  resonate  more  to  the  human  hand  than  to  the  non 
biological primes. The simplicity of the brick leads us to exclude that faster response 
times  were  due  to  lower  visual  complexity  of  the  human  hand  prime.  Crucially,  the 
human hand prime differed not only from the brick, but also from the robotic hand. This 
effect can be due to a higher motor resonance when the hand is similar to our own. While 
a higher resonance with biological than with not biological stimuli is already present in 
children, they do not respond to gender differences of the hand primes. Results reveal that 
adults become more sensitive to fine-grained aspects of the biological stimuli. Indeed, 
male participants respond faster to hands of their own gender, characterized by a specific   87 
posture, the grasping one. Why this gender dependent motor resonance and the ability to 
distinguish between a static and a grasping posture is not present with women can be 
matter of further investigation. It could depend on the effect of gender stereotyping which 
leads to respond fast to man’s hand, or on the higher attention women paid to objects 
characteristics instead than to action characteristics. 
The direction of the effects we found (i.e. facilitation with prime stimuli that might 
produce resonance, interference with dangerous compared to neutral objects) allows us to 
advance  hypotheses  concerning  the  underlying  mechanisms.  Our  results  indicate  that 
observing a hand in a given posture induces participants to prepare an action, probably 
through the mediation of the mirror neuron system. This action is prepared faster when 
the  hand  we  observe  is  rather  similar  to  our  own.  While  children  rely  only  on  the 
distinction between biological hands and other stimuli, adults become aware of gender 
and postural differences in biological hands. The resonant effects we found are in line 
with the ideomotor theories, in particular with the Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Prinz, 
1997;  Hommel  et  al.,  2001),  according  to  which  perceived  events  and  actions  are 
represented by the same “event codes”, and rely on the same representational code. For 
this reason, the more similar are the observed action and the performed action, the more 
motor responses would be facilitated. Once the motor response is prepared, however, it 
has to be adapted to a specific object. Responses are fast and straightforward when neutral 
objects  are  presented.  When  dangerous  objects  are  displayed,  instead,  a  blocking 
mechanism  seems  to  intervene,  producing  longer  response  times.  The  absence  of  an 
interaction  between  prime  and  objects  suggests  that  two  different  neural  systems  are 
involved in an independent and not really integrated fashion: one, possibly mediated by 
the mirror neurons, triggered by the action observation, the other, possibly mediated by 
the canonical neurons, triggered by the objects displayed (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
The absence of this integration could be due to the specific paradigm we used, i.e. a   88 
priming one. Indeed, in a recent study by Morrison et al. (2012), there is evidence of 
integration between action and object information. In both an imaging (fMRI) study and a 
tactile detection experiment, participants observed hands in an approaching/grasping or 
withdrawing posture toward noxious or neutral objects, and were required to evaluate 
whether object and action were appropriate to one another. Results showed that distinct 
sensorimotor  regions  were  activated  with  specific  responses  to  different  stimuli 
characteristics  (i.e.,  kind  of  object,  kind  of  action,  and  action-object  interaction).  In 
particular, viewing grasping actions toward dangerous objects activates the postcentral 
sensorimotor cortex that integrates both object and action information in order to process 
the  sensory  outcomes  of  observed  hand-object  interaction.  Overall,  somatosensory 
cortices  and  inferior  parietal  lobule  seem  to  anticipate  the  consequences  of  observed 
hand-object  interaction  with  noxious  objects,  as  the  painful  grasp  condition  is  more 
activated compared to all other conditions. 
Overall, our study is the first to our knowledge that investigates development of the 
sensitivity to dangerous and neutral objects, and also of the effects that these different 
objects  can  have  on  other  organisms,  such  as  other  humans,  males  and  females,  and 
robots.  Results  of  the  present  study  corroborate  and  widely  extend  previous  ones, 
showing resonant mechanisms when interacting with dangerous objects. Certainly, further 
studies are necessary, in order to investigate in deep this complex issue and to better 
understand the neural mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects.   89 
PART 2 
 
CHAPTER IV 
SIMON EFFECT 
 
 
The second part of the thesis is related to the “Simon” theme. Thus, in this chapter I 
present  this  issue  both  at  a  theoretical  and  empirical  level.  First,  I  will  start  from 
researches on stimulus–response (S–R) compatibility to introduce the first experimental 
evidence on the classical “Simon effect”. Second, a paragraph will be dedicated to most 
recent studies on the so-called “social or joint Simon effect”, showing how this effect has 
been used as a tool to investigate a relevant topic of social cognition, the joint action, and 
different cognitive processes related to it, such as perception, attention, action planning, 
and cognitive control. Finally, a section will be focused on the discussion of the reported 
empirical findings in a broader theoretical perspective on joint action, within which can 
be placed both the Study 2, presented in the next chapter, and the Study 3, presented in 
Chapter 6. 
 
4.1 Classical Simon effect 
Traditional  in  cognitive  psychology  researchers  used  the  stimulus–response  (S–R) 
compatibility to consider the link between systems for perception and action. In a spatial 
S-R compatibility task a participant was required to make spatial responses (e.g., left and 
right key-presses) on the basis of the stimulus location (e.g., left or right) ). The result is 
that response times are faster and more accurate when both the stimulus and response 
locations correspond (i.e., compatible condition) than when they do not correspond (i.e.,   90 
incompatible condition), (Alluisi & Warm, 1990). Specifically, response times are about 
50 ms faster when participant makes a left key-press response to the left stimulus and a 
right  key-press  response  to  the  right  stimulus  than  when  participant  experiences  the 
opposite mapping (e.g., Shaffer, 1965). The spatial compatibility effect is considered as a 
function of the relative locations of stimulus and response (Nicoletti, Anzola, Luppino, 
Rizzolatti, & Umiltà, 1982), and it is explained in terms of response selection; namely, 
response selection is faster when the spatial codes for stimulus and response correspond 
than when they do not correspond (Proctor & Reeve, 1990). 
A similar spatial compatibility effect is registered when a non-spatial feature (e.g., the 
stimulus  colour)  is  defined  as  relevant  and  the  stimulus  location  as  irrelevant,  and 
participant is required to respond (with a left or right key-press) to the relevant non-
spatial feature (e.g., red or green stimulus), (see Figure 4.1 for a schematic representation 
of the classical Simon task). Also in this kind of task, responses are faster and more 
accurate  when  the  irrelevant  stimulus  location  and  the  correct  response  location 
correspond  (i.e.,  corresponding  trials)  than  when  they  do  not  correspond  (i.e.,  non-
corresponding trials), hence indicating that stimulus location influences performance even 
if task-irrelevant. This phenomenon is known as “Simon effect” (Simon & Rudell, 1967; 
Simon, 1990; for reviews, see Lu & Proctor, 1995; Proctor & Vu, 2006; Rubichi, Vu, 
Nicoletti, & Proctor, 2006). 
The seminal study on this effect was conducted by Simon and Rudell (1967), who 
were originally interested to investigate the hemispheric dominance for speech. To this 
aim, they programmed an auditory reaction-time task and verified the relation between 
ear  stimulated  and  handedness.  More  specifically,  this  experiment  was  aimed  to 
demonstrate that  right-handed participants would respond faster to a verbal  command 
(e.g., the word “right” or the word “left”) when it was heard by their right ear than by 
their left ear, while left-handed participants would respond faster to a command when it   91 
was heard by their left ear than by their right ear. Even though this predicted result was 
not  registered,  Simon  and  Rudell  (1967)  obtained  another  interesting  result:  reaction 
times were faster when the “right” command was presented to the right ear than to the left 
ear,  and,  vice-versa,  reaction  times  to  the  “left”  command  were  faster  when  it  was 
presented to the left ear than to the right ear. Namely, responses were 42-ms faster when 
the command was heard in the corresponding ear rather than in the non-corresponding 
ear. In this case, the ear in which a participant heard the command was the task-irrelevant 
feature that nevertheless influenced the performance. This work showed for the first time 
the  tendency  to  react  to  the  source  of  a  stimulus.  Later,  Simon  and  colleagues 
demonstrated that the Simon effect emerged not only with auditory stimuli, but also with 
visual stimuli (Craft & Simon, 1970). Simon explained the effect as follows: “A strong 
stereotypic tendency to respond initially to the directional component of a stimulus rather 
than to its symbolic content” (Simon & Rudell, 1967, p. 31). 
Contemporary accounts  widely  assume that the  Simon effect is due to  a conflict, 
emerging at the stage of response selection (e.g., Rubichi, Nicoletti, Umiltà, & Zorzi, 
2000; Rubichi & Pellicano, 2004). More specifically, according to dual-route models (De 
Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, 1994), response activation is possible by means 
of two routes: one is the automatic or direct route and the other is the intentional or 
indirect  route  (Hommel  &  Prinz,  1997).  The  direct  route  automatically  activates  the 
corresponding  response  through  pre-existing  long-term  S–R  associations,  linking  a 
stimulus to its spatially corresponding response; conversely the indirect route activates the 
response generated on the basis of task instructions through short-term and task-defined 
S–R  associations  (e.g.,  Zorzi  &  Umiltà,  1995).  In  corresponding  trials,  the  response 
location corresponds to that of the stimulus and thus the two responses activated both by 
direct and indirect route are the same; in this case no conflict arises. Instead, in non-
corresponding trials, the response location does not correspond to that of the stimulus and   92 
thus the two activated responses do not correspond; in this case the conflict must be 
resolved before the execution of the correct response, leading to a slowing of response 
times. The difference between corresponding and non-corresponding trials results in the 
classical Simon effect. 
I will not go into presentation of several experimental evidence produced in these 
years  nor  of  theoretical  developments  or  controversies  (e.g.,  Hommel,  2011;  Proctor, 
2011), as beyond the aims of the thesis. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Joint Simon effect 
More relevant to the purpose of the present work, several recent studies have shown 
that a similar effect (defined “joint Simon effect”) occurs even when the Simon task is 
shared  between  two  participants  (defined  “joint  Simon  task”,  see  Figure  4.2  for  a 
schematic representation). As anticipated in Chapter 1 (see section 1.5.2), Sebanz and 
colleagues (Sebanz et al., 2003) were the first to develop this new paradigm. In their 
experiment,  participants  were  shown  photographs  of  a  centrally  presented  right  hand 
Figure 4.1 Schematic representation of the classical Simon task: participant is seated centrally in
front of a monitor, and responds to red stimulus with a left key-press and to green stimulus with a 
right key-press. Panel A shows compatible conditions, in which stimulus and response locations 
correspond. Panel B shows incompatible conditions, in which stimulus and response locations 
does nor correspond. 
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pointing to the right, to the left, or straight, with the instruction to press one of two 
lateralized keys (e.g., left and right key-presses) according to the color of a ring on the 
index finger (e.g., red or green ring). Participants were required to perform the task in 
three different conditions: in the two-choice condition participant sat centrally in front of 
a monitor and responded to one ring color with a left key-press and to the other color with 
a right key-press (e.g., participant responded to green ring with a left key-press and to red 
ring with a right key-press). In the joint go/no-go condition participant was paired with 
another participant and they sat side-by-side in front of a monitor, and each participant 
was required to respond only to one color with a key-press (e.g., participant who sat to the 
left responded to green ring with a left key-press, while participant sitting to the right 
responded  to  red  ring  with  a  right  key-press).  In  the  individual  go/no-go  condition 
participant sat laterally (e.g., to the right side) while an empty chair was beside him/her, 
and he/she responded to only one color with a key-press (e.g., participant responded to 
red ring with a right key-press). Response times were faster when the responses spatially 
corresponded to the pointing direction of the hand (corresponding trials) compared to 
when  they  did  not  correspond  (non-corresponding  trials).  This  advantage  for 
corresponding trials was evident not only when participant performed the task alone (two-
choice  condition),  responding  to  both  colors  (classical  Simon  effect),  but  also  when 
he/she  performed  the  task  with  another  participant  (joint  go/no-go  condition),  each 
responding to only one color (joint Simon effect). In contrast, the effect was absent when 
participant performed the task alone but responding only to one color (individual go/no-
go  condition).  Sebanz  and  colleagues  explained  the  emergence  in  the  joint  go/no-go 
condition of a similar effect to that registered in the two-choice condition as follows: 
“Given  that  the  action  alternative  at  the  other’s  disposal  is  represented,  the  spatial 
dimension of the two responses is also represented and thus overlaps with the irrelevant 
spatial dimension of the stimulus. Hence, just as in a normal Simon task, the response   94 
corresponding  to  the  spatial  information  provided  by  the  stimulus  is  automatically 
activated” (Sebanz et al., 2003, p. 18). 
This finding suggests that when co-acting with another person, participants consider 
the  other  person’s  actions  and  consequently  activate  relative  response  codes  in  their 
action plans. According to Sebanz et al. (2003), the joint Simon effect shows that each 
participant  represented  the  stimulus-response  rules  and  the  action  plans  of  both 
individuals  (also  defined  agents  or  actors)  involved  in  the  task:  in  other  words,  they 
created  shared  representation  or  co-representation.  The  process  behind  the  spatial-
compatibility  effects  was  activated  by  the  interaction  between  the  response  codes 
activated through observation and the internal response codes. In the individual go/no-go 
task  this  effect  was  absent  because  only  one  response  code  was  formed  and  thus  no 
conflict  between  spatial  codes  occurred.  It  can  be  argued  that  people  may  represent 
stimulus  events  independently  from  their  target  and  may  represent  an  action  without 
considering who is carrying it out. 
The same effect reported by Sebanz et al. (2003) occurs even with symbolic stimuli 
that  do  not  convey  spatial  information.  In  the  study  of  Atmaca,  Sebanz,  Prinz,  and 
Knoblich (2008), participants were required to respond with a left or right key-press to 
odd  and  even  numbers,  ranged  from  2  to  9.  Results  showed  that,  when  a  participant 
performed this task alone, responses were faster with a left key-press to small numbers 
and with a right key-press to large numbers. This effect of number magnitude (irrelevant 
to  the  task)  is  the  so-called  “SNARC  effect”,  due  to  an  automatic  magnitude 
representation  on  a  mental  number  line,  from  the  left  to  the  right,  activated  by  the 
perception of numbers (Dehaene, 1997). More interesting, when two participants sat side-
by-side and performed the task together (e.g., one responded to even numbers and the 
other to odd numbers) the same effect was registered. Namely, participant sitting on the 
left side was faster to respond to small numbers, while participant sitting on the right was   95 
Figure 4.2 Schematic representation of the joint Simon task: participants are seated side-by-side 
in front of a monitor. Each participant was required to respond only to one color with a key-press: 
participant seated to the left responds to red stimulus with a left key-press; participant seated to 
the right responds to green stimulus with a right key-press. Panel A shows compatible conditions, 
in which stimulus and response locations correspond. Panel B shows incompatible conditions, in 
which stimulus and response locations does nor correspond. 
 
faster to respond to larger numbers. This result indicates that, as in the original study of 
Sebanz et al. (2003), participants represented their own action alternative in relation to the 
co-actor’s actions. 
Many questions are raised from these early data on shared task representations: in the 
following I will try to present some relevant issues and how researchers addressed them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Cognitive mechanisms 
One interesting and debated point concerns the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
co-representation  effect.  Since  the  first  evidence  showed  that  this  effect  occurred  in 
complementary  tasks  (i.e.,  tasks  that  gave  the  participants  the  impression  of  being 
performing in collaboration with another person), Guagnano, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2010) 
assessed whether the same effect emerged even when two participants are completely 
independent. To this aim, the two participants performed two independent detection tasks 
(i.e., one responded to red stimuli and the other to blue stimuli) and, in order to avoid the 
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idea  of  complementarity  and  turn-taking,  on  80%  of  the  trials,  the  stimuli  required  a 
response  from  both  participants.  The  joint  Simon  effect  emerged  when  the  two 
participants  sat  close  to  each  other  within  arm’s  reach  (in  the  so-called  peripersonal 
space) and performed a task in which they did not collaborate. However, the effect was 
absent when participants performed the social task outside of each other’s arm-reach (i.e., 
outside peripersonal space). Guagnano et al. (2010) explained this finding suggesting that, 
when participants are next to each other, the co-actor represents a spatial reference point 
for coding one’s own action in space. Thus, they claimed that the joint Simon effect does 
not necessarily imply a representation of the other’s action. 
A similar compatibility effect was registered in the study of Welsh (2009), when 
participants sat close to each other and performed the task with their hands crossed or 
uncrossed. This result shows that the spatial coding can be based on the position of one’s 
body relative to the other’s body, or on the position of one’s hand relative to the other’s 
hand. 
Still  regarding  the  cognitive  mechanisms  subserving  shared  task  representations, 
some studies indicate that for others’ actions to be included in one’s own action plan, they 
must be of a biological nature (Tsai & Brass, 2007). More specifically, in their study Tsai 
and Brass (2007) investigated whether co-representation occurs only when participants 
interacted with a biological agent or whether co-representation can also emerge when 
individuals perform the task with a non-biological agent. Participants experienced a joint 
Simon task, responding to targets (red or green) with a key-press, while a videotaped 
hand (wooden or human) responded to the target of the other color. Results showed that 
the joint Simon effect is not limited to real-world interactions, as reported by previous 
studies, since it emerges also when participants act with a computer human hand, rather 
than with another real participant. Moreover, this effect occurs only when participants 
perform the task with conspecifics (i.e, when they watch responses of human hand) and   97 
not  with  a  non-biological  agent  (i.e,  when  they  watch  responses  of  wooden  hand). 
Namely, the joint Simon effect is biologically tuned. 
Other studies have focused on the importance of others’ actions visibility (Sebanz et 
al, 2003; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005a; Welsh, Higgins, Ray, & Weeks, 2007; Tsai, 
Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008). For example, Tsai et al. (2008) investigated the nature of co-
representation  and  how  knowledge  about  another’s  intentional  behavior  influences 
participant’s performance. They manipulated the identity of the co-actor in a joint Simon 
task, using either a real third-person or a computer program. Each participant performed 
the task under the implemented belief that he/she was interacting with another, thus there 
was not the influence of actor presence. In one condition participants were informed that 
they were performing the task (e.g., responding to green stimuli) with a person in another 
room (e.g., responding to red stimuli), thus a biological agent, while in the other condition 
with a computer program (e.g., responding to red stimuli), thus a non-biological agent. 
However,  in  both  conditions  the  responses  of  the  co-actor  were  random  sequences 
generated by the same computer program and participants did not receive any visual-
auditory feedback on the performance of the other agent. In line with their previous study 
(Tsai & Brass, 2007), Tsai et al. (2008) found a joint Simon effect only when participants 
believed that they were performing the task with a biological agent, while the effect was 
not present when they believed that they were performing the task with a non-biological 
agent. Notice that this biologically tuned effect emerged even in the absence of any kind 
of feedback, thus suggesting that shared representation occurs on the basis of the believed 
animation of the co-actor. 
 
4.2.2 Neural mechanisms 
Besides the study of cognitive mechanisms underlying shared task representations, 
some electrophysiological studies have been conducted to explore the neural mechanisms.   98 
For example, some researchers investigated how performing a task with another person 
affects action planning and control (Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & Wascher, 2006b; Tsai, 
Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). Through event-related potential (ERP) measurements, 
these  studies  can  extend  previous  reaction  time  (RT)  findings.  In  fact,  recording 
electrophysiological  responses  to  stimuli  referring  to  other’s  action,  it  is  possible  to 
investigate the source of action selection conflicts and action control processes. In the 
study of Sebanz et al. (2006b), ERPs were measured while participant performed a Simon 
task alone (individual condition) and with another agent (group condition). The results 
showed  that  acting  together  requires  a  particular  involvement  of  processes  related  to 
action  planning  and  control,  due  to  the  creation  of  other’s  action  representation.  In 
particular, the amplitude of the Go P3 component indicates that action-relevant stimuli 
which refer to the other’s action cause a response similar to that referring to one’s own 
action.  Moreover,  the  amplitude  of  the  No-Go  P3  component  shows  that  participant 
anticipates the other’s action and has a sort of tendency to act that, however, must be 
suppressed.  Thus,  exists  an  inhibitory  mechanism  that  suppresses  action  tendencies 
during the perception of stimuli requiring another’s action. These findings support the 
claim  that  both  one’s  own  and  others’  actions  are  represented  in  a  common 
representational  domain,  and  that  one’s  own  action  representation  is  activated  by 
observing or anticipating other’s action. 
Similarly, Tsai et al. (2006) conducted a research in which both reaction times (RTs) 
and ERPs were registered in a Go/No-Go task. In line with Sebanz et al. (2006b), the 
emergence of the effect in the joint condition indicated that both action perception and 
action execution share a common coding at the representation level. In addition, they 
replicated the effect on No-Go P3 component, thus underlying the importance of action 
anticipation and its crucial role in joint action. Finally, Tsai et al. (2006) revealed that, 
when  a  conflict  emerged  between  responses  for  relevant  and  irrelevant  stimulus   99 
dimensions, subjects inhibit responses for irrelevant dimension and select responses for 
relevant one. Thus, they support the claim that interference effect occurs after the stage of 
identification of stimulus relevance and, thus, at the stage of response selection (Sebanz et 
al., 2003). 
These researches (Sebanz et al, 2006b; Tsai et al., 2006) can be considered as first 
examples of how it is possible to study real-time dyadic interactions with neuroscientific 
methods. 
 
4.2.3 Social modulations 
An interesting line of research is being developed recently, focusing on how social 
variables influence the creation of shared representations. For example, factors such as 
the  characteristics  of  the  co-actors  and  the  kind  of  the  interaction  context  have  been 
investigated  to  understand  how  they  can  modulate  the  tendency  to  take  each  other’s 
actions into account. 
Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, and Prinz (2005b) focused on a possible link between 
shared task representations and impairments in mental state attribution. They measured 
and  compared  the  performance  on  Simon  task  of  individuals  with  autism  and  the 
performance  of  a  control  group  of  healthy  participants.  Results  showed  similar  co-
representation  effects  on  the  two  groups,  thus  indicating  that  autistic  deficits  in 
understanding mental states do not influence the creation of representation about the rules 
specifying the task of another agent. 
More relevant to my thesis work and, in particular, to the studies that I will present in 
the next chapters, other researches investigated the influence of interpersonal relations in 
task  co-representation.  Hommel,  Colzato,  and  van  den  Wildenberg  (2009)  tried  to 
understand the role of the valence of the interaction between two co-acting individuals. A 
joint Simon task was used in two conditions: in the first condition participant performed   100 
the task with a confederate (i.e., an accomplice of the experimenter) who was friendly and 
cooperative, namely participants were involved in a positive relationship; in the second 
condition  participant  acted  with  a  confederate  intimidating  and  competitive,  namely 
participants  were  involved  in  a  negative  relationship.  Results  showed  that  the  Simon 
effect was restricted to the positive relationship, whereas the negative relationship leaded 
to a reduction of the effect. Thus, this finding suggests that shared task representations 
only occur in positive relationships and, against the assumption that task representations 
are socially shared (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003), it is on favour of a separate representation 
of  self-generated  and  other-generated  actions.  Hommel  et  al.  (2009)  proposed  that 
positive relationships strengthen the link between attributes and actions related to oneself 
and actions related to the other (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991), thus favouring the 
integration between self- and other-generated actions in a common representation. On the 
contrary, negative relationship may increase the self-other distinction, thus preventing this 
integration.  From  this  view,  it  derives  that  the  emergence  of  shared  representations 
strictly  depends  on  the  strength  of  the  psychological  connection  between  co-acting 
individuals: stronger is this connectedness, more likely is that self and other actions are 
integrated in a common representation. 
Similarly, Kuhbandner, Pekrum, and Maier (2010) investigated the influence of mood 
state. To induce an affective state, participants watched a neutral, positive, or negative 
film  clip  before  to  perform  the  joint  Simon  task.  Results  demonstrated  a  larger  joint 
Simon  effect  when  the  task  was  performed  after  the  induction  of  a  positive  mood, 
revealing  that  positive  affect  enhanced  the  activation  of  the  response  code  actually 
associated with the other’s action. Instead, no effect was observed after the induction of a 
negative mood, indicating that motor representations associated with the other’s action 
were no longer activated.   101 
Along  this  line,  Ruys  and  Aarts  (2010)  considered  the  role  of  interdependence 
between participants on the emergence of shared representations. In their experiment an 
auditory version of the joint Simon task was employed and participants believed that they 
were interacting with another person placed in another room. The joint Simon effect was 
measured in three experimental conditions: in the independent condition a reward was 
given to the ten best-performing participants (i.e., the achievement of a personal goal was 
independent of the co-actor), in the cooperative condition both participants of the five 
best performing couples earned a reward and in the competitive condition ten winners 
were randomly selected for the reward (i.e., in these two last conditions the achievement 
of a personal goal depended on the co-actor). Results showed that a joint Simon effect 
emerged  under  all  conditions;  however  the  effect  was  smaller  in  the  independent 
condition compared to the other two conditions. To explain their finding, Ruys and Aarts 
(2010) suggested that both in the cooperative and competitive condition the participants’ 
performance was interdependent and thus they needed to attend to the intentions of the 
other to successfully complete the task. According to their view, the emergence of shared 
representations  does  not  depend  on  whether  the  participants  need  to  cooperate  or 
compete, rather it depends on whether they attend to the intentions of the other. 
 
4.2.4 Learning 
A final point on shared task representations that may be interesting to introduce, and 
that will be relevant for the Study 3 (Chapter 6), concerns the learning. In fact, recent 
studies  have  focused  on  whether  and  how  jointly  practiced  task  can  influence 
performance  on  another  subsequent  joint  task  (Milanese  et  al.,  2010;  Milanese,  Iani, 
Sebanz, & Rubichi, 2011). Studies of individual performance demonstrated that it was 
possible  to  modulate  performance  on  the  Simon  task  (i.e.,  transfer  task)  by  asking 
participants  to  perform  before  (i.e.,  practice  task)  a  spatial  compatibility  task  with   102 
incompatible  mapping  (Proctor  &  Lu,  1999).  More  specifically,  whether  participants 
performed a practice task responding to stimuli on the left with a right key-press and to 
stimuli on the right with a left key-press, they showed a reduced or even a reversed spatial 
compatibility effect in a subsequent transfer task where they had to respond to color, 
ignoring the spatial position of the stimuli. This effect is defined as “transfer of learning 
effect”. 
Milanese and colleagues (2010) created a “social” version of this paradigm (i.e., a 
joint transfer-of-learning paradigm), showing the influence of joint task performance on 
implicit  learning  and  the  transfer  of  this  learning  to  subsequent  performance.  Results 
demonstrated that transfer effects occurred not only when participants performed both the 
practice  and  the  transfer  task  together,  but  also  when  participants  first  performed  the 
practice alone and then the joint compatibility task. Instead, the effect was not present 
when  participants  first  performed  the  practice  together  and  then  performed  the 
compatibility  task  alone.  This  finding  indicates  that  the  representations  in  joint  task 
performance  are  different  from  the  representations  in  individual  performance.  The 
transfer effect occurs from the joint to the joint condition and from the individual to the 
joint condition, and not vice-versa from the joint to the individual condition. 
In  another  research,  Milanese  et  al.  (2011)  used  the  joint  transfer-of-learning 
paradigm to investigate which elements of the practice task are necessary and need to 
remain constant for this joint transfer-of-learning effect to emerge. Results showed that 
keeping the same position during both practice and transfer tasks are necessary for the 
emergence of the joint transfer-of-learning; on  the contrary, co-actor identity is not a 
crucial element. Thus, these findings highlight that the joint transfer-of-learning effect is 
influenced by spatial parameters of the practice and transfer tasks, but is not tuned to a 
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These studies indicate that transfer studies can be a useful new paradigm to study the 
nature of shared task representations. 
 
4.3 Joint Simon effect and joint action 
In this last section I will try to discuss the above reported empirical findings in a 
wider theoretical perspective on joint action. As I have already revealed in Chapter 1 (see 
section 1.5.2), joint actions can be considered one of the most important topic in the new 
trend of cognitive sciences.  Indeed, several  researches were  carried out on this issue, 
assuming  that  relevant  social  constraints  for  the  architecture  of  individual  cognitive 
processing can be provided by basic forms of interaction. Joint action can be defined as 
“any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions 
in space and time to bring about a change in the environment” (Sebanz et al., 2006a, p. 
70). As we shall see in this section, the coordination required to achieve a common goal 
includes  a  combination  of  perceptions,  action  plans,  and  intentions  of  the  individuals 
involved in the interaction. 
Understanding and explaining joint action have first interested philosophers (Tuomela 
& Miller, 1988; Searle, 1990; Bratman, 2009). They argued that shared intentions are the 
foundation of joint actions: in fact, compared to individual actions, joint actions involve a 
shared  intention,  an  essential  element  for  understanding  coordination  in  joint  action. 
Some  philosophers  claim  that  shared  intentions  differ  from  individual  intentions  as 
regards the attitude involved (Searle, 1990; Kutz, 2000), their plural subjects (Gilbert, 
1992), or in the way they arise (e.g., by means of team reasoning; Gold & Sugden, 2007). 
Instead,  Bratman  (2009)  holds  that  multiple  individual  intentions  constitute  shared 
intentions. Recently, joint action has also become a topic of interest in linguistics that 
emphasized the role of language (Clark, 1996).   104 
More relevant for the project, psychological researches on perception, action, and 
cognitive  control  investigated  the  perceptual,  motor,  and  cognitive  mechanisms 
underlying  processes  which  are  relevant  for  joint  actions,  such  as  planning  and 
coordination.  According  to  what  presented  in  the  previous  section,  cognitive 
psychologists demonstrated that, at least in part, successful joint actions depend on the 
ability  to  share  representations  (Knoblich  &  Sebanz,  2006).  Shared  perceptual 
representations may arise when individuals direct their attention to where an interaction 
partner is attending in order to attend to the same objects or events in the environment 
(joint attention). Shared action and task representations may allow individuals to predict 
others’  actions  and  integrate  others’  actions  in  their  own  action  planning.  This  task 
sharing indicates that, while performing a task together, co-actors know what the other’s 
task is and the conditions under which the other will perform a certain action. Namely, the 
two co-actors involved in a joint action create a shared representation of both their own 
and other’s tasks, and their coordination in real time is supported by the ability to predict 
each other’s actions (Sebanz et al., 2006a). 
On the whole, philosophical, linguistic, and psychological approaches have suggested 
that the capacity to jointly act together is based on the specific ability to share mental 
states  between  the  participants.  Below  I  shall  continue  to  focus  on  the  psychological 
approach to this topic and to recent attempts to explain what kind of representations and 
processes make joint action possible. 
As already mentioned, joint actions differ from individual actions in several ways: for 
example, when individuals perform actions together they had to predict what others are 
going to do, to control one’s behaviour, and to obtain temporal coordination.  
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4.3.1 Mechanisms and minimal architecture of joint action 
Several mechanisms are involved in joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006a). First, joint 
attention provides a mechanism that allow individuals to share the same perceptual input 
and direct attention to the same events in the environment. Second, a strong link between 
perception and action allows individuals to form representations of others’ action goals 
and to predict action outcomes. Third, the prediction of actions based on certain events in 
the environment and independently by action observation is achieved by forming shared 
task representations. Fourth, the integration of the “what” and “when” of others’ actions 
in  one’s  own  action  planning  allows  action  coordination.  Finally,  in  joint  actions  the 
combined outcome of one’s own and others’ actions is more relevant than the results of 
individual actions. 
According to Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, and Sebanz (2010), I would present an 
interesting  model  or  “minimal  architecture”  that  support  joint  action.  Such  minimal 
architecture includes representations, processes, and “coordination smoothers”. The first 
element, representations, is present both in the case of individual and joint action, since 
individuals had in any case to represent their goals and the tasks necessary to obtain their 
goals.  However,  in  joint  situation  individual  knows  that  carry  out  his/her  task  is  not 
enough to achieve the goal and that therefore the intervention of another agent become 
necessary. In this new condition, the agent should represent not only his/her own task, but 
also the task of the other agent, on the basis of what co-agent is expected to do (i.e., the 
kind  of  action  the  other  will  perform  and  the  intention  that  drives  that  action).  This 
element can be defined the “what” aspect of joint action (Sebanz et al, 2006a). However, 
in minimal case, the agent might represent only his/her own task, as demonstrated for 
example by studies on chimpanzees (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006) and on earliest 
joint  actions  between  infants  and  adults  (Moll  &  Tomasello,  2007).  Even  if  this  is 
possible, generally it is useful to represent the other’s task, since this allows to make a   106 
prediction  about  what  the  other  will  do.  In  fact,  several  studies  on  co-representation 
discussed  in  the  previous  section  (e.g.,  Sebanz  et  al.,  2003,  2005a;  Tsai  et  al.,  2006; 
Atmaca, et al., 2008) showed that individuals represent the other person’s task, even when 
acting on a goal that the co-actor cannot contribute to. In addiction, electrophysiological 
findings demonstrated that agents mentally execute the co-actor’s task (e.g., Sebanz et al., 
2006b; Tsai et al., 2008). 
As regards the second element of minimal architecture for joint action, Vesper et al. 
(2010)  claimed  that  two  processes  are  active  on  the  representations:  monitoring  and 
prediction. Monitoring processes are useful to establish to what degree a given task and 
thus a given goal have been achieved, and whether actions are being carried out properly 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Three elements had to be monitored 
to accomplish a given task and goal: the agent’s own task, the co-agent' task, and the goal. 
In some cases it is sufficient only to monitor the results of the joint action, while in other 
cases the agents can monitor the other’s actions or the results of the other’s actor. This 
last kind of monitoring can improve performance and thus outcomes. 
Prediction is the second kind of process activated on the representations, and it takes 
care of how the actions will be developed and it is also useful for coordination. Some 
theories which I have already mentioned (the common coding theory, Prinz, 1997; the 
motor  simulation  theory,  Jeannerod,  1997,  2006;  and  the  motor  resonance  theory, 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) converge on the idea that action observation can support 
the understanding of goals and intentions. However, as Sebanz et al. (2006a) also remark, 
to interact successfully with others, knowing what they are currently doing may not be 
sufficient. As claimed by Pacherie (2012), agents must not only predict the consequences 
of their own actions (self-predictions), but they must also do the same for the actions of 
their co-agents (other-predictions), and finally integrate both self and other-predictions to 
create  predictions  about  the  joint  consequences  of  their  combined  actions  (joint   107 
predictions). These three kinds or levels of predictions are possible and facilitated through 
motor simulation which allows to understand how actions will influence the environment 
and  their  consequences  (Wolpert  &  Ghahramani,  2000),  and  to  predict  our  own  and 
others’ actions (Wolpert et al., 2003). Predictions can concern expectations about both 
long-term events and actions online. Researches on motor experience and motor expertise 
supported  the  claim  that  motor  simulation  plays  an  essential  role  in  the  ability  to 
anticipate others’ actions (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Aglioti et al., 2008; for a more 
detailed discussion on this topic, see section 2.4). This anticipation process allows actors 
to predict the timing and the future events produced by oneself and others, rather than 
simply  responding, and  also to incorporate the timing of others’ actions in their own 
action  planning.  Consequently,  it  also  improves  interpersonal  temporal  coordination 
(Keller,  Knoblich,  &  Repp,  2007)  that  represents  the  “when”  aspect  of  joint  action, 
crucial for acting synchronously or in turns (Sebanz et al, 2006a). 
The  third  element  of  minimal  architecture  for  joint  action  are  the  so-called 
coordination smoothers. Despite the presence of a motor simulation mechanism, it can be 
very difficult to obtain the precise coordination in time or space required by joint action 
and to predict accurately the others’ actions. In these cases, the coordination smoothers 
may  be  useful.  They  represent  something  aimed  to  simplify  coordination,  a  kind  of 
“strategic tools”. A first type of coordination smoother for agents is to modify their own 
behaviour so that others can more easily predict future actions (Vesper, van der Wel, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011). A second type includes various modes of delimiting and 
structuring  one’s  own  task  to  reduce  the  need  for  coordination  (Brennan,  Chen, 
Dickinson,  Neider,  &  Zelinsky,  2008).  Further  types  of  coordination  smoother  are 
coordination signals (Clark, 1996) and synchronisation (Wilson & Wilson, 2005). 
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4.3.2 Classification of joint action 
After  trying  to  understand  which  are  the  elements  that  seem  to  underlie  the 
emergence of joint action, now I would propose a kind of classification of such actions 
that will allow us to read and interpret in a different way many of the concepts already 
emerged so far. We have just seen that coordination is a key element on joint action. On 
the basis of several findings presented in the previous section and of some issue discussed 
in Chapter 1, and according to Knoblich et al. (2011), it is possible to identify two types 
of coordination during joint action: planned coordination and emergent coordination. “In 
planned  coordination,  agents’  behavior  is  driven  by  representations  that  specify  the 
desired outcomes of joint action and the agent’s own part in achieving these outcomes. In 
emergent coordination, coordinated behavior occurs due to perception–action couplings 
that make multiple individuals act in similar ways; it is independent of any joint plans or 
common knowledge” (Knoblich et al., 2011, p. 62). 
As  highlighted  by  definition,  emergent  coordination  can  occur  not  only  during 
planned  joint  actions,  but  also  between  individuals  who  have  no  planned  to  perform 
actions together, thus it can also occur spontaneously.  For instance,  I  previously  (see 
section 1.5.1) talked about mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) that we can now consider 
as an example of emergent coordination. Three processes of emergent coordination can be 
identified: entrainment, perception–action matching, and action simulation As anticipated, 
I have discussed these mechanisms in Chapter 1, thus in the following I would resume 
them briefly to figure out how they are related to joint action. 
Entrainment can be defined as a process that occurs in a direct interaction between 
co-agents and allow their temporal coordination and synchronization, without a direct 
coupling (Schmidt, Fitzpatrick, Caron, & Mergeche, 2011). 
A second source of emergent coordination is the matching between observed actions 
and observer’s own repertoire of actions. This mechanism can allow mimicry since, when   109 
we  observe  an  action,  there  is  an  activation  of  corresponding  representations.  Both 
ideomotor theory of action control (e.g., Prinz, 1997; Jeannerod, 1999; Hommel et al., 
2001) and findings concerning mirror neurons (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) have explained these common representations in perception and action, based on 
the similarity in actor–object relations. Moreover, this link can also be based on ability 
and expertise of the observer (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). Thus, the perception–
action match can favour emergent coordination inducing the same action tendencies in 
different agents who observe another’s actions (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). 
The third process of emergent coordination, the action simulation, is closely related to 
the perception-action matching. Indeed, after the emergence of a link between observed 
and performed actions, observers can apply their internal models to predict the timing and 
results  of  observed  actions  in  real  time,  a  process  known  as  action  simulation  (e.g., 
Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004). Thus, action simulation can facilitate 
emergent coordination since it causes the same expectations about the actions in different 
actors, leading to similar future actions (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). Even if emergent 
coordination can facilitates joint actions, it cannot be fully understood in isolation from 
planned coordination (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
Whereas  in  emergent  coordination  the  planning  can  be  absent,  in  planned 
coordination the co-agents plan their own actions in relation to joint action results or 
others’ actions, thus it can not occurs spontaneously. As already stated in the minimal 
architecture for joint action, in planned coordination agent knows that the intervention of 
another  agent  is  necessary  to  achieve  a  goal.  Two  principal  processes  of  planned 
coordination can be identified: shared task representations and joint perceptions. 
In shared task representation process, since agents know that they are not going to 
achieve alone their goals, they can consider others’ motives, thoughts, or perspectives 
and, moreover, they can make predictions about the consequences of their own actions,   110 
about the consequences of the actions of their co-agents, and about the joint consequences 
of  their  combined  actions  (Vesper  et  al.,  2010;  Pacherie,  2012).  Shared  task 
representations provide control structures that allow agents to flexibly engage in joint 
action,  specifying  the  individual  parts  each  agent  had  to  execute  and  thus  in  turn 
favouring monitoring and prediction processes that allow interpersonal coordination in 
real  time  (Knoblich  &  Jordan,  2002;  Pacherie  &  Dokic,  2006).  More  and  more 
psychological experiments were carried out to investigate how individual performance is 
modulated by co-actors’ tasks. Several data showed that agents form very specific task 
representations,  which  included  both  their  own  part  of  the  task  and  the  part  to  be 
performed  by  the  co-actor  (e.g.,  Sebanz  et  al.,  2003)  Namely,  actors  form  shared 
representations of tasks quasi-automatically, even if representing the co-actor’s task is not 
necessary to execute their own part or even when it would be more effective to ignore one 
another. In fact, behavioral and electrophysiological findings reviewed in the previous 
section  support  this  claim.  Whether  agents  represent  others’  tasks  does  not  appear  to 
depend on whether doing so is necessary for performing their own tasks effectively, nor 
always on directly perceiving their co-actors. Rather it does depend on believing that the 
other task is being performed by a human agent rather than a non-human one (Tsai & 
Brass, 2007), and it depends on whether agents are acting in each other’s peripersonal 
space (Guagnano et al., 2010). Representing a co-actor’s task leads to inhibit oneself from 
performing  others’  actions  and  to  have  one’s  motor  system  sensitive  to  others'  errors 
(Sebanz  et  al.,  2006b;  Tsai  et  al.,  2006).  These  findings  show  that  shared  task 
representations influence how agents monitor and plan their actions, thus highlighting 
how  shared  task  representations  could  facilitate  joint  action.  By  means  of  these 
representations, agents monitor and plan both sets of actions and thus they can coordinate 
their  actions  and  predict  their  joint  results.  Overall,  shared  representations  have  been 
shown to emerge even when the task would in principle allow participants to act without   111 
considering  and  representing  the  other’s  action,  hence  suggesting  that  they  are 
automatically created any time individuals act in a social context. However, the automatic 
nature of such shared representations has been put into question by the results of recent 
studies  suggesting  that  social  and  emotional  factors  may  modulate  their  emergence 
(Hommel et al., 2009; Kuhbandner et al., 2010; Ruys & Aarts, 2010). 
As  regards  the  second  process  of  planned  coordination,  namely  joint  perception, 
including  another’s  perceptions  into  one’s  own  representation  of  the  other’s  task  can 
improve planned coordination. For example, this kind of process is involved when co-
actors’ perspectives on a jointly perceived environment are different. Moreover, when 
perceptual access to objects in the environment differs between co-actors, joint perception 
process consists in make inferences about what a co-actor can or cannot perceive (e.g., 
Brennan & Hanna, 2009). Thus, joint perceptions could help to create a common ground 
between co-actors, to adapt one’s own task, and to facilitate monitoring of the other’s 
task. 
To  briefly  summarize,  in  the  second  part  of  this  section  I  reported  a  distinction 
between two types of coordination, each supports joint action. On the one hand, emergent 
coordination occurs spontaneously and involves individuals who have no planned to act 
together, and it is supported by entrainment, common perception–action matching, and 
simulation processes. On the other hand, in planned coordination individuals plan their 
own actions in relation to joint action goal or in relation to others’ actions, and it relies on 
shared task representations and joint perceptions. Most forms of joint action require both 
emergent and planned coordination because they are two complementary processes whose 
synergy allows successful joint action (Knoblich et al., 2011). In fact, planning alone does 
not allow agents to synchronize or to predict others’ future actions based on their own 
action repertoire, features of joint action enabled by emergent coordination. Conversely, 
emergent coordination alone does not allow agents to distribute different parts of a task   112 
among themselves or to adjust their actions to others, features of joint action enabled by 
planned coordination. 
Certainly, future researches on joint action should further investigate how emergent 
coordination and planned coordination are involved together, and how agents are able to 
integrate the more basic processes of emergent and planned coordination with the higher-
level representations and processes postulated in theory of mind research, such as mental 
state  attribution.  Some  of  the  studies  reviewed  above  indicate  the  possibility  that 
emotional factors, what agents believe, and their social relations can strongly influence 
the processes underlying joint actions. In fact, in the next chapters I shall present two 
studies aimed at investigating the influence of the co-agents’ group membership on the 
emergence of joint action and, in particular, on the emergence of shared representation.   113 
CHAPTER V 
STUDY 2: 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND JOINT ACTION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The need to investigate cognition and action in a social context has become more and 
more evident in recent years, and several research efforts are focusing on studying joint 
action, that is, the ability to coordinate our actions with those of others (Sebanz et al., 
2006a). As studies reviewed in the previous chapter suggest, this ability may depend on 
the creation of shared representations that integrate in the same action plan current and 
predicted self and other’s actions (e.g., Knoblich et al., 2011; Rubichi et al., 2011). 
As has been extensively explained in Chapter 4, a task recently used to investigate 
joint action and the emergence of shared representation is the Simon task (Sebanz et al., 
2003). Briefly resuming, in the classical Simon task, participants respond to a non-spatial 
feature (e.g., color) of stimuli presented left or right of fixation point with assigned right 
and left key-presses. The Simon effect refers to the finding that performance is faster and 
more accurate when stimulus and response location correspond compared to when they 
do not (Simon & Rudell, 1967; for reviews, see Proctor & Vu, 2006; Rubichi et al., 
2006), hence indicating that stimulus location affects performance even if task-irrelevant. 
It is widely assumed that the effect is due to a conflict, emerging at the stage of response 
selection (e.g., Rubichi et al., 2000; Rubichi & Pellicano, 2004), between two alternative 
response codes, one generated on the basis of task instructions and the other automatically 
activated through preexisting associations linking a stimulus to its spatially corresponding 
response (e.g., De Jong et al., 1994).   114 
More relevant to the purpose of the present work, several recent studies showed that a 
similar Simon effect occurs even when the Simon task is shared between two participants 
(e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005a; Milanese et al., 2010; Ferraro, Iani, Mariani, Milanese, 
& Rubichi, 2011). The occurrence of the joint Simon effect suggests that each participant 
automatically represented the other’s part of the task and integrated this representation in 
his/her action planning. Indeed, in the absence of such a shared representation, the effect 
would not have been evident due to the lack of a competition between two alternative 
responses. (Knoblich et al., 2011; Rubichi et al., 2011). 
Several findings reviewed in Chapter 4 demonstrate the automatic nature of shared 
representations,  that  seem  to  emerge  any  time  individuals  act  in  a  social  context. 
However,  recent  studies  suggest  that  social  and  emotional  factors  may  modulate  the 
emergence  of  such  shared  representations.  Briefly  resuming  some  results  previously 
discussed and relevant for the present study, the joint Simon effect seems to be modulated 
by the valence of the interaction between two co-acting individuals, since it emerged only 
when participants were involved in positive relationship, whereas negative relationship 
leaded to a reduction of the effect (Hommel et al., 2009). In the same way, a larger joint 
Simon effect is registered when a positive mood was inducted between participants, while 
no effect is observed after the induction of a negative mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010). 
Similarly,  a  larger  joint  Simon  effect  emerges  when  performance  of  two  co-actors  is 
interdependent, both during cooperative and competitive conditions, compared to when 
performance is independent (Ruys & Aarts, 2010). Overall, these data put into question 
the automatic nature of shared representation. 
Looking  at  social  psychology  studies,  they  indicate  that  the  process  of  social 
categorization,  that  is  the  perception  of  belonging  to  a  social  group,  can  influence 
thinking,  feeling,  and  behaving  toward  members  of  the  ingroup  (i.e.,  the  group  the 
individual is a member of) versus members of the outgroup (i.e., the other group). For   115 
instance, social categorization enhances perception of differences between groups and of 
similarities within the group (Allen & Wilder, 1975, 1979; Doise, Deschamps, & Meyer, 
1978). More relevant for the present study, there are indications that when individuals 
categorize  themselves  as  group  members,  the  group  to  which  they  belong  becomes 
included in the self (Smith & Henry, 1996). 
The aim of the present study (Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in press a) was to assess 
whether shared representations, as indexed by the presence of the joint Simon effect, are 
modulated by group membership. Stated differently, we hypothesized that the joint Simon 
effect should emerge when co-acting individuals perceive themselves as part of the same 
social  group.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  expected  to  disappear  when  co-actors  perceive 
themselves as belonging to different social groups. 
The  available  literature  suggests  that  identification  with  a  group  may  occur  at 
different  degrees.  According  to  some  authors,  awareness  of  belonging  to  a  common 
category  is  the  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  group  formation.  Crucially,  the 
manipulation of minimal cues is often sufficient to motivate identification with a group 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974). In these works, the 
differentiation between ingroup and outgroup occurred even when allocation into groups 
was  arbitrary  and  virtually  meaningless.  Other  authors  posit  that  individuals  perceive 
themselves as part of the same group if they are aware of belonging to a category, share a 
common goal, and perceive themselves as positively interdependent with respect to goals 
and means to attain these goals (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). 
Based on these considerations, we ran two experiments in which individuals were 
required to perform a Simon task along another person who was perceived as belonging 
either to the same group or to a different group and manipulated group formation. In 
Experiment 4, participants were divided arbitrarily into two groups, based on a trivial and 
almost completely irrelevant basis, and they were then asked to perform a Simon task   116 
with an individual who was supposed to belong to the same group or to a different group. 
In Experiment 5, we manipulated whether the goals of two jointly acting individuals were 
positively related and hence the success of one individual made the success of the other 
more  likely,  or  whether  they  were  negatively  related  and  hence  the  success  of  one 
member rendered the success of the other less likely. In both experiments, the joint Simon 
effect  was  expected  to  show  up  when  participants  perceived  themselves  as  ingroup 
members and to be absent when they perceived the other as an outgroup member. 
 
5.2 Experiment 4 
The present experiment aimed at investigating whether the differentiation between 
ingroup and outgroup obtained by manipulating minimal cues (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971) is 
effective in modulating the arising of the joint Simon effect. This would suggest that the 
activation of shared representations is sensitive to minimal ingroup–outgroup distinctions. 
Based on the performance on two cognitive tasks, participants were ostensibly placed 
in either the “synesthetic” or the “differentiator” group depending on their “cognitive 
style” (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). In reality, performance on the two tests was not scored 
and participants were arbitrarily divided. After being categorized, participants performed 
a joint Simon task along with an individual who was believed to belong either to the same 
group or to a different group. 
If perceiving oneself as part of a group decreases the distinction between self and 
others belonging to the same group, and increases the distinction between self and others 
belonging  to  a  different  group,  a  joint  Simon  effect  should  be  evident  when  coupled 
individuals are categorized as belonging to the same group, while it should be absent 
when they are categorized as belonging to two different groups. 
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5.2.1 Methods 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduates students from the University of Bologna (10 males and 22 
females)  with  a  mean  age  of  22  years  (age  range:  19–31  years)  took  part  in  the 
experiment for monetary  reward (5 €). All were right-handed and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and gave 
written informed consent. Once recruited, they were randomly paired and each couple 
was randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. 
 
5.2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli  
In the first part of the experiment, participants performed two cognitive tasks taken 
from Cadinu and Rothbart (1996, Experiment 4). For the first task (see Appendix C), 
participants were presented with a sheet showing a list of 15 nouns (five animals, five 
trees, and five tools) for 30 s. and, at the end of the time interval, they were asked to write 
down within 30 s. as many of the nouns of the list as they could recall. For the second 
task (see Appendix D), participants were presented with a sheet containing a pattern of 
seven large letters (one A, one C, two Ds, two Es, one F), each of them made of small 
letters (for example, a big A could be made of small Ds) for 15 s., and were then required 
to report within 10 s. how many times they saw the big E and how many time they saw a 
letter composed of small Es. 
During  the  experiment,  participants  sat  side-by-side  in  front  of  a  17-inch  colour 
monitor (the eye-to-screen distance was approximately 60 cm). E-Prime 2.0 software was 
used for presenting stimuli and collecting responses. 
Stimuli in the joint Simon task were red or green solid squares (2 x 2 cm), presented 
4.5 cm to the left or to the right of a central fixation cross (1 x 1 cm). Responses were   118 
executed by pressing the “z” or “-” key of a standard Italian keyboard with the left or 
right index finger, respectively. 
 
5.2.1.3 Procedure 
The experimenter explained that the study was aimed at investigating the effect of 
different cognitive styles on task performance. To this aim, participants were informed 
that they would perform three separate tasks. After completion of the first two cognitive 
tasks,  participants  were  required  to  respond  to  a  brief  questionnaire  while  the 
experimenter left the room to score the participants’ performance. When the experimenter 
returned to the room, she communicated to the participants their results, telling them that 
they displayed either the same cognitive style (same-group condition) or two different 
cognitive styles (different-group condition). Even though participants believed that the 
style assignment was based on their performance to the two tasks, it was random. 
Participants  were  then  provided  with  information  about  their  cognitive  styles  and 
informed that they would have to perform a task together. In the same group condition, 
the  experimenter  emphasized  that,  based  on  their  cognitive  style,  participants  were 
expected  to  display  a  very  similar  performance.  In  the  different-group  condition,  the 
experimenter emphasized that, based on their different cognitive styles, performance on 
the following task was expected to be remarkably different. 
Participants were then required to perform a Simon task jointly, sitting side-by-side in 
front of the same computer screen (for a schematic representation of the joint Simon task, 
see  Figure  4.1  in  Chapter  4).  Each  participant  was  instructed  to  respond  to  only  one 
stimulus  color.  For  half  of  the  pairs,  the  participant  sitting  on  the  right  chair  was 
instructed to press the right key to the green stimulus whereas the participant sitting on 
the left chair was instructed to press the left key to the red stimulus. The other half pairs 
experienced the opposite stimulus–response mapping.   119 
A  trial  began  with  the  presentation  of  the  fixation  cross  at  the  center  of  a  black 
background. After 1 s, the stimulus appeared to the right or to the left of fixation and 
remained visible for 800 ms. Maximum time allowed for a response was 1 s. A response 
terminated the trial and the inter-trial interval was 1 s. 
The Simon task consisted of 20 practice trials and 160 experimental trials that were 
divided into two blocks of 80 trials each. For half of the trials, stimulus and response 
location  corresponded  (corresponding  trials),  and  for  the  other  half,  they  did  not 
correspond (non-corresponding trials). 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a post-experiment 
questionnaire (see Appendix E) to rate the experimental situation using a 7-point bipolar 
semantic differential scale on the following dimensions: easy versus difficult (1 = easy, 7 
= difficult), pleasant–unpleasant (1 = pleasant, 7 = unpleasant), positive–negative (1 = 
positive, 7 = negative), and cooperative–competitive (1 = cooperative, 7 = competitive). 
On the whole, the experiment consisted of a 30-min session.  
 
5.2.2 Results 
Error  trials  were  less  than  1%  and  were  excluded  from  further  analyses.  Correct 
response times (RT) were entered into a 2 x 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA)  with  Condition  (same-group  vs.  different-group  condition)  as  between-
subjects  factor  and  stimulus–response  Correspondence  (corresponding  vs.  non-
corresponding  trials)  as  within-subjects  factor.  Newman-Keuls  post-hoc  test  was  also 
conducted on significant interactions. 
The effect of Condition did not reach significance [F (1, 30) = 1.25, MSe = 3761, p = 
.28]. There was a main effect of Correspondence [F (1, 30) = 40.92, MSe = 47, p < .001], 
with faster RTs in corresponding (M = 329 ms) than in non-corresponding trials (M = 340 
ms).  Data  are  shown  in  Figure  5.1.  The  advantage  for  corresponding  responses  was   120 
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evident in both experimental conditions with a 13-ms Simon effect in the same-group 
condition and a 10-ms effect in the different-group condition. Even though the effect was 
numerically smaller in the different-group condition than in the same-group condition, 
this  difference  did  not  reach  statistical  significance,  as  indicated  by  the  lack  of  a 
significant Correspondence x Condition interaction [F (1, 30) = 1.01, MSe = 47, p = .32]. 
As regards the scores obtained from the bipolar semantic differential scale, overall 
participants judged the situation as easy (M = 1.93, SD = 1.13), pleasant (M = 2.19, SD = 
1.03), positive (M = 1.69, SD = .86), and cooperative (M = 2.87, SD = 2.03). A t test was 
used to assess whether the scores significantly differed from the neutral point (4). For the 
participants in the same-group condition, all judgments were significantly lower than the 
neutral point (p < .001). For the participants in the different-group condition, only the 
cooperative–competitive dimension obtained a score equal to 4, [t (1, 15) = -0,81, p = 
.43],  while  scores  in  the  other  dimensions  were  lower  than  4  (p  <  .01).  A  t  test  for 
independent samples indicated that for all dimensions, the scores were significantly lower 
for the same-group condition (p < .05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Study 2, Experiment 4: reaction times (ms) for corresponding and 
non-corresponding  trials  as  a  function  of  group  membership  (same  group  vs. 
different group). Error bars show standard errors of the means.   121 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Our results indicate that shared representations, as indexed by the joint Simon effect, 
emerge even when participants believe to perform the task along with a member of a 
different group. The observation that under the same-group condition, the joint Simon 
effect  is  comparable  to  the  effect  reported  in  previous  studies  (Sebanz  et  al.  2003; 
Milanese et al. 2010), clearly demonstrates that simply perceiving themselves as part of 
the same group as a co-actor does not enhance the creation of shared representations. 
Actually, even though the paradigm proposed by Tajfel et al. (1971) constitutes the 
conceptually  more  related  reference  for  the  experimental  situation  that  we  used,  it  is 
important to emphasize that a relevant element marked the difference between the present 
experimental situation and the one traditionally used in the minimal cues paradigm. In 
fact, in the conditions studied by Tajfel and colleagues, participant after having received 
the information concerning his/her group membership (i.e., category of those who prefer 
Klee vs. Kandinsky paintings) undertakes the task of giving monetary rewards to two 
persons  only  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  their  categorical  membership.  In  this 
situation, participant becomes “outside” to the judged system even if aware of sharing a 
categorical  affiliation  with  one  of  the  two  persons.  In  the  case  of  the  experimental 
situation that we designed, participant after has been arbitrarily assigned to the category 
of synesthetic or differentiator is engaged in a motor decision task in which he/she is 
compared directly with a partner. Therefore, in this case participant is “intern” to the 
judged  system.  Given  the  situation  provided  by  the  joint  Simon  effect,  namely  the 
possible integration of others’ actions in one own plan, it becomes important the degree of 
salience with which participant feels to belong to a given category. According to the 
“self-categorization  theory”  (Turner,  1987),  categorical  salience  is  determined  by  two 
factors: the accessibility of a category and the adequacy of that category in the account of 
the stimuli present in a context. With regard to accessibility, participants performed the   122 
Simon  task  immediately  after  giving  them  the  information  about  their  categorical 
membership;  this  element  gave  us  a  plausible  security  that  that  information  should 
maintain salient this type of categorization. As regards the adequacy, we had chosen a 
generic and ambiguous system of categorical attribution (synesthetic vs. differentiator) 
that seemed to fit the characteristics of the task that couples of participants were about to 
execute:  categorical  labels  assigned  to  participants  might  seem  appropriate  in  favor 
different strategies of interaction with the partner during the execution of that particular 
type of task. The results obtained do not have revealed any difference in performance of 
participants belonging to two different categories, hence suggesting that a simple self-
categorization  condition,  as  the  one  we  used,  was  not  sufficient  to  activate  different 
strategies of interaction on the basis of the sharing or not of the same categorical labels 
with the partner during the joint Simon task. 
 
5.3 Experiment 5 
Differently from Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel et al., 1971), other authors posit that 
individuals perceive themselves as part of the same group if they are aware of belonging 
to a category, share a common goal, and perceive themselves as positively interdependent 
with respect to goals and means to attain these goals, and thus they had to cooperate 
(Rabbie  &  Horwitz,  1969).  In  a  study  designed  to  investigate  the  influence  of  social 
categorization on helping behavior, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) founded that, when an 
identity  of  belonging  to  the  same  group  was  inducted,  helping  behaviors  increased 
significantly  towards  persons  previously  perceived  as  members  of  an  outside  group. 
Although factors such as the degree of similarity and the empathic relationship could play 
a role, the responsible of the helping behaviors was the process of re-categorization, that 
made persons as members of a single common group. In the same direction were the 
results obtained in a study conducted by Kramer and Brewer (1984). In a situation of   123 
decision making regarding the use and consume of a shared and depleted natural resource, 
participants exerted a more severe self-control when moving from belonging to different 
groups toward a situation in which a superordinate group identity was made salient. 
Based on these empirical findings, Experiment 5 was aimed at assessing whether the 
differentiation  between  ingroup  and  outgroup  obtained  by  manipulating  the 
interdependence  experienced  by  two  acting  individuals  is  effective  in  modulating  the 
arising  of  the  joint  Simon  effect.  This  would  indicate  that  the  activation  of  shared 
representations is sensitive to complex ingroup–outgroup distinctions. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  positive  interdependence  implies  cooperation  since 
individuals  need  to  work  together  to  attain  a  common  goal;  conversely,  negative 
interdependence implies competition since individuals work one against the other to attain 
a personal goal (Deutsch, 1949, 1962). As mentioned above, the effects of competition 
and  cooperation  on  the  emergence  of  shared  representations  have  been  recently 
investigated  by  Ruys  and  Aarts  (2010).  Although  we  find  the  results  of  this  study 
interesting,  we  believe  that  their  competitive  condition  does  not  satisfy  the  widely 
accepted definition of competition, since a given number of participants was randomly 
selected  for  the  reward.  Instead,  competition  is  generally  defined  as  involving  one 
individual attempting to outperform another in a zero-sum situation, namely in a situation 
in which the gain or loss of a participant is perfectly balanced by the gain or loss of 
another participant (Kelley & Thiabut, 1969). Accordingly, in the present experiment, 
participants were randomly coupled and asked to perform the Simon task together, each 
responding  to  one  stimulus  color.  Under  the  positive  interdependence  (cooperative) 
condition,  participants  were  told  that  the  couple  with  the  fastest  and  most  accurate 
responses  would  receive  an  economic  reward.  Under  the  negative  interdependence 
(competition) condition, they were told that the participant of the couple with the fastest 
and most accurate responses would receive an economic reward.   124 
5.3.1 Methods 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two new undergraduates students from the University of Bologna (18 males 
and 14 females) with a mean age of 22.3 years (age range: 19–34 years), took part in the 
Experiment 5 for monetary reward (5 €). All subjects were right-handed and reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment 
and gave written informed consent. Participants were randomly coupled and each couple 
was randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. 
 
5.3.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure 
Stimuli were the same as those used in the Simon task of Experiment 4. 
Participants  were  required  to  perform  the  Simon  task  jointly.  Half  couples  were 
assigned to the cooperative condition, and the other half were assigned to the competitive 
condition.  In  the  cooperative  condition,  each  couple  of  participants  was  placed  in 
competition against the other couples. Participants in the couple were told that the best-
performing couple, in terms of both speed and accuracy, would receive a ten Euro reward 
(five  Euro  to  each  participant).  The  experimenter  emphasized  the  importance  of 
coordinating their efforts as they worked on the task to attain the goal. In the competitive 
condition, participants in the couple were placed in a competition against one another. 
They were told that at the end of the experiment, the best-performing participant, in terms 
of both speed and accuracy, would receive a five Euro reward. 
The experiment consisted of 20 practice trials and 260 experimental trials that were 
divided into two blocks. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a post-experiment 
questionnaire  to  rate  the  experimental  situation  using  a  7-point  bipolar  scale  on  the 
following dimensions: easy versus difficult (1 = easy, 7 = difficult), pleasant–unpleasant   125 
(1  =  pleasant,  7  =  unpleasant),  positive–negative  (1  =  positive,  7  =  negative),  and 
cooperative–competitive (1 = cooperative, 7 = competitive). 
On the whole, the experiment consisted of a 20-min session.  
 
5.3.2 Results 
Data were treated as in previous experiment. Error trials were less than 1% and were 
excluded from further analyses. Correct RTs were entered into a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA  with  Condition  (cooperative  couples  vs.  competitive  couples)  as  between-
subjects  factor  and  stimulus–response  Correspondence  (corresponding  vs.  non 
corresponding  trials)  as  within-subjects  factor.  Newman-Keuls  post-hoc  test  was  also 
conducted on significant interactions. 
Condition did not reach statistical significance [F (1, 30) = 1.65, MSe = 3837, p = 
.21]. There was a main effect of Correspondence [F (1, 30) = 20.88, MSe = 53, p < .001], 
with faster RTs in corresponding (M = 317 ms) than in non-corresponding trials (M = 324 
ms). Most important, there was a significant Condition x Correspondence interaction [F 
(1, 30) = 8.85, MSe = 53, p < .01]. Data are shown in Figure 5.2. The Newman–Keuls test 
showed that the advantage for corresponding responses was significant in cooperative 
couples (14 ms) but not in competitive couples (3 ms). An analysis with the magnitude of 
the effect as dependent variable indicated that these two values significantly differed [F 
(1, 30) = 8.84, p < .01]. 
As regards the scores obtained from the bipolar semantic differential scale, overall 
participants judged the situation as easy (M = 1.87, SD = .79), pleasant (M = 2.37, SD = 
1.52),  positive  (M  =  2.03,  SD  =  1.38),  and  cooperative  (M  =  3.56,  SD  =  2.39).  For 
cooperative couples, all judgments were lower than the neutral point 4 (p < .03). For 
competitive couples, judgments on the cooperative–competitive dimension were equal to 
4 [t (1,15) = .47, p = .64], all other judgments were lower than 4 (p < .001). Importantly,   126 
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competitive couples tended to judge the situation as more competitive than cooperative 
couples (2.8 vs. 4.3 for cooperative and competitive couples, respectively), [t (1, 30) = 
1,84, p = .07]. No other difference between couples reached statistical significance (p > 
.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
These results indicate that the activation of shared representations, as indexed by the 
joint Simon effect, occurs only when individuals cooperate but not when they compete. 
This result is inconsistent with the finding by Ruys and Aarts (2010) showing that shared 
representations emerge when individuals attend to the co-actor intentions, irrespective of 
the cooperative or competitive nature of the interaction. The observation that both groups 
perceived the experimental situation as equally positive and pleasant allows us to exclude 
that differences in performance could be due to emotional factors. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Study 2, Experiment 5: reaction times (ms) for corresponding and non-
corresponding  trials  as  a  function  of  interdependence  (cooperative  couples  vs. 
competitive couples). Error bars show standard errors of the means.   127 
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5.4 Comparison between Experiments 4 and 5 
To compare the magnitude of the Simon effect, the correct RTs of Experiment 4 and 
Experiment  5  were  entered  into  a  one-way  ANOVA,  with  Condition  (same-group, 
different-group, cooperation, competition) as between-subjects factor. 
The joint Simon effect was significantly higher in the same-group (13 ms, p = .019) 
and in the cooperative conditions (14 ms, p = .017) compared to competitive couples (3 
ms), [F (3, 60) = 3.86, MSE = 100, p = .01] (Figure 5.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 General Discussion 
Previous  studies  suggest  that  shared  representations  emerge  whenever 
complementary actions are distributed across different individuals (see findings reviewed 
in Chapter 4; e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003). The joint Simon effect has indeed been taken as 
an indication that when two individuals perform the Simon task each responding to one 
stimulus color, each individual forms a representation of both action alternatives. One 
open  question  is  whether  shared  representations  are  automatically  formed  any  time 
Figure 5.3 Study 2, Comparison Experiments 4 and 5: reaction times (ms) for joint 
Simon effect as a function of Condition (same-group, different-group, cooperative 
couples, competitive couples). Error bars show standard errors of the means. 
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individuals act in a social context or whether they depend on the perceived psychological 
connectedness  between  co-acting  individuals.  To  address  this  question,  we  assessed 
whether joint actions, as indexed by the joint Simon effect, are modulated by perceived 
group  membership  and  by  the  strength  of  the  differentiation  between  ingroup  and 
outgroup (Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in press a). 
Our  results  indicate  that  mere  social  categorization  of  co-acting  participants  into 
groups did not modulate the emergence of shared representations that were evident even 
when participants believed to perform the task along with an individual belonging to a 
different social group (Experiment 4). On the contrary, joint action was influenced by the 
type of interdependence between co-actors. Specifically, shared representations were not 
activated when co-acting individuals were required to compete one against the other and 
their performance was negatively interdependent (Experiment 5). 
Although research using Tajfel’s (1970) minimal group paradigm suggests that social 
categorization  is  a  sufficient  antecedent  of  ingroup–outgroup  distinction  and  of 
consequent ingroup-favoring discrimination, some authors raised questions about whether 
social  categorization  alone  is  sufficient  for  group  formation  and  intergroup 
discrimination. For instance, drawing on Lewin’s idea (1948), Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) 
proposed  that  a  perceived  positive  interdependence  is  the  precondition  for  group 
formation  and  for  subsequent  ingroup–outgroup  differentiation.  Our  findings  may 
contribute to this long-lasting debate. Indeed, the finding that only the ingroup–outgroup 
distinction  produced  by  negative  interdependence  was  strong  enough  to  disrupt  the 
emergence  of  shared  representations  favors  the  view  that  ingroup–outgroup 
discrimination  processes  are  enhanced  by  perceived  interdependence.  To  make  this 
conclusion more plausible, in a possible future study could be appropriate to replicate the 
Experiment 4 emphasizing also in perceptual terms the role of participants’ categorical   129 
membership  in  the  Simon  task,  namely  providing  elements  that  mark  in  a  visible 
perceptually way the participants’ membership to a same or different group. 
Notably,  the  finding  of  a  joint  Simon  effect  when  participants  were  required  to 
cooperate and its absence when they were required to compete is at odd with the view 
proposed  by  Ruys  and  Aarts  (2010)  that  shared  representations  emerge  even  in 
competitive contexts as long as individuals attend to the intentions of the co-actor. Indeed, 
under the competitive condition used in our study, since the participants’ goal was to 
outperform their co-agents, they were likely to observe and pay attention to the others’ 
actions  and  intention  to  monitor  their  progress  toward  their  goal.  More  specifically, 
according to the literature on achievement goals (for a review, see Poortvliet & Darnon, 
2010), people whose aim is to outperform others, as occurs in competitive situations, 
develop an “other-referenced focus” since, to monitor their progress toward the goal, they 
tend  to  compare  their  performance  with  the  performance  of  others.  On  the  contrary, 
people whose aim is to improve one’s own performance develop a “self-referenced focus” 
since they tend to compare their present performance with their previous performances. 
Nevertheless, no joint Simon effect was observed under the competitive condition. On the 
contrary, a joint Simon effect was observed under the cooperative condition. 
Even though the findings of the present study do not support the view that shared 
representations emerge any time individuals act in a social context, they suggest that the 
tendency to integrate the co-actor’s action into our own action system is quite strong. 
Such a conclusion is indeed also suggested by the results of those studies showing that the 
joint Simon effect occurs even when individuals believe to perform the task along with 
another person sitting in a different room (e.g., Tsai et al., 2008; but see Welsh et al., 
2007 for different results). The finding of a joint Simon effect under both conditions of 
Experiment 4 and the observation that it was of comparable magnitude under these two 
conditions and under the cooperative condition of Experiment 5 seem to suggest that   130 
when  acting  in  a  social  context,  by  default,  individuals  may  perceive  positive 
interdependence  with  co-acting  individuals,  even  when  cooperation  is  not  explicitly 
requested  and  ingroup–outgroup  differentiation  is  not  supported  by  negative 
interdependence  (i.e.,  competition).  This  result  is  consistent  with  Tomasello  and 
colleagues (2005) who argue that human beings are inclined to share goals and intentions. 
According  to  the  authors,  this  uniquely  human  ability  is  the  result  of  the  interaction 
between two different capacities. The first is the ability to “read” the others’ intentions 
through observation of their behavior, namely human beings would be able to understand 
and represent others as agents oriented to achieve goals. The second ability concerns the 
motivation to share intentions and cooperate with others, an ability that expresses itself in 
cooperative behavior, emerges very early in the individuals, and constitutes an important 
basis for later cognitive development. Lastly, the perception of positive interdependence 
may enhance the willingness to invest in the interaction (Poortvliet & Darnon, 2010), 
hence paving the way for the emergence of shared representations. Differently, when the 
other represents an obstacle toward the attainment of a personal goal, as occurs in explicit 
competitive  situations,  individuals  may  be  less  willing  to  coordinate  their  efforts,  to 
depend on, and to be influenced by the other’s actions, this blocking the integration of self 
and other’s action.   131 
CHAPTER VI 
STUDY 3: 
JOINT ACTION AND CARRY-OVER EFFECT OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Engaging an interaction with other individuals is a fundamental part of our daily life 
and  many  factors  can  influence  these  relationships.  Several  evidence  from  social 
psychology  clearly  demonstrates  that  factors  such  as  prejudice,  competition,  and 
cooperation  interact,  and  influence  the  social  context.  In  this  regard,  it  seems  very 
interesting the “Realistic group-conflict theory” which claims that, when two groups are 
in  competition  for  limited  resources,  the  potential  success  of  one  group  menaces  the 
comfort and interests of the other one, resulting in negative outgroup attitudes (Campbell, 
1965; Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Levine & Campbell, 1972). These resources 
may be not only tangible (e.g., money), but may also involve power or control (e.g., 
political  power).  When  the  goals  of  different  groups  are  complementary,  relations 
between the groups will be positive; conversely, when conflicting goals exist, relations 
will be negative. The resulting conflict may increase ingroup solidarity (i.e., toward the 
group the individual is a member of), which amplifies the ingroup/outgroup distinction 
and creates intergroup hostility. 
To test realistic group-conflict theory, in their seminal work Sherif and colleagues 
(Sherif et al., 1961) divided children in a summer camp program into two separate groups 
and involved them in competitive activities (Phase 1). Since these activities permitted 
victory of only one group over the other, one group’s success precluded the success of the   132 
other one. Until competition continued, hostility between the groups increased (Phase 2). 
The bias between the groups decreased only when common goals that required intergroup 
cooperation were introduced (Phase 3). 
Besides this seminal study, other findings demonstrated that incompatible goals and 
perceived  competition  between  groups  are  linked  to:  negative  outgroup  attitudes, 
stereotyping,  intergroup  threat,  and  prejudice  (Langford  &  Ponting,  1992;  Tougas, 
Brown,  Beaton,  &  Joly,  1995;  Watts,  1996;  Beaton  &  Tougas,  2001;  Zarate,  Garcia, 
Garza,  &  Hitlan,  2004;  for  a  review,  see  Riek,  Mania,  &  Gaertner,  2006).  Indeed, 
according  to  realistic  group-conflict  theory,  conflicts  of  interest  and  thus  negative 
interdependence between groups induce prejudice and social discrimination because such 
conflicts lead to intergroup threat. For increased prejudice to occur, perceiving a conflict 
or  a  competition  is  sufficient.  Moreover,  higher  levels  of  prejudice,  even  towards  an 
outgroup that was not involved in the competition, can be caused by both recollection of a 
competition from memory and participation in a competition. In this regard, Sassenberg, 
et al. (2007) argued that thinking about or going through a competition might cause the 
so-called “carry-over effect of competition”, namely a subsequent intergroup situation 
might be experienced as more competitive. 
In line with this assumption, Stapel and Koomen (2005) showed that a “difference” 
focus was activated by competitive situation, while a “similarity” focus was activated by 
cooperative  situation.  In  fact,  different  situations  can  cause  the  onset  of  different 
mindsets, namely of “cognitive procedures related to how one chooses between various 
goal alternatives or to the planning of actions one must take in order to attain a chosen 
goal” (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990, p. 1120). When a “competition mindset” 
is activated in one context, the encountered intergroup contexts can be perceived as more 
competitive. Hence, a competition mindset should cause more prejudice, higher perceived 
negative  interdependence,  and  increased  outgroup  homogeneity,  compared  to  when  a   133 
cooperation mindset or no specific mindset is activated (e.g., Carnevale & Probst, 1998; 
Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001). 
As claimed in the previous chapters, the importance of the social context and its 
influence on the involved co-actors are becoming more important within the cognitive 
sciences, as well as for social psychology. In particular, the topic of joint action will be 
central  even  in  this  chapter,  using  once  again  the  joint  Simon  paradigm  as  a  tool  to 
measure the emergence of shared representations. As we shall see, the present study is 
closely related to the investigation presented in the previous chapter. More specifically, 
the Study 3 (Anelli et al., in preparation a) is aimed to further assess whether shared 
representations are modulated by group membership, in particular by the interdependence 
experienced  by  two  acting  individuals,  and  whether  the  induction  of  cooperative  or 
competitive condition leads to the emergence of a sort of carry-over effect. 
Relevant to our aims, recent studies focused on how the joint Simon effect can be 
modulated by social factors. Briefly resuming some findings widely discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5, some studies clearly demonstrate that shared representations, as indexed by the 
joint Simon effect, emerge after the induction of a positive but not of a negative mood 
(Kuhbandner  et  al.,  2010);  they  are  activated  after  interaction  between  two  co-acting 
individuals with positive valence but not after interaction with negative valence (Hommel 
et al., 2009); they depend on whether participants attended to the intentions of the other, 
particularly in interdependent condition compared to independent one  (Ruys &  Aarts, 
2010). 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in our previous work (Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in 
press a), we investigated the influence on joint actions of perceived group membership of 
co-acting  participants  and  the  strength  of  the  differentiation  between  ingroup  and 
outgroup, manipulating minimal cues (i.e., belonging of participants to the same vs. to 
different group; Experiment 4) and the perceived interdependence (i.e., cooperative vs.   134 
competitive  interdependence;  Experiment  5).  Our  results  indicate  that  mere  social 
categorization of co-acting participants into groups did not influence the emergence of 
shared representation, as indexed by the joint Simon effect, which was present even when 
participants perform the task with an individual belonging to a different social group. In 
contrast,  the  emergence  of  shared  representation  was  modulated  by  the  kind  of 
interdependence between co-actors, as it was activated when participants were required to 
cooperate and their performance was positively interdependent, while it was absent when 
they had to compete and their performance was negatively interdependent. 
Overall, previous studies, both from social and cognitive psychology, provide clear 
evidence  of  the  social  context  importance  on  the  participants’  performance;  namely, 
factors such as competition and cooperation seem to play a relevant role in the process of 
social interaction. 
Starting  from  these  assumptions,  we  ran  three  experiments  in  which  couples  of 
participants were required to perform a joint Simon task following a task in which they 
experienced different kinds of perceived interdependence. More specifically, we aimed to 
measure  the  influence  exerted  by  shared  cooperative  or  competitive  practice  on 
subsequent performance. Moreover, we assessed the duration of the practice effects. We 
used the same manipulation employed in our previous work (Chapter 5, Experiment 5; 
Iani  et  al.,  2011,  Experiment  2;  Anelli  et  al.,  in  press  a,  Experiment  2),  namely  we 
manipulated whether the goals of the two participants were positively related (i.e., the 
success of one individual made also the success of the other more likely) or whether they 
were negatively related (i.e., the success of one individual made the success of the other 
less likely). 
To  this  aim,  we  used  a  modified  version  of  the  transfer-of-learning  paradigm, 
introduced for the first time in a spatial stimulus–response (S–R) correspondence task by 
Proctor and Lu (1999). The authors showed that it was possible to modulate performance   135 
on the Simon task (i.e., transfer task) by asking participants to perform before a spatial 
compatibility task (i.e., practice task) with incompatible mapping (i.e., responding to the 
right stimulus with the left key and vice versa). Specifically, in the transfer task the Simon 
effect was reduced, absent or even reversed, since responding with incompatible mapping 
in the practice task strengthens the non-corresponding association between a stimulus and 
a  response,  and  this  association  affects  performance  even  when  the  task  is  changed 
(Proctor  &  Lu,  1999;  Tagliabue,  Zorzi,  Umiltà,  &  Bassignani,  2000;  Iani,  Rubichi, 
Gherri,  &  Nicoletti,  2009).  In  two  recent  studies,  introduced  in  Chapter  4  about  the 
importance of learning on shared representations, Milanese and colleagues (Milanese et 
al.,  2010,  2011)  created  a  “social”  version  of  this  paradigm  (i.e.,  a  joint  transfer-of-
learning paradigm), showing the influence of joint task performance on implicit learning 
and the transfer of this learning to subsequent performance. 
In  the  present  study,  we  combined  two  well-known  paradigms  of  cognitive 
psychology:  the  joint  Simon  task  developed  by  Sebanz  and  colleagues  (Sebanz  et  al. 
2003)  and  the  joint  transfer-of-learning  task  developed  by  Milanese  and  colleagues 
(Milanese et al., 2010). This choice allowed us first of all to assess whether and to what 
extent performing a competitive or a cooperative task with a co-actor shapes the way a 
subsequent task is executed, comparing the participants’ performance before and after the 
introduction of a condition of interdependence, and second to measure the duration of this 
potential effect. To these aims, we ran three experiments in which participants performed 
a joint Simon task before and after practicing a non-spatial task, in order to be sure that 
spatial characteristics of the practice task did not affect performance in the transfer task, 
as it might happens with a spatial S–R correspondence task. For this reason, we choose 
the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in a social version (i.e., a joint Flanker task; 
Atmaca,  Sebanz,  &  Knoblich,  2011).  In  more  detail,  in  Experiment  6,  participants 
performed the joint Simon task in a neutral condition (i.e., without any competitive or   136 
cooperative instruction; baseline session), the joint Flanker task in a cooperative condition 
(practice session), and the joint Simon task in a neutral condition (transfer session); in 
Experiment  7,  they  performed  the  joint  Simon  task  in  a  neutral  condition  (baseline 
session), the joint Flanker task in a competitive condition (practice session), and the joint 
Simon  task  in  a  neutral  condition  (transfer  session);  finally,  in  Experiment  8,  they 
performed the joint Simon task in a neutral condition (baseline session), the joint Flanker 
task  in  a  competitive  condition  (practice  session),  and  the  joint  Simon  task  in  a 
cooperative condition (transfer session), (see Figure 6.1 for the experimental design). 
On the basis of reviewed findings, derived both from studies of cognitive and social 
psychology,  we  hypothesize  the  emergence  of  a  significant  joint  Simon  effect  when 
participants practice a cooperative interdependence (Experiment 6). Instead, we predict 
that the joint Simon effect would be reduced or even absent when participants experience 
a competitive interdependence in the practice session (Experiment 7). Finally, as regards 
the  duration  of  the  predicted  competitive  practice  effect  (Experiment  8),  we  can 
advancing two possible hypotheses: if a competitive practice has a long-lasting effect, we 
should obtain a reduced or null joint Simon effect even when participants experience a 
cooperative  condition  after  a  competitive  practice;  instead,  whether  the  competitive 
practice only produces a short-lasting effect, we should register a significant joint Simon 
effect when participants experience a cooperative condition after a competitive practice. 
Stated  differently,  we  hypothesize  that  a  carry-over  effect  should  emerge  after  a 
competitive  interdependence,  whereas  no  carry-over  effect  should  be  present  after  a 
cooperative interdependence. 
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Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of the experimental design used in the Study 3. In the 
three sessions participants are seated side-by-side in front of a monitor. In the baseline and 
transfer sessions participants perform a joint Simon task, whereas in the practice session 
they perform a joint Flanker task. 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Experiment 6 
The  aim  of  the  present  experiment  was  to  assess  whether  a  cooperative  practice 
performed  alongside  another  person  can  modulate  performance  in  a  subsequent  joint 
Simon task. To this end, participants were required to perform a joint Simon task in a 
neutral  condition  (i.e.,  without  any  competitive  or  cooperative  instruction)  before  and 
after  performing  a  practice  with  a  cooperative  joint  Flanker  task  (i.e.,  receiving 
cooperative instruction). 
 
6.2.1 Methods 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen undergraduates students from the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (3 
males and 13 females) with a mean age of 22.4 years (age range: 20–32 years) took part 
in the experiment for course credits. All subjects were right-handed and reported normal 
Baseline session 
(joint Simon task) 
Practice session 
(joint Flanker task) 
Transfer task 
(joint Simon task) 
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or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the experiment and 
gave written informed consent. Once recruited, they were randomly paired. 
 
6.2.1.2 Apparatus and timuli 
During  the  experiment,  participants  sat  side-by-side  in  front  of  a  17-inch  colour 
monitor (the eye-to-screen distance was approximately 60 cm). E-Prime 2.0 software was 
used for presenting stimuli and collecting responses. 
Stimuli in the joint Simon task were red or green solid squares (2 x 2 cm), presented 
4.5 cm to the left or to the right of a central fixation cross (1 x 1 cm). Stimuli in the joint 
Flanker task were arrays of five letters (2.5 x 1 cm), presented centrally. In both tasks, 
responses were executed by pressing the “z” or “-” key of a standard Italian keyboard 
with the left or right index finger, respectively. 
 
6.2.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three consecutive sessions separated by a 5-min interval: 
a baseline session, a practice session, and a transfer session. In the baseline and transfer 
sessions  participants  performed  a  Simon  task,  whereas  in  the  practice  session  they 
performed a Flanker task. Both Simon and Flanker tasks were carried out jointly with 
participants sitting side-by-side in front of the same computer screen. 
In  the  first  (baseline  session)  and  in  the  third  session  (transfer  session),  each 
participant was instructed to respond to only one stimulus colour. For half of the pairs, the 
participant  sitting  on  the  right  chair  was  instructed  to  press  the  right  key  to  the  red 
stimulus whereas the participant sitting on the left chair was instructed to press the left 
key to the green stimulus. The other half experienced the opposite mapping. Participants 
had to make speeded discriminative responses to the colour of the square and to ignore 
the location of the stimulus. The colour and location of the stimulus varied randomly but   139 
both  colours  and  locations  appeared  equally  often  across  the  experiment.  For  each 
participant, two types of trials were included in the experiment: “corresponding” trials, in 
which the stimulus appeared on the same side of the screen as the side of the correct 
response,  and  “non-corresponding”  trials,  in  which  the  stimulus  appeared  on  the  side 
opposite to that of the correct response. 
In the second session (practice session), the two participants performed a modified 
version  of  the  Flanker  task  (Eriksen  &  Eriksen,  1974),  namely  a  joint  Flanker  task 
(Atmaca et al., 2011) in a cooperative condition. Each couple of participants was placed 
in competition against the other couples and it was told that the best performing couple, in 
terms of both speed and accuracy, would receive a ten Euro reward (five Euro to each 
participant). In other words, participants were required to collaborate in order to achieve 
the common goal. We used the same instructions employed in the cooperative condition 
of the Experiment 5. To note, the experimenter informed that the cooperation concerned 
only that session and not the whole experiment. Participants were presented with arrays of 
five  letters,  with  the  letter  in  the  middle  position  constituting  the  target  letter.  Each 
participant was instructed to respond to two of four target letters by pressing the response 
key  (left or right key-press). Targets were the letters H, K, S, and C,  with H and K 
assigned to one key, and S and C assigned to the other key. The letters H, K, S, C, and U 
served as flankers. The combination of target and flanker letters resulted in four stimulus 
types (see Appendix F), namely targets are surrounded by distracting flankers that are 
either: the same as the target (identical trials), perceptually different from the target but 
refer to the same response/same participant (compatible trials), perceptually different and 
refer  to  the  opposite  response/other  participant  as  the  target  (incompatible  trials),  or 
perceptually different and do not refer to any response/any participant (neutral trials). The 
combinations  of  target  pairs  (H,  K  vs.  S,  C)  and  response  keys  (left  vs.  right)  were 
counterbalanced across participant.   140 
In both tasks, a trial began with the presentation of the fixation cross at the center of a 
black background. After 1000 ms the stimulus appeared. In the Simon task, the stimulus 
appeared to the right or to the left of the fixation cross, remained visible for 800 ms, and 
the maximum time allowed for a response was 1000 ms. In the Flanker task, the stimulus 
appeared at the center, remained visible for 600 ms, and the maximum time allowed for a 
response was 1000 ms. In both tasks, a response terminated the trial and the inter-trial-
interval was 600 ms. 
Both  baseline  and  transfer  sessions  consisted  of  12  practice  trials  and  160 
experimental  trials,  divided  into  two  blocks  of  80  trials  each.  The  practice  session 
consisted of 24 practice trials and 288 experimental trials that were divided into three 
blocks of 96 trials each. On the whole, the experiment consisted of a 40-min session.  
 
6.2.2 Results 
Here and in the following experiments we report only the data for the Simon tasks 
(baseline and transfer sessions). 
Error  trials  (1  %  in  the  baseline  session  and  1  %  in  the  transfer  session)  were 
excluded from further analyses. Correct response times (RTs) were submitted to a 2 x 2 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Session (baseline vs. transfer) and 
stimulus–response  Correspondence  (corresponding  vs.  non-corresponding  trials)  as 
within-subjects  factors.  Fisher’s  LSD  post-hoc  test  was  also  conducted  on  significant 
interactions. 
Correspondence produced a significant effect on RTs [F (1, 15) = 8.29, MSe = 329, p 
= .01], showing that participants were faster in corresponding (M = 341 ms) than in non-
corresponding (M = 354 ms) trials. Both the effect of Session [F (1, 15) = 1.51, MSe = 
926, p = 0.24] and the interaction between Session and Correspondence [F (1, 15) = 0.95, 
MSe  =  18,  p  =  0.35]  did  not  reach  significance.  Data  are  shown  in  Figure  6.2.  The   141 
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advantage for corresponding responses was evident in both sessions, with a 14-ms joint 
Simon  effect  in  the  baseline  session  and  a  12-ms  effect  in  the  transfer  session.  As 
indicated by the lack of a significant interaction between the two factors, even though the 
effect was numerically smaller in the third session than in the first one, this difference did 
not reach statistical significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Discussion 
The results of the Experiment 6 indicate that after a cooperative practice task the joint 
Simon effect is still present. Hence, a cooperative training performed jointly with another 
person does not seem to affect the performance on a subsequent Simon task. For all three 
experiments, we decided to discuss in more detail the results in the General Discussion 
section. 
 
6.3 Experiment 7 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate what happens when participants 
performed a competitive practice, instead of a cooperative one, and to assess whether this 
Figure  6.2  Study  3,  Experiment  6:  reaction  times  (ms)  for  the  baseline  and 
transfer sessions as a function of stimulus–response Correspondence. Error bars 
show standard errors of the means.   142 
kind of practice can different modulate the performance in a subsequent joint Simon task. 
To this end, as in the Experiment 6, participants were required to perform a joint Simon 
task in a neutral condition (i.e., without any competitive or cooperative instruction) before 
and  after  performing  a  joint  practice.  Differently  from  the  previous  experiment,  they 
practiced a competitive joint Flanker task (i.e., receiving competitive instruction). 
 
6.3.1 Methods 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen  new  undergraduates  students  from  the  University  of  Modena  and  Reggio 
Emilia (4 males and 12 females) with a mean age of 24.3 years (age range: 22–27 years) 
took  part  in  the  Experiment  7  for  course  credits.  All  subjects  were  right-handed  and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment  and  gave  written  informed  consent.  Once  recruited,  they  were  randomly 
paired. 
 
6.3.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure  
Apparatus,  stimuli,  and  procedure  were  the  same  as  Experiment  6  except  for  the 
following. 
During  the  practice  session  participants  performed  a  joint  Flanker  task  in  a 
competitive condition instead of in a cooperative one. Participants in the couple were 
placed in a competition against one another and they were told that at the end of the 
experiment the best performing participant, in terms of both speed and accuracy, would 
receive a five Euro reward. In other words, participants were required to compete in order 
to achieve the goal. We used the same instructions employed in the competitive condition 
of the Experiment 5. To note, the experimenter informed that the competition concerned 
only that session and not the whole experiment.   143 
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6.3.2 Results 
Data were treated as in previous experiment. Error trials (1 % in the baseline session 
and 1 % in the transfer session) were excluded from further analyses. Correct RTs were 
submitted to 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Session (baseline vs. transfer) and 
stimulus–response  Correspondence  (corresponding  vs.  non-corresponding  trials)  as 
within-subjects  factors.  Fisher’s  LSD  post-hoc  test  was  also  conducted  on  significant 
interactions. 
The main effect of Correspondence was significant [F (1, 15) = 7.24, MSe = 136, p = 
.02]. Participants were faster in corresponding (M = 332 ms) than in non-corresponding 
(M = 340 ms) trials. The effect of Session did not reach significance [F (1, 15) = 0.01, 
MSe  =  671,  p  =  .98].  Most  important,  the  interaction  between  Session  and 
Correspondence  was  significant,  indicating  that  the  Simon  effect  differed  in  the  two 
sessions [F (1, 15) = 11.06, MSe = 42 , p < .01]. Data are shown in Figure 6.3. The 
Fisher’s LSD test revealed that the Simon effect observed in the baseline session was 
significant (13 ms), while a reduced and non significant effect (2 ms) was evident in the 
transfer session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  6.3  Study  3,  Experiment  7:  reaction  times  (ms)  for  the  baseline  and 
transfer sessions as a function of stimulus–response Correspondence. Error bars 
show standard errors of the means.   144 
6.3.3 Discussion 
The results of the Experiment 7 allow us to conclude that after a competitive practice 
task  the  joint  Simon  effect  emerged  in  the  baseline  session  disappears.  Hence,  a 
competitive  training  performed  jointly  with  another  person  seems  to  influence  the 
performance on a subsequent Simon task. 
 
6.4 Experiment 8 
Experiment  8  was  aimed  at  assessing  the  duration  of  the  practice  effect.  More 
specifically, we would evaluate whether the competitive practice used in Experiment 7 
modulates the joint Simon performance even when in the transfer session participants 
experienced the opposite condition. To this end, in the first session participants were 
required to perform a joint Simon task in a neutral condition, than to carry out a practice 
with a competitive joint Flanker task, and in the third session to complete a joint Simon 
task in a cooperative condition. This procedure can allow us to understand whether a 
competitive practice can only produce a short-lasting effect (i.e., whether a significant 
joint Simon effect emerges when participants are placed in a cooperative condition after a 
competitive practice) or whether a competitive practice can have a long-lasting effect on 
the participants’ performance (i.e., whether the joint Simon effect does not emerge even 
when participants experience a cooperative condition after a competitive practice). 
 
6.4.1 Methods 
6.4.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen  new  undergraduates  students  from  the  University  of  Modena  and  Reggio 
Emilia (3 males and 13 females) with a mean age of 22.3 years (age range: 20–27 years) 
took  part  in  the  Experiment  8  for  course  credits.  All  subjects  were  right-handed  and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All were naive as to the purpose of the   145 
experiment  and  gave  written  informed  consent.  Once  recruited,  they  were  randomly 
paired. 
 
6.4.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure  
Apparatus,  stimuli,  and  procedure  were  the  same  as  Experiment  7  except  for  the 
following. 
During the transfer session participants performed a joint Simon task in a cooperative 
condition instead of in a neutral one. More precisely, as in the Experiment 7, during the 
practice session participants performed a joint Flanker task in a competitive condition and 
they were told that the best performing participant, in terms of both speed and accuracy, 
would receive a five Euro reward. Instead, during the transfer session each couple of 
participants  performed  a  joint  Simon  task  in  a  cooperative  condition,  namely  in 
competition against the other couples, and it was told that the best performing couple, in 
terms of both speed and accuracy, would receive a ten Euro reward (five Euro to each 
participant). 
 
6.4.2 Results 
Data were treated as in previous experiments. Error trials (1 % in the baseline session 
and 1 % in the transfer session) were excluded from further analyses. Correct RTs were 
submitted to a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Session (baseline vs. transfer) and 
stimulus–response  Correspondence  (corresponding  vs.  non-corresponding  trials)  as 
within-subjects  factors.  Fisher’s  LSD  post-hoc  test  was  also  conducted  on  significant 
interactions. 
The  main  effects  of  Session  [F  (1,  15)  =  14.32,  MSe  =  704,  p  <  .01]  and 
Correspondence [F (1, 15) = 16.47, MSe = 115, p < .01] were significant. Participants 
were faster in the transfer (M = 341 ms) than in the baseline (M = 366 ms) session, and in   146 
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corresponding (M = 348 ms) than in non-corresponding (M = 359 ms) trials. Data are 
shown in Figure 6.4. As indicated by the lack of a significant interaction between the two 
factors [F (1, 15) = 3.07, MSe = 22, p = 0.10], the advantage for corresponding responses 
was evident in both sessions, with a 13-ms joint Simon effect in the baseline session and a 
9-ms effect in the transfer session. Even though the effect was numerically smaller in the 
third session than in the first one, this difference did not reach statistical significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.3 Discussion 
The results of the Experiment 8 showed that a significant joint Simon effect emerged 
when participants were placed in a cooperative condition after a competitive practice, thus 
indicating that a competitive practice produced a short-lasting effect. Indeed, while in the 
Experiment 7 we showed that a competitive practice influenced the performance on a 
subsequent  task  with  neutral  instruction  (i.e.,  the  joint  Simon  effect  was  null),  in the 
present experiment we demonstrated that a competitive training has not influence on a 
subsequent task with cooperative instruction (i.e., the joint Simon effect was present). 
 
Figure  6.4  Study  3,  Experiment  8:  reaction  times  (ms)  for  the  baseline  and 
transfer sessions as a function of stimulus–response Correspondence. Error bars 
show standard errors of the means.   147 
6.5 Comparison between Experiments 6, 7, and 8 
To  compare  the  magnitude  of  the  Simon  effect  in  the  different  experiments,  the 
correct  RTs  of  Experiment  6,  Experiment  7,  and  Experiment  8  were  entered  into  an 
ANOVA, with Session (baseline vs. transfer) as within-subjects factor and Experiment (6, 
7, and 8) as between-subjects factor. 
The main effects of Session [F (1, 45) = 13.99, MSe = 55, p < .001] was significant, 
showing that the joint Simon effect was significantly higher in the baseline session (M = 
13 ms) than in the transfer (M = 8 ms) session. Both the effect of Experiment [F (2, 45) = 
0.57, MSe = 387, p = 0.57] and the the interaction between Session and Experiment [F (2, 
15) = 3.01, MSe = 55, p = 0.06] did not reach significance (Figure 6.5). 
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6.6 General Discussion 
As  previously  stated  (see  Chapter  4),  there  is  growing  evidence  suggesting  that 
successful  joint  action  depends,  at  least  in  part,  on  the  ability  to  automatically  share 
representations (Tomasello et al., 2005; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). However, the view 
that shared representations are automatically created any time individuals act in a social 
Figure 6.5 Study 3, Comparison Experiments 6, 7, and 8: reaction times (ms) for 
joint Simon effect as a function of Session (baseline and transfer) and Experiment. 
Error bars show standard errors of the means. 
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context has been put in question by researches that demonstrate the influence of social 
factors on the emergence of such representations, as indexed by the joint Simon effect. 
The results of the Study 2, presented in the previous chapter, seem to be in line with this 
latter statement, as they showed that shared representations were not activated when an 
ingroup–outgroup distinction is created by means of negative interdependence and thus 
co-acting individuals compete one against the other (Experiment 5). 
The present study was aimed to extend our knowledge on the cognitive mechanisms 
at  the  basis  of  shared  representations  in  collaborative  and  competitive  contexts,  by 
focusing on whether and to what extent prior experience could modulate performance in 
task sharing. Using behavioural measures and combining two experimental paradigms, 
namely the joint Simon and the joint transfer-of-learning, it has been possible to test 
whether and what kind of prior practice modulates performance. To address this question, 
we assessed whether joint action, as indexed by the joint Simon effect, can be specifically 
influenced  by  different  kinds  of  previous  experienced  cooperative  and  competitive 
interdependence (Anelli et al., in preparation a). 
Our results demonstrate that the joint Simon effect was present after a non-spatial 
cooperative practice, namely a cooperative training performed jointly with another person 
did not modulate the performance on a subsequent Simon task. Thus, the emergence of 
shared representations was evident when participants were prior required to cooperate to 
achieve a common goal and their performance was positively interdependent (Experiment 
6). On the contrary, the joint Simon effect disappeared after a non-spatial competitive 
practice, namely a competitive training performed jointly with another person influenced 
the performance on a subsequent task, even if in this task participants received the explicit 
information that they are no longer in competition one against the other. Thus, shared 
representations  were  not  activated  when  co-acting  individuals  were  prior  required  to 
compete  one  against  the  other  and  their  performance  was  negatively  interdependent   149 
(Experiment 7). Taken together, these findings confirm the modulation of the perceived 
interdependence  on  shared  representations,  since  they  emerged  with  positive  and 
cooperative  interdependence  while  they  were  disrupted  by  negative  and  competitive 
interdependence.  It  should  be  noticed  that  the  specificity  of  the  reported  effect 
demonstrates  the  transfer  of  the  specific  type  of  relationship  and  of  the  specific 
instruction, and not the influence of any practice experienced jointly by two participants. 
Moreover, we can also rule out the influence on the performance in the transfer task of 
any spatial characteristics of the practice task, as it might happens with a spatial S–R 
correspondence task, since we chose a non-spatial practice task. These data are in line 
both with results of the Study 2 (Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in press a) and with 
evidence derived from social psychology (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969) reported in Chapter 
5. 
The novelty of this study consists in demonstrating the emergence of a “carry-over 
effect of competition”, of which there is evidence in social psychology (Sassenberg et al., 
2007), by combining two paradigms of cognitive psychology such as the joint Simon 
(Sebanz  et  al.  2003)  and  the  joint  transfer-of-learning  (Milanese  et  al.,  2010).  More 
specifically, by means of this innovative methodology we demonstrated the influence of 
this carry-over effect of competition on the emergence of shared representations. Instead, 
social psychology studies have shown that this effect well explains the increase in levels 
of prejudice towards an unrelated outgroup not involved in competition, after both the 
imagination  or  recollection  of  a  competition  from  memory  and  the  participation  in  a 
competition (Sassenberg et al., 2007). Notably, in our case the competition concerns two 
participants and not groups. 
Another relevant point of the present work is that, by using the joint Simon and the 
joint transfer-of-learning paradigms, we have investigated another aspect of this carry-
over  effect  of  competition,  namely  its  duration  (Experiment  8).  To  the  best  of  our   150 
knowledge, this element has never been measured before in the topic of joint action. 
Specifically, we wanted to explore whether, once established a competitive setting, the 
joint Simon effect did not emerge even though participants receive new instructions and 
experience a cooperative interaction, thus demonstrating that it was a long-lasting effect, 
or whether a competitive practice can only produce a short-lasting effect. Our results 
allow us to claim that the carry-over effect of competition has a short-lasting effect, since 
it  is  canceled  when  the  same  participants  experienced  a  cooperative  and  positive 
interaction. This finding is consistent with a theory presented above, namely the realistic 
group-conflict  theory  (Sherif,  1966;  Sherif  &  Sherif,  1969),  which  argues  that 
competition between two groups decrease only when intergroup cooperation is required to 
achieve a common goal. However, it must be noted that in our case there is a competition 
between two persons and not between two groups. Despite this difference, what should be 
emphasized is that the introduction of a common goal for both participants decreases 
competition in our study, leading to a cancellation of the carry-over effect of competition. 
This result can be well explained as follows: attitudes toward outgroup (or toward another 
participant, as in our case) are a reflection of the structural relationship between ingroup 
(self in our case) and outgroup (other participant in our case) goals or interest. In line with 
this explanation, evidence from social psychology studies showed that negative attitudes, 
intergroup hostility, low level of support, stereotypes, and prejudices emerge when there 
is a negative interdependence and the aims are incompatible (Sassenberg et al., 2007; for 
a review, see Riek et al., 2006). 
Our  findings  deserve  a  last  consideration.  The  short-lasting  carry-over  effect  of 
competition  is  also  consistent  with  some  conclusions  and  same  references  mentioned 
during the discussion of the Study 2. Namely, according to Tomasello et al. (2005) we 
can  argue  that  individuals  tend  for  their  nature  to  share  goals  and  intentions,  and  to 
cooperate  with  others,  and  according  to  Poortvliet  and  Darnon  (2010)  that  positive   151 
interdependence  can  increase  the  individuals’  intention  to  invest  in  the  interaction, 
allowing the emergence of shared representations. This intention is weakened in the case 
of competitive situations. 
To  conclude,  the  present  study  confirms  that  shared  representations  do  not 
automatically emerge every time individuals act in a social context, and that the tendency 
to integrate the others’ action into our own action system and to cooperate is quite strong.   152   153 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The present project has been conducted within the Social Cognition framework. The 
perspective  of  the  thesis  can  be  inscribed  in  the  area  of  cognitive  science  that  is 
undergoing an important shift, from the focus on the human abilities of individuals acting 
in isolation to the investigation of aspects of social understanding (Chapter 1). A crucial 
point  is  the  idea  that  action  observation  can  support  the  understanding  of  goals  and 
intentions,  as  claimed  by  different  theories,  namely  the  common  coding  theory  (e.g., 
Prinz,  1997),  the  motor  simulation  theory  (e.g.,  Jeannerod,  2003),  and  the  motor 
resonance theory (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Among the several topics of social 
cognition, my doctoral thesis was focused on motor resonance and joint action. These 
issues have been separately treated in the first (Chapter 2) and in the second (Chapter 4) 
part of the thesis, respectively, starting from a theoretical and empirical analysis to the 
experimental investigation in a series of experiments, conducted by using two effects of 
cognitive psychology, namely the affordance and Simon effects. 
 
The motor resonance topic has been investigated with the affordance effect in the 
Study 1 (Chapter 3; Anelli et al., in press b; Anelli et al., under review). In particular, two 
questions have been addressed in three experiments with a priming paradigm on adults 
and  school-age  children:  first,  how  motor  responses  to  objects  and  sensitivity  to  fine 
object characteristics (i.e. object typology and object category) develop, and second how 
motor resonance develops. 
As far as first point is concerned, I explored both the ability to differently perceive 
and process objects that can be potentially source of danger or pain for us (dangerous 
object) and objects that we can approach and interact without any risk (neutral object),   154 
and  the  ability  to  discriminate  between  artefact  and  natural  objects.  Results  clearly 
demonstrate  that  both  children  and  adults,  males  and  females,  are  sensitive  to  the 
difference between dangerous and neutral objects, since response times were slower with 
the  first  than  with  the  second.  This  finding  could  be  interpreted  as  due  to  two 
mechanisms,  an  interference  or  a  blocking  mechanism,  that  however  the  present  data 
cannot disentangle. Indeed, it is possible that even dangerous objects evoke affordances, 
as neutral ones, but that responses to them are slowed down due to the presence of a late 
occurring blocking mechanism. Alternatively, it is possible that dangerous objects, even if 
they are potentially graspable, do not elicit reaching or grasping actions toward the object, 
but that they rather evoke aversive affordances, due to the perception of their danger from 
very early processing phases. It can be proposed that only data on time course could allow 
us to clarify to what the delay with dangerous objects is due and whether affordances or 
aversive affordances are activated. However, some speculations are possible concerning 
the  different  underlying  neural  mechanisms.  The  slowdown  of  responses  can  be 
associated to an inhibition effect provoked by a selective attention mechanism or can be 
due to the threatening character of the stimuli (e.g., Algom et al., 2004). Another possible 
way  to  understand  the  mechanism  underlying  the  slowing  of  response  times  with 
dangerous stimuli compared to neutral ones is in terms of the mechanisms responsible for 
treating cognitive conflict. Considering the TRoPICAL model proposed by Caligiore and 
colleagues (2010, 2012), the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a double role, exerting both an 
inhibitory and an excitatory control. Since PFC can receive inputs from the emotional 
circuits, in the current study it may allow participants to inhibit the tendency to respond to 
affordances in case of dangerous objects. Alternatively, two different, separable circuits 
underlie cognitive and emotional conflict (e.g., Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008): a 
lateral PFC system devoted to resolving conflict non related to emotional stimuli, and a 
rostral anterior cingulate system devoted to resolving emotional conflict and associated   155 
with a top-down inhibition of the amygdala with emotional distractors. However, PFC 
would  have  also  an  impact  on  inhibition  related  emotional  stimuli  (Munakata  et  al., 
2011). 
Concerning the ability to discriminate between artefact and natural objects, a specific 
developmental  trajectory  emerged,  since  sensitivity  to  the  difference  between  objects 
categories starts to develop in children but appears clearly only in the adult-female group, 
since response times were faster with natural objects than with artefacts. Thus, even if the 
task requires to distinguish between artefacts and natural objects, at all ages participants 
respond differently to dangerous and neutral objects, but more fine-grained differences 
such  as  those  related  to  object  category  emerge  later.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the 
literature (Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio et al., 2008; Anelli et al., 2010) and could be due to 
the activation of both manipulative and functional information with artefacts, and only of 
manipulative information with natural objects. This study adds to previous results in the 
literature as it shows that participants respond differently to the two object typologies 
only when they dealt with neutral objects, while with dangerous objects the perception of 
their  danger  overcame  more  fine-grained  categorical  distinction.  It  remains  to  be 
explained why females responded differently to natural objects and artefacts, while males 
did not. 
As far as second point is concerned, in order to investigated how motor resonance 
develops, I explored whether both children and adults were sensitive to the affordances 
and the potential dangers offered by the objects in the environment to others, and whether 
a  general  resonance  or  a  more  fine-grained  motor  resonance  phenomenon  occurred. 
Results show an effect of primes that can reflect the existence of a resonant mechanism. 
Such mechanism seems to be already developed in children, but it could become more 
fine-tuned  with  age.  Indeed,  children  already  resonate  more  to  the  biological  (human 
hands) than to the non-biological (robot hand and brick) primes. This effect can be due to   156 
a higher motor resonance when the hand is similar to our own. To note, while a higher 
general resonance with biological than with non-biological stimuli is already present in 
children, they do not respond to gender differences of the hand primes. Results reveal that 
adults become more sensitive to fine-grained aspects of the biological stimuli, since male 
participants respond faster to grasping hands of their own gender, thus showing that they 
are aware of gender and postural differences in biological hands. Further investigation are 
necessary  to  clarify  why  the  gender-dependent  motor  resonance  and  the  ability  to 
distinguish  between  a  static  and  a  grasping  posture  are  not  present  with  women.  For 
example,  these  findings  could  be  due  to  an  effect  of  gender  stereotyping,  leading  to 
respond fast to man’s hand, or to the higher attention women pay to objects characteristics 
instead  than  to  action  characteristics,  so  explaining  the  females  more  fine-grained 
categorical  distinction  above  reported.  Some  hypotheses  are  possible  concerning  the 
different  underlying  neural  mechanisms.  Facilitation  with  prime  stimuli  that  might 
produce resonance and interference with dangerous compared to neutral object indicate 
that  observing  a  hand  in  a  given  posture  induces  participants  to  prepare  an  action, 
probably through the mediation of the mirror neurons. This action is prepared faster when 
the hand we observe is rather similar to our own. Such resonant effects is in line with the 
ideomotor theories (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001), according to which perceived 
events  and  actions  rely  on  the  same  representational  code.  For  this  reason,  the  more 
similar are the observed action and the performed action, the more motor responses would 
be facilitated. Once the motor response is prepared, however, it has to be adapted to a 
specific object. The absence of an interaction between prime and objects suggests that 
two different neural systems can be involved in an independent way: one activated by the 
action observation and possibly mediated by the mirror neurons, the other activated by the 
object  observation  and  possibly  mediated  by  the  canonical  neurons  (Rizzolatti  & 
Craighero, 2004). The absence of this integration could be due to the priming paradigm   157 
used, since in a recent study by Morrison et al. (2012), there is evidence of integration 
between action and object information. In particular, they showed that viewing grasping 
actions  toward  dangerous  objects  activates  the  post-central  sensorimotor  cortex  that 
integrates both object and action information in order to process the sensory outcomes of 
observed hand-object interaction. 
Overall,  this  study  is  the  first  that  investigates  how  sensitivity  to  dangerous  and 
neutral objects develops and the effects that these different objects can have on other 
organisms, and it provides the first evidence of resonant mechanism while interacting 
with dangerous objects. These represent the really original contributions of this research. 
 
The  second  main  issue  of  this  dissertation  concerned  joint  action  and  has  been 
investigated with the Simon effect both in the Study 2 and in the Study 3, starting from 
some findings which indicate the influence of social factors on the processes underlying 
joint actions and shared representation. 
Specifically the Study 2 (Chapter 5; Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in press a) assessed 
whether shared representations, as indexed by the presence of the joint Simon effect, are 
modulated by group membership. In particular, the Experiment 4 investigated the role of 
minimal ingroup–outgroup distinctions. I used a social psychology paradigm proposed by 
Tajfel  et  al.  (1971),  the  minimal  cues  manipulation,  and  participants  were  arbitrarily 
divided  in  two  groups,  to  measure  their  performance  when  a  joint  Simon  task  was 
executed by two individuals who belong to the same group or to a different group. Results 
clearly  show  that  shared  representations  emerge  even  when  participants  believe  to 
perform the task along with a member of a different group. The lack of difference in 
performance of participants belonging to two different categories suggests that a simple 
self-categorization condition is not sufficient to activate different strategies of interaction, 
on the basis of the sharing or not of the same categorical label with the partner during the   158 
joint Simon task, namely on the basis of perceiving themselves as part of the same or of a 
different group as a co-actor. 
Instead,  in  Experiment  5  a  more  complex  ingroup–outgroup  distinctions  was 
employed.  I started from the propose of Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) that a perceived 
positive  interdependence  is  the  precondition  for  group  formation  and  for  subsequent 
ingroup–outgroup  differentiation,  and  I  manipulated  the  role  of  experienced 
interdependence  between  participants.  Participants’  performance  in  a  joint  task  was 
measured when the goals of two jointly acting individuals were positively related and thus 
they had to cooperate, and when the goals were negatively related and thus individuals 
had to compete during the task. Results reveal that the activation of shared representations 
occurs only when individuals cooperate but not when they compete, thus demonstrating 
that joint actions are influenced by the type of interdependence between co-actors. 
Taken together, findings of Study 2 may contribute to a long-lasting debate on social 
psychology, between authors as Tajfel (1970) who claimed that social categorization is a 
sufficient antecedent of ingroup–outgroup distinction and of consequent ingroup-favoring 
discrimination, and others authors as Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) who raised questions 
about whether social categorization alone is sufficient for group formation and intergroup 
discrimination.  These  results,  showing  that  only  the  ingroup–outgroup  distinction 
produced  by  negative  interdependence  is  strong  enough  to  disrupt  the  emergence  of 
shared representations, favors the view that ingroup–outgroup discrimination processes 
are enhanced by perceived interdependence, according to Rabbie and Horwitz position. 
Even though these findings are at odd with the view that shared representations emerge 
automatically any time individuals act together in a social context, they suggest that the 
tendency to integrate the co-actor’s action into our own action system is quite strong, in 
line with literature (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2008). Indeed, the emergence of a 
joint Simon effect under both same group and different group conditions of Experiment 4,   159 
and the observation that it is of comparable magnitude under these two conditions and 
under the cooperative condition of Experiment 5 suggest that when acting in a social 
context,  by  default,  individuals  may  perceive  positive  interdependence  with  co-acting 
individuals, even when cooperation is not explicitly requested. 
Overall, the original contribution of this research consists in merging evidence and 
paradigms both of social and cognitive psychology to demonstrate the influence of social 
factors on the processes underlying joint actions and shared representation. 
The Study 3 (Chapter 6; Anelli et al., in preparation a) was strictly related to the 
previous  investigation,  as  it  was  aimed  at  extending  knowledge  on  the  cognitive 
mechanisms at the basis of shared representations. More precisely, it was further assessed 
whether shared representations are modulated by group membership, in particular by the 
interdependence experienced by two individuals, combining two paradigms of cognitive 
psychology, the joint Simon and the joint transfer-of-learning. In particular, first of all the 
research investigated whether performing a cooperative (Experiment 6) or a competitive 
(Experiment 7) joint practice task influences the way a subsequent task is executed. To 
this  aim,  participants’  performance  was  measured  and  compared  before  and  after  the 
introduction of a condition of interdependence. Results demonstrate the emergence of 
shared representations when participants were prior required to cooperate to achieve a 
common  goal  and  their  performance  was  positively  interdependent  (Experiment  6), 
whereas shared representations are not activated when participants were prior required to 
compete  one  against  the  other  and  their  performance  was  negatively  interdependent 
(Experiment  7).  On  the  whole,  these  data  confirm  the  modulation  of  the  perceived 
interdependence on shared representations. The specificity of the reported effect which 
emerges only in the competitive condition, and thus it can be defined as a carry-over 
effect of competition, demonstrates the transfer of the specific type of relationship and of 
the specific instruction. This allow to exclude that the effect can be due to the influence of   160 
any practice experienced jointly by two participants or to spatial characteristics of the 
practice task, since a non-spatial practice task was chosen. These data are in line both 
with results of Study 2 (Iani et al., 2011; Anelli et al., in press a) and with evidence 
derived from social psychology (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). 
As  second  relevant  point,  the  Study  3  investigated  the  duration  of  the  carry-over 
effect  of  competition  (Experiment  8).  Specifically,  I  explored  whether  a  competitive 
practice can produce a long-lasting or a short-lasting effect. Results allow to claim that 
the carry-over effect of competition has a short-lasting, since it is canceled and leads to 
the  emergence  of  shared  representation  when  the  same  participants  experience  a 
cooperative and positive interaction after a competitive practice. 
On  the  whole,  the  original  contribution  of  Study  3  is  the  demonstration  of  the 
influence  of  this  carry-over  effect  of  competition  on  the  emergence  of  shared 
representation, to date an effect only reported in social psychology researches to explain 
the  increase  in  levels  of  prejudice  towards  an  unrelated  outgroup,  after  both  the 
imagination or recollection of a competition from memory and the real participation in a 
competition  (Sassenberg  et  al.,  2007).  Moreover,  the  short  duration  of  the  carry-over 
effect of competition is consistent with the realistic group-conflict theory (e.g., Sherif & 
Sherif,  1969)  which  argues  that  competition  between  two  groups  decrease  when 
intergroup cooperation is required to achieve a common goal. 
Taken  together,  findings  of  Study  2  and  of  Study  3  demonstrate  that  shared 
representations do not automatically emerge every time individuals act in a social context, 
but that the tendency to integrate the others’ action into our own action system and to 
cooperate  is  quite  strong,  as  co-representations  emerge  even  when  cooperation  is  not 
explicitly requested and as soon as a cooperation becomes necessary to attain a common 
goal.  This  result  is  consistent  with  Tomasello  and  colleagues  (2005)  who  argue  that 
human  beings  are  inclined  to  share  goals  and  intentions.  The  authors  analyzed  what   161 
makes human cognition so unique in the animal kingdom, by creating the possibility of 
culture  and  cultural  evolution.  They  claimed  that  what  makes  the  difference  is  not 
language  nor  theory  of  mind  nor  difference  in  sociality  between  humans  and  other 
animals, but the adaptation for participating in collaborative activities involving shared 
intentionality. This fundamental human ability requires selection during human evolution 
process both for skills of others’ intentions reading and for motivation to share intentions 
and  cooperate  with  others.  Finally,  as  claimed  by  Poortvliet  and  Darnon  (2010)  the 
perception of positive interdependence situation may enhance the willingness to invest in 
the  interaction,  thus  facilitating  the  emergence  of  shared  representations,  whereas  in 
competitive situations individuals may be blocked in integrating self and other’s action 
due to their less willingness to coordinate their efforts, to depend on, and to be influenced 
by the other’s actions. 
 
To conclude, several experimental evidence has been reported in this doctoral thesis 
concerning both motor resonance and join action. These results widely extend previous 
ones reviewed in my work, as they show resonant mechanisms when interacting with 
dangerous objects (Study 1) and modulation of social factors on the emergence of shared 
representation during joint actions (Studies 2 and 3). Certainly, further  researches  are 
necessary in order to investigate in deep these complex issues and to better understand the 
neural  mechanisms  underlying  these  behavioral  effects.  On  the  whole,  the  original 
contribution of these studies is represented by the application of cognitive psychology 
methodologies in the investigation of relevant topics within the Social Cognition research.   162   163 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Study-sample: experimental stimuli, 24 objects. 
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Appendix B. Study 1: experimental stimuli. 
 
B.1 Experiment 1, 2, and 3: 16 objects. 
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B.2 Experiment 1: 6 primes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Grasping hand of a female child 
 
 
Grasping hand of a male child  
 
 
 
Static hand of a female child 
 
 
Static hand of a male child 
  
 
 
Grasping hand of a robot 
 
 
Control stimulus (brick) 
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B.3 Experiments 2 and 3: 6 primes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Grasping hand of a female adult 
 
 
 
Grasping hand of a male  adult 
 
 
 
Static hand of a female  adult 
 
 
 
Static hand of a male  adult 
 
  
 
Grasping hand of a robot 
 
 
Control stimulus (brick) 
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Appendix C. Study 2: first cognitive task. 
 
 
BETULLA 
                IPPOCASTANO 
GATTO 
                ACCETTA 
PINZA 
                CONIGLIO 
MARTELLO 
                BADILE 
TARTARUGA   
                FORBICI 
PINO    
                CIPRESSO 
SALICE 
                MUCCA 
CANE           172 
Appendix D. Study 2: second cognitive task. 
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Appendix E. Study 2: post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
Conoscevo già il mio compagno:  
￿ sì 
￿ no 
 
Se sì, qual è il grado di conoscenza: 
￿ l’ho visto una volta 
￿ l’ho visto alcune volte  
￿ lo vedo sempre 
￿ siamo compagni di corso 
￿ siamo amici 
 
La situazione è stata: 
Facile     ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿      Difficile 
Piacevole    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿      Spiacevole 
Positiva    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿      Negativa 
Competitiva  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿      Non competitiva 
 
La mia prestazione è stata molto simile a quella del mio compagno: 
Completamente d’accordo    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿    Completamente in disaccordo  
 
Se sei in disaccordo, scegli una delle seguenti opzioni: 
￿  la mia prestazione è stata migliore 
￿  la sua prestazione è stata migliore   174 
Appendix F. Study 3: joint Flanker task stimuli. 
 
 
  STIMULUS TYPES 
 
TARGETS 
 
 
Identical 
 
 
Compatible 
 
 
Incompatible 
 
Neutral 
 
H 
 
HHHHH 
(Hid) 
KKHKK 
(Hcomp) 
SSHSS 
(Hinc) 
UUHUU 
(Hneu) 
 
K 
 
KKKKK  
(Kid) 
HHKHH 
(Kcomp) 
CCKCC 
(Kinc) 
UUKUU 
(Kneu) 
 
S 
 
SSSSS 
(Sid) 
CCSCC 
(Scomp) 
KKSKK 
(Sinc) 
UUSUU 
(Sneu) 
 
C 
 
CCCCC 
(Cid) 
SSCSS 
(Ccomp) 
HHCHH 
(Cinc) 
UUCUU 
(Cneu) 
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